If the future of war was predicted by anyone, then it was Azerbaijan. It used unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to devastating effect in breaking the long deadlock with Armenia over the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh. That was in 2020, two years before Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine. So it was notable when Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev visited Navy Forces Headquarters, accompanied by the Defense Minister General Zakir Hasanov, on September 6 to unveil two new unmanned naval platforms: the super-fast, 49 ft-long, Turkish-made SALVO armed uncrewed surface vessel, and the KAYRA maritime kamikaze drone. Both are being manufactured in Azerbaijan, although numbers are unknown.
Littoral powers including Russia and Iran will take note, as will others with an eye on the Caspian. War in Europe and the Middle East have spilled over into the sea this year: Ukraine hit Russian targets in July and September, and similarly Israel struck Iranian military sites and warships. The sea’s immunity from warfare is now gone, even if the five littoral states are at peace.
Aware of the risks, and mindful of the new lessons of naval warfare taught by Ukraine’s naval feats on the Black Sea, Azerbaijan has markedly intensified its domestic defense production. This effort includes not only expanding the volume of manufactured weaponry but also diversifying defense partnerships and dramatically increasing defense expenditure, signaling Baku’s determination to strengthen its military posture and technological autonomy. Azerbaijan first unveiled the acquisition of the Turkish-produced SALVO, fitted with missile systems, in August 2025 during a naval exercise designed to signal a new era in the modernization of the armed forces to tackle any potential threat and protect maritime borders. In 2018, Azerbaijan agreed with Turkey to jointly build four manned warships, although it is unclear if work has begun. It has also launched joint production with Israel of Shaldag fast patrol boats.
This reinforces Azerbaijan’s leading position in the South Caucasus in drone warfare, having begun the systematic development of its drone fleet as early as 2015, securing a decisive technological edge. The outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian war and the US–Iran conflict in its immediate neighborhood, coupled with missile attacks in the Caspian Sea, prompted Baku to further reinforce its maritime posture. This included strengthening its Caspian flotilla, while simultaneously advocating for the creation of a regional naval alliance with Kazakhstan and Turkey, and, to a certain extent, with Turkmenistan, an initiative aimed at consolidating security cooperation and counterbalancing external threats.
While the recent demonstration of new USVs marked a new milestone in Azerbaijan’s military doctrine, it also highlighted the growing depth of Azerbaijan-Turkey joint defense production. Hence, the new SALVOs are being produced by a joint venture between MİRAS, a defense industry company operating under Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Defense, and Turkish shipbuilder Dearsan. Indeed, with this public demonstration, Baku signals that it is shifting beyond importing advanced weaponry and defense products from foreign partners toward domestic production, maintenance, and technology transfer.
The new USVs will enable Azerbaijan to accelerate maritime border patrolling, conduct reconnaissance, engage surface targets, and ensure the safety of offshore energy and other maritime infrastructure (it’s notable that Russian oil rigs were among Ukraine’s targets this month).
The spillover from the European and Middle Eastern wars, coupled with the persistent Russian threat to maritime security, is absolutely central for Azerbaijan, given its vast network of infrastructure across the basin, namely the vital importance of the Middle Corridor trade route, and the upcoming Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), which is set to be the corridor’s southern wing. Relations with Russia, which shot down an Azerbaijani civilian aircraft last year, and Iran — which has conducted military maneuvers on its southern border — have not always been warm, although there’s no obvious or immediate threat of conflict involving Azerbaijan.
Even so, Azerbaijan will have noted the Russian flotilla in the Caspian firing Kalibr long-range missiles targeting Ukraine’s key infrastructure, which is likely the main reason behind Baku’s recent purchases of the Israeli-made fifth-generation Ice-Breaker anti-ship cruise missile system. With this, Azerbaijan possesses a robust barrier on maritime borders, while enhancing coastal defense capabilities.
Azerbaijan knows that anti-ship missiles and USVs are insufficient to tackle massive attacks from the sea, as they cannot fully replace the conventional navy force. Thus, Baku’s ambitions of building a strong and modern navy, as well as fostering regional alliances in the basin with other partners, seem a rational choice. For example, in recent years, the Azerbaijan-Kazakhstan-Turkey axis has grown stronger, resulting in regular naval exercises between Azerbaijan and Kazakh naval forces. Since 2023, they have held three large-scale drills dubbed Khazri-2023, Caspian Breeze-2025, and Khazri-2025 aimed at joint coordination efforts to defend the Middle Corridor and oil-gas-related infrastructure, and practicing responses to attacks by a simulated enemy, countering underwater sabotage, and dealing with the threat of mines.
In this context, Azerbaijan has drawn lessons from Ukraine’s wartime experience, which profoundly reshaped perceptions of naval drones in modern warfare. Kyiv’s effective deployment of inexpensive drones demonstrated that even a smaller state lacking a powerful navy could inflict serious damage on a comparatively stronger adversary. That emboldened Baku to enhance its relationship with Kyiv, especially in drone technology, despite vocal Russian discontent.
By investing in the development of local unmanned systems both in naval and land forces, Azerbaijan seeks to deter by making itself too well-armed to attack.
Fuad Shahbazov is a policy analyst covering regional security issues in the Eurasian region. He regularly provides his short geopolitical insights at @fuadshahbazov.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
