When a secure Starlink satellite facility outside Sofia was set ablaze in October, the Bulgarian government remained silent. It took an opposition lawmaker’s leak to reveal a major security breach that had paralyzed a critical piece of allied infrastructure routing battlefield communications for Ukraine’s defenders.

Questions then arose not just about who was behind the attack (likely Russia) but why Bulgaria’s Kremlin-friendly government had been so reticent to make the attack public and explain who might be behind it.

Starlink facilities were also targeted by saboteurs in Poland and Lithuania, both of which instantly sounded the alarm, publicly decrying the attacks and attributing them to Russia. It is possible to conclude that Bulgaria’s tight-lipped response illustrates a front-line NATO nation still paralyzed by the prospect of naming its primary geopolitical adversary.

Sofia’s politically driven reluctance to expose or confront Moscow is the latest iteration of a decades-long systemic weakness. From the stalled investigations into the 2015 poisoning of arms manufacturer Emilian Gebrev and repeated arson at his weapon depots, to today’s muted responses regarding Black Sea drone strikes against merchant vessels in the Black Sea, and Starlink sabotage, the Bulgarian state consistently treats Russian subversion not as a national security threat to be neutralized, but as a political crisis to be managed through denial and the occasional cover up.

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By imposing on itself an unrealistic threshold of “irrefutable proof” before naming the Kremlin, Sofia effectively aides Moscow’s strategy of plausible deniability. This creates a dangerous strategic vulnerability on NATO’s eastern flank that divides the alliance, weakens regional deterrence, and invites Russian aggression. Allies can quite reasonably suspect that Bulgaria’s ruling politicians are pulling their punches from some misplaced sense of Slavic solidarity. It is reasonable to say that the 19th century belief in “Russia the liberator” has yet to be replaced by the 21st century notion of Russia the saboteur.

This current posture of executive silence mirrors a long-standing and dangerous institutional reflex.

The blueprint for Sofia’s systematic foot-dragging was laid bare following Gebrev’s Novichok-style poisoning and a series of unexplained explosions at his EMCO weapon depots. For years, Bulgarian prosecutors and intelligence agencies buried the case, choosing to drop the investigation entirely rather than trace the clear path leading to the Kremlin’s elite sabotage squad, Unit 29155.

It was only after intense British intelligence pressure following the 2018 Salisbury poisonings that Sofia was cornered into acknowledging Russian involvement. Reflecting on this institutional failure, former Bulgarian President Rosen Plevneliev offered a candid admission to The New York Times: “Anytime it’s linked to something with Russia, Bulgarian intelligence is very impotent,” adding that the security apparatus “is not willing to counter Russian intelligence and hybrid warfare.”

Today, this engineered impotence persists. Following a relentless wave of air and sea drone strikes on commercial cargo vessels in the Black Sea, including the sinkings of the Alfa Watan and the HS Dignity within Bulgaria’s exclusive economic zone, the geopolitical rift between Sofia and its Western allies widened into a public chasm.

In Brussels, EU leaders at the European Council summit squarely blamed Moscow. Yet, arriving at the exact same summit, Prime Minister Radev broke ranks. Adhering strictly to a policy of strategic ambiguity, he told reporters that Bulgaria possessed “no solid evidence” of Russian culpability. Although he admitted that “logic suggests” the attacks “benefit the Russian Federation,” he insisted “we don’t have any solid evidence that the drones were Russia’s.”

Compelled by the reformist opposition parties to hold an emergency parliamentary hearing of the nation’s security chiefs and facing potential regional isolation, the Radev administration was forced into a series of reactive, face-saving concessions. To quiet critics, Sofia joined forces with Romania and Turkey to propose an emergency EU-backed moratorium on drone strikes against civilian shipping.

More telling still was the collapse of Radev’s self-reliance narrative: within days of claiming it lacked proof of an aggressor, Bulgaria formally requested that NATO urgently deploy combat aircraft and counter-drone systems to protect its sovereign waters. While the Bulgarian government initially declined to join NATO’s anti-drone initiative, it changed its mind following pressure from the opposition and the European Parliament. This stark reversal from defensive denial to emergency appeals for allied hardware show that the Bulgarian government wakes up to its security realities only when the political cost of protecting Moscow’s deniability becomes too high to bear.

Demanding court-room ready proof for acts of shadow warfare before attributing responsibility to Moscow aligns precisely with the Kremlin’s tactical calculus. Russia’s overarching goal in the gray zone is to maintain plausible deniability, allowing it to inflict strategic costs on the West without crossing red lines.

To achieve this, Moscow increasingly relies on local criminal syndicates, radicalized individuals, and third-country nationals to execute sabotage attacks like the Starlink arson. By laundering state-sponsored warfare through ordinary criminality, Russia purposefully builds an evidentiary buffer designed to paralyze risk-averse or Kremlin-friendly governments.

Radev’s administration actively rewards this strategy by treating the lack of courtroom-ready evidence as a political license for inaction. Moreover, Bulgaria’s cautious reactions have not

led to de-escalation – such responses merely signal to the Kremlin who the weakest link is and that NATO’s eastern flank might find it difficult to act collectively.

To break this cycle of engineered paralysis, Sofia’s allies must fundamentally reframe their engagement with her. First, they should remind the Bulgarian government that political attribution is not a judicial conviction – waiting for flawless forensic proof before naming the adversary effectively grants Russia a veto over NATO’s security decisions.

Second, the alliance can no longer treat the Bulgarian executive branch as a reliable or unified gatekeeper for regional security. Instead, NATO must significantly improve coordination with Bulgaria’s reformist political parties and parliamentary factions. These domestic reformists possess the legislative levers and political will to aggressively highlight the issue.

By using parliamentary oversight, pointing to suppressed intelligence, and forcing emergency security hearings, these factions are the only forces capable of driving a wedge between Radev and his pro-Russian base.

For the alliance, empowering these internal democratic counterweights is no longer a matter of domestic Bulgarian politics. It is a vital geopolitical necessity to shore up the vulnerabilities in the collective defense of the eastern flank.

Dessie Zagorcheva holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from Columbia University. She specializes in international security with a focus on Russia and Eastern Europe. Her current research examines NATO’s response to Russian sharp power.  

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.

Illustration: An defense technology assembly diagram of a LUCAS drone. Credit: Sara Boyer/Center for European Policy Analysis.
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