President Donald Trump’s anger at European capitals over their lack of support for the US-Israeli war on Iran, and his repeated warning that Washington may pull out of NATO, leaves the continent facing a worrying dilemma.
It needs an urgent reset, even as the political and financial troubles of France and the UK — traditionally Europe’s two defense heavyweights — are causing deep concern.
The reluctance of London to raise defense spending at the necessary speed, alongside the Europe-wide growth of populist parties that are at best ambivalent about the threat from Moscow, means the continent could find itself outgunned and poorly prepared.
European nations would prefer to hold on to NATO, with its command structures and systems painstakingly built over 70 years, but Washington’s apparent rejection of Atlanticism is forcing an urgent rethink.
The European Union also wants to take a growing role in defense and security, but its inability to act at speed, exacerbated by voting systems that allow Kremlin-friendly states to throw sand in the gears, is disabling its response.
The combined risk has created the need for a security apparatus that does not buckle under American ambiguity or populist ties to Moscow.
The formation of a European Security Council, separate from the EU, could open the way to a stronger defensive posture and improved coordination. Based on a similar proposal made by France and Germany in 2018, it could help remedy the current lack of decisiveness and unity.
The council could have a rotating membership, with a seat for each of the regions of Europe (Western, Southern, Nordic, Eastern, Baltic, and Balkan), and could make decisions by majority, avoiding the consensus voting that paralyzes the EU.
It would be vital for countries from across the continent to be included, as Russia’s hybrid threat does not stop at EU or NATO member states. History has shown Moscow tends to target countries seeking to build closer relations with the West, such as Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova.
“An effective European Security Council must include all of Europe’s security contributors,” said Arthur de Liedekerke, a fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) and a senior director at Rasmussen Global.
“Ukraine and Norway, for instance, would be net providers rather than passive beneficiaries,” he said. “Kyiv brings four years of frontline combat against Russia and unmatched experience in modern warfare, while Oslo has advanced military capabilities and vital expertise in Arctic operations, an increasingly important theatre for European security.”
Moldova could offer experience of Russian informational and cognitive warfare, while Balkan countries could add defense-industrial depth, especially in ammunition production, he added.
Regional rotating memberships on the council would encourage burden-sharing. Inevitably, the biggest defense spenders (Germany, France, the UK, and Poland) would argue for permanent seats, but the risk of political shifts or rogue actors jeopardizing defense commitments could undermine deterrence, allowing an opportunistic opponent to call the bluff on collective defense.
While Central and Eastern Europe and the Nordic states have long known the threat from Russia, and are preparing as the first line of defense in a greater conflict, there is clear evidence that NATO and Western European governments have failed to adapt to the rapid pace of change shown by the war in Ukraine.
At Hedgehog 2025 and REPMUS/Dynamic Messenger, two NATO training exercises, Ukrainian forces inflicted serious damage on their NATO counterparts despite having fewer personnel and less equipment. The lessons learned indicate a critical lack of preparedness for modern warfare among their allies.
Ukraine has skillfully integrated unmanned systems on all fronts, pairing them with accurate battle management systems to enable shorter detection-to-strike times. This allowed smaller units to locate and engage targets faster than their Western counterparts could respond.
The exercises demonstrated that the speed and lethality of drone warfare are poorly understood in Western commands (including the US, which has suffered some significant blows from Iranian attacks this year). By rotating regional representation, states such as Ukraine, which is more attuned to this technological frontier, could ensure its lessons are integrated into European planning.
The concept of regional membership of the Council could also help mitigate the threat of rogue European states driven by Kremlin-friendly populists.
Before his historic defeat in April, Hungary’s Viktor Orbán leveraged EU rules on decision-making by consensus to delay aid packages to Ukraine and block sanctions through procedural obstruction. Slovakia’s Robert Fico has also echoed Kremlin talking points while resisting military support to Kyiv.
A Rassemblement National government in France or Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) coalition in Germany might be expected to adopt a similar posture, with far greater capacity for obstruction.
One cannot simply hope that Europe will outlive populist far-right governments; it should plan around them instead. As a result, a European Security Council should not have permanent seats, in case a valuable member goes rogue, or consensus voting, to prevent misaligned actors from blocking action.
Instead, it should have two-year rotating regional memberships with a two-thirds supermajority voting mechanism. This would help overcome the indecision that has tarnished Europe’s deterrence and global positioning for decades.
It is a weakness that Vladimir Putin has exploited before, in 2008, 2014, and 2022, when European hesitancy confirmed to him that the continent’s collective will collapses under pressure, and he will not hesitate to exploit it again.
A European Security Council could reverse this negative trend.
Europe does not lack the military weight or the economic power to matter on the world stage; it lacks the institutional spine. Building that spine now, before the next crisis, is the only responsible choice.
Niccolò Comini is an independent researcher. He writes about Italian politics and foreign policy, and has been published on CEPA’s Europe’s Edge, Foreign Policy, and The National Interest.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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