On Good Friday, Germany’s Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul revived a debate that should have been settled when Russia first invaded Ukraine: how can the European Union (EU) act decisively in times of crisis?
Russia, China, and increasingly the United States are raising the stakes; the EU needs to get its act together. Wadephul’s solution, to move from unanimity to qualified majority in foreign policy decisions, is sound, but not novel.
Few would argue that a country the size of Cyprus should have the power to veto decisions agreed by the 26 other members to determine whether the EU has a future in a geopolitical era. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán is the most prominent pyromaniac, but certainly not the only one who sees the value of using the veto as leverage over Brussels, Berlin, and Paris. He will be out of office in the coming weeks, but the issue of unanimity stands. The question remains how to get EU member states to surrender their veto. On this, Germany must provide an answer.
Germany must lead in this debate because unanimity is also insurance against German power and the dilemma of a country “too big for Europe, too small for the world.” Chancellor Friedrich Merz promised German leadership to build the continent’s strongest conventional army and deter Russia, but he did little to assuage fears of German dominance over its neighbors. Some might retort that Poland’s Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski argued that he fears German power less than German inactivity. He clarified, however, that this applied for “as long as Germany is in the EU and NATO.”
And others are more skeptical: smaller countries, among them the Baltics, Austria, and Slovakia, remain wary of giving up their veto power. There is strong demand in Europe for Germany to step up, but also a serious concern that Berlin might step over its neighbors.
Before asking others to give up the veto, the Merz government must define what acceptable German leadership looks like. That debate should happen first within the Cabinet, then with the German public, and finally with its neighbors. So far, there is little sign that Berlin is seriously wrestling with the question.
Qualified majority voting would give larger member states greater influence over the EU’s foreign and security policy, but with great power comes great responsibility. The US maintained its influence over the continent not by size alone, but by carrying the burden of security and prosperity. For decades, Germans have renounced the traditional means of power that true leadership requires. Instead, they idolized moral absolutes and the virtues of being a “civilian power,” which birthed the infamous policy of Wandel durch Handel (change through trade) with Russia.
If Germany is sincere about its ambitions to take responsibility for Europe, it must become more comfortable with the language and the use of power to deter, coerce, and secure European interests through diplomacy, geoeconomics, and credible military defense. The evolution of its aid to Ukraine, from an initial 5,000 helmets to tens of billions of euros in financial, humanitarian, and military assistance, is a promising sign; its response to Greenland and Iran has been less impressive. Germany must be consistent in its positions and show that it understands power — the ability to make difficult choices without the luxury of avoiding them. Only then will Germany’s neighbors be willing to entrust their security to it.
The disconnect between Germany’s aspirations and reality is twofold: on the one hand, there is a lack of credibility regarding its willingness to lead and to bear the costs. On the other hand, there is a lack of reassurance that leadership will not amount to dominance.
In Foreign Affairs, Liana Fix proposed a set of “golden handcuffs” to allay concerns about the latter. She rightly points out that the history of European integration is full of trade-offs that allowed Germany to accumulate power in exchange for being constrained by European institutions. Fiscal integration, common debt, and a consolidation of the continent’s defense industry are certainly means to align Germany’s interests with those of the EU. The Merz government should seriously consider these steps, as they are a small but necessary price to pay to make the EU a stronger geopolitical actor.
Short of raising the white flag, the alternative is to double down on coalitions of the willing, which provide flexibility to act when crises arise. They have been successful on several issues, including organizing Ukraine aid to bypass Hungary’s veto. But while such groupings are helpful in the short-term, they risk undermining the EU in the long run. If consequential decisions are made outside EU structures and lead to institutional or political lock-ins, the European project loses its purpose, hollowing out the EU from within.
Germany must communicate what it wants and what it is willing to give in return.
Jurek Wille is a master’s student at Johns Hopkins SAIS in Washington, DC. He previously worked at Germany’s Federal Ministry of Defense.
Friedrich Conradi is a German journalist and master’s student in international relations at Johns Hopkins University in Washington, DC.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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