The one thing on which there is broad agreement, from Moscow to Kyiv to Brussels to Washington, is that Russian President Vladimir Putin is among the biggest winners from Donald Trump’s return to the White House.
Trump, after all, clearly holds Putin in higher esteem than he does Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and has publicly and repeatedly questioned the utility of America’s transatlantic alliances. What more could Putin want in an American president?
The conventional wisdom, however, is almost certainly wrong.
To be sure, Trump re-enters the White House bearing gifts for the Russian president. His rhetorical promise to end the war rapidly — with the bones of a “peace plan” predicated on withdrawing US military support and the suspension of NATO accession talks — sows enough uncertainty that European leaders may begin to question the viability of continued resistance to Russia’s onslaught. And the prospect of friction in the Atlantic alliance plays very much to Putin’s interests.
But those superficially favorable tides belie rougher seas ahead for Russia. As Trump exchanges the rhetorical simplicity of the campaign trail for the harsher realities of political give-and-take in Washington, Putin is likely to see many of his earlier promises evaporate. What’s worse, the priorities Trump is likely to retain — including going hard against China and Iran — will greatly complicate Putin’s life.
The Russian president will also remember the first Trump administration, and the ways in which Congress and the civil service helped ensure sanctions in response to the 2014 annexation of Crimea remained in place, and in fact increased throughout Trump’s time in office.
While forward planning and a more pliant Congress may give the White House a freer hand this time around, Trump is still likely to find there is little political capital to be gained from making nice with Putin. Indeed, there may be a price to pay. Trump will also cling to his image, not just as a deal-maker but as a deal-winner, and if Putin wants American acquiescence in Ukraine, he will likely have to give Trump something in return.
But Putin doesn’t have much to offer. The Biden administration has already won the release of Russia’s highest-profile American hostages, and while renouncing claims to dominion in the post-Soviet space might give Trump a nice rhetorical win, Putin will be loath to eat humble pie in the public eye.
To make matters worse, the one thing Trump is likely to want — Russian cooperation or at least abstention on his broader geopolitical agenda — is the one thing Putin is most unable to give.
Trump has been clear that he sees America’s key adversaries as China and Iran, not Russia, and part of the rationale for withdrawing from America’s European entanglements and obligations is to allow a clearer focus on the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East. If anyone in Trump’s foreign policy team harbors visions of a grand alliance with Moscow against Beijing and Tehran, they’re indulging in a dangerous fantasy.
Through a combination of military and economic aid, both China and Iran have worked hard to help keep Russia’s war effort on the rails, seeing it as an opportunity to weaken the US and damage Western solidarity while giving Beijing and Tehran a freer hand in their own neighborhoods. As self-interested as this support has been, it has been critical to Russia’s ability to continue its war and keep its economy afloat, and Moscow is expected to be grateful.
When Trump starts throwing punches at Beijing and Tehran, then it will be incumbent on Putin to show solidarity with his authoritarian allies. If he sits on his hands, he would inevitably evoke the ire of Xi Jinping and Ali Khamenei, who retains the ability to make his life difficult by stopping the flow of goods and money that have allowed Moscow to circumvent sanctions and export controls.
In the end, the price Russia is forced to pay to support Iran and China may far outweigh the price Iran and China have been willing to pay to support Russia, a reality Putin likely understands but can do little to avoid. Loans, after all, are usually repaid with interest.
Trump’s approach to geopolitics is likely to shift the balance in Moscow’s most important relationships, turning Putin from a taker to a giver of succor to China and Iran. The Trump-Putin relationship would rapidly sour as a result, and rather than the driver of a thus-far compartmentalized conflict with the West, Putin would find himself hostage to a much bigger confrontation between greater powers.
If Putin finds himself in need of sympathy, he’s unlikely to find it — even in Trump’s Washington.
Sam Greene is Director of the Democratic Resilience Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis and Professor of Russian Politics at King’s College London.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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