It is courting season in the South Caucasus. As Western influence declines in Georgia and Azerbaijan, these two key countries are looking elsewhere to hedge their bets. The results may turn out to be profound.
Azerbaijan has just applied for membership in BRICS, an entity that initially consisted of Russia, China, Brazil, South Africa, and India, but recently expanded with the addition of a few African and Middle Eastern countries.
Now known as the BRICS+, the grouping seems to have little to unify it beyond a vision of a multipolar world, which means a world less influenced by the West. Initially created — by a Goldman Sachs analyst, at least as an acronym — the grouping has been stronger on shared grievance than shared policy.
Even so, it has a wide appeal much like the Non-Aligned Movement in the Cold War; countries like Azerbaijan, with its energy wealth and dismissal of human rights, see a joint interest with states like China and Russia. It has also applied for a bigger role (to become a so-called dialogue partner from its current observer status) within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Chinese-dominated multilateral entity that was initially focused on Central Asia. As with the BRICS expansion, the SCO’s new ambitions are Chinese-driven, while Russia, India, and others playing along.
Deals with China generally come with bells attached, and this was no different. “Win-Win“ Xi Jinping’s government pledged to develop infrastructure projects with Azerbaijan as part of the strategic partnership that the two countries agreed upon in July. It also hopes for Chinese investment in manufacturing. Increasingly, cooperation with China is not only beneficial economically but also comfortable from a purely political point of view. Azerbaijan, flush with victory over Armenia last year and aware that the European Union (EU) is dependent on its gas, clearly feels able to pursue its own interests in its own way.
Simultaneously, Azerbaijan is pushing for the completion of a rapprochement with Iran after years of strained relations, which reached a nadir with the attack on the Azeri embassy in Tehran in early 2023. The reconciliation continued despite the election of a new Iranian president and Israel’s traditionally close ties with Baku, which has served as a powerful irritant for the Islamic Republic.
Georgia too has made major shifts in its foreign policy. Its attempts to build a so-called multi-vector approach involve a particular focus on strengthening foreign ties with the Middle East and Asian countries. Two recent visits by the Georgian premier to Tehran testify to this change and are especially notable given Georgia’s previously close links with the West that were crippled by the passage of the foreign agents law, derided by opponents as the “Russia law” when passed earlier this year. The Georgian government has also expanded its ties with China with the strategic partnership signed in July 2023.
There is a clear logic in getting closer to the Eurasian powers and multilateral institutions. First, it is about economic and investment opportunities. China has cash and is ready to invest in critical infrastructure sectors such as ports and railways. For instance, a Chinese consortium will build a deep sea port in Anaklia located on Georgia’s Black Sea coast, which aims at evolving into a hub within the expanding Middle Corridor, a route connecting the EU and Turkey with Central Asia and China. Beijing also looks at Azerbaijan’s Caspian coast for investments, along with the railway and pipeline infrastructure that runs across the South Caucasus to Turkey.
This has its own economic logic, of course. But it also marks a clear political statement that the South Caucasian states are not dependent on the West for money or political approval. Azerbaijan has long been regarded as an outlier, with a much-criticized human rights record and no desire to join Western clubs.
The more radical departure is Georgia’s. Less than a year after the EU granted membership status, the government is now close to an open rift. A pledge to abolish opposition parties should it win October’s election is a statement of just how little it cares.
Washington and Brussels have already suggested a complete re-evaluation of bilateral relations is underway, large parts of financial aid from the US and EU to Georgia has been stopped, and NATO, for the first time since the 2008 Bucharest summit, avoided mentioning Georgia’s aspirations. The EU has said it may stop Tbilisi’s membership bid officially, and perhaps even abolish the visa-free regime.
Taken together, this may amount to much more than flirting with the West’s rivals. Firstly, as mentioned, the West relies on Azeri energy and Georgian trade routes for Central Asian energy supplies. In other words, there is room for relations to deteriorate if relations worsen.
Secondly, the South Caucasus has grown geopolitically congested. There remains the long-standing Western-Russia competition prevalent since the early 1990s, but now, too, other influential countries such as China, Iran, the Gulf states, and India are becoming involved.
Quite how this will play out is unclear. The results of the Georgian elections are key, but predictions of the outcome are unreliable when it is not known how the campaign will develop. For now, at least, two of the three South Caucasian states are exploring new approaches.
Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at European University in Bilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of Silk Roads.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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