While attention mostly falls upon China’s inroads into Central Asia’s economic and security spheres, so undercutting Russia, India has emerged as a new seller of weapons as the region diversifies its military procurement.
In early October, Indian Defense Secretary Rajesh Kumar Singh confirmed that India had exported its domestically developed Akash air-defense system to Tajikistan. The system can intercept aircraft, helicopters, and drones at ranges of up to approximately 25 km (16 miles). New Delhi also confirmed the export of the same system to Turkmenistan, which had previously been reliant on Russian- and Chinese-origin air-defense equipment.
Cooperation has also expanded in other security fields. In September-October, India and Kazakhstan held the Kazind-2026 joint military exercise involving approximately 60 military personnel from each country. This followed the India-Uzbekistan exercises, Dustlik-2026, held in April and a similar drill held with Kyrgyzstan.
India has likewise stepped up security coordination and counterterrorism efforts, military-technical consultations, and intelligence-related cooperation with Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. The India-Central Asia foreign ministers’ security dialogue held in June 2025 in New Delhi reaffirmed cooperation against terrorism, terrorist financing, arms trafficking, and narcotics trafficking.
India’s inroads matter. It signals a general shift in Central Asia’s military procurement away from a heavy dependence on Russia, which likes to regard the region as its backyard.
India is not the only actor Central Asian countries are turning to. China, for example, has in the past few years expanded its position in the region by selling Chengdu J-10CE jets to Uzbekistan, the second country to take delivery after Pakistan. Kazakhstan is also reportedly interested in purchasing six K-8W light-combat aircraft from China. There is also Turkey with its compact drones that have become increasingly attractive for Central Asian countries following their performance in the wars for Nagorno-Karabakh, and amid the ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and Iran.
Although Indian arms sales to Central Asia remain relatively modest, the growing presence of Chinese weaponry in the region points to a potentially significant long-term shift in the regional balance of power. Since the 1990s, Russia has served as the predominant military and security partner for Central Asian states, a position reflected in its extensive network of military bases, bilateral defense agreements, and multilateral security arrangements.
Russian domination of Central Asia’s military procurement began to change in the early 2020s, particularly following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The prolonged conflict has placed considerable strain on Russia’s military-industrial capacity, limiting Moscow’s ability to meet the defense requirements of its traditional partners.
Russia has consequently faced growing difficulties in fulfilling arms orders and supplying military equipment to allies and partners, including Belarus, Armenia, and several Central Asian states.
These constraints have prompted Central Asian governments to diversify military procurement, creating new opportunities for India to expand its defense exports and strengthen security cooperation across the five republics. Although Russia remains an important military partner, India’s growing role and that of China could gradually erode Moscow’s position.
More importantly, the implications of this trend extend beyond the immediate sale of military equipment. The acquisition of Indian weapons systems creates longer-term technological and logistical ties, as recipient countries will require Indian expertise, spare parts, maintenance services, technical training, and modernization support. Over time, these dependencies could translate into deeper institutional ties between Indian defense industries and Central Asian armed forces.
Seen from a wider perspective, India’s military outreach to Central Asia is part of New Delhi’s search for more active relations with the region. The engagement increasingly consists of developing regional trade routes (especially on the north-south axis), bilateral commerce, investments into critical infrastructure and cooperation on potential security spillover from Afghanistan, all of them exemplified in the visits made by Indian prime minister Narendra Modi to Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan earlier this year.
New Delhi and Tashkent elevated their relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership and agreed to work on connectivity, education and, most of all, critical minerals.
Indian weaponry, coupled with that of other non-traditional suppliers, creates a qualitatively different balance of power in Central Asia. What currently appears to be a relatively limited expansion of Indian arms exports could eventually become an important driver of a broader redistribution of military and security influence in Central Asia, gradually challenging Moscow’s and, to a certain extent, Beijing’s influence in the region.
Emil Avdaliani is a research fellow at the Turan Research Center and a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia. His research focuses on the history of silk roads and the interests of great powers in the Middle East and the Caucasus.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
