Unless NATO gets serious about closing the gaps in its deterrence, Russia may be tempted to test its resolve. There are currently serious shortfalls, which can be organized under three areas.
Defense Plans:
The first gap concerns regional defense plans, which detail how NATO is supposed to provide reinforcements in case of war with Russia.
While their content is classified, reports suggest NATO plans for US reinforcements to arrive at ports in Western Europe, primarily Rotterdam, and move to the eastern border through designated land corridors.
The new members, Sweden and Finland, would be reinforced through Norway, with Italy and Greece also assigned a role.
The plans underline NATO’s continued overwhelming dependency on the United States. A greater European defense responsibility is essential to preserve alliance cohesion, given questions about the US commitment, Donald Trump’s possible re-election, and China’s geostrategic pull for US resources.
This is a self-imposed weakness. Ports like Rotterdam and the entire logistical chain reaching hundreds of miles to the east are — as has become clear during the war against Ukraine — vulnerable to numerous forms of attack.
This would be changed if European allies accepted that they should provide the lion’s share of its conventional fighting forces in the years to come. This would take time but, meanwhile, Europeans should accelerate infrastructure quality (including bridges, roads, and rail systems) for the swift transportation of large amounts of troops and heavy equipment to the eastern flank.
Air and Missile Defense:
The second issue is improving NATO’s integrated air and missile defense. This was spelled out in strong wording at NATO’s Vilnius Summit in 2023, which noted the need for a rotational presence focused on the eastern border to compensate for NATO’s serious shortage in air defense weaponry. According to sources involved in NATO defense planning, the alliance today remains unable to muster more than 5% of the air defense capacity necessary to protect Central and Eastern Europe against a full-scale attack.
Russia’s use of missiles, drones, and glide bombs against Ukrainian cities and energy grids adds urgency to NATO’s investment. It is also a liability for its defense plans because it leaves alliance ports and land corridors vulnerable to attack.
At the recent Washington Summit, the alliance announced a US ballistic missile defense site in Poland, but the fact is that it will take years to reacquire a proper capability to fend off simple drones and sophisticated hypersonic missiles after decades of underinvestment in countering aerial threats.
Reaction Forces:
The third gap relates to NATO’s reaction forces, starting with shortcomings in deployment.
Assessing the real level of troop readiness against the requirements of the regional plans calls for more rigorous verification, such as snap exercises and unannounced inspections. Moreover, the entry of Sweden and Finland requires adjustment to NATO’s operational command and control for the Baltic area. The current plan is to have Norfolk (United States) cover Norway, Sweden, and Finland and Brunssum (the Netherlands) cover the Baltic States, Poland, and Germany. The obstacle is hardly insurmountable, but NATO obviously needs a unified operational system for its defense in the Baltic area.
NATO must also address shortages of deployed units on the border with Russia. The as-yet incomplete basing of a German brigade in Lithuania, a Canadian-led brigade in Latvia, a British-led battalion in Estonia, and the newly announced land force presence in Finland are clear steps forward, but they do not close the disparity in forces relative to Russian and Belarusian forces in the region. Deterrence by denial ideally requires a 1:2 ratio with troops adequately equipped with armor, artillery, and ammunition to prepare for Ukraine-style warfare.
Ahead of the 2025 NATO Summit in The Hague, allies will have to link continuing discussions about allied defense expenditure to the military requirements for a credible deterrence of Russia.
This will need to include an assessment of defense-industrial production increases that also take into account the need to supply Ukraine.
NATO allies should get accustomed to an aggressive and unpredictable Russia that will only back off when met with superior strength; peace is best assured by preparing for war.
Henrik Larsen, PhD, is a Non-Resident Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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