While there was only limited damage from the 19 Russian drones that entered Poland on September 9, the strategic signal was deafening. The Kremlin is using an old playbook on a grander scale — poke your enemy and see how he responds.
Will the West demonstrate unity and resolve, or weakness and hesitation? The Kremlin believes NATO can be bent to its will. That notion must be shattered.
Poland got off on the right foot. The response was swift and, in a rare display of unity, a quickly convened meeting of the National Security Council included both President Karol Nawrocki and Prime Minister Donald Tusk, who buried their bitter political differences for the occasion.
Poland also invoked Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which is designed for consultations when sovereignty and security are threatened. This decision is designed to make every ally take ownership of the problem and demonstrate to Moscow that airspace incursions cannot be shrugged off as accidents of war (one of several contradictory talking points from Russia during the day).
What are the risks? The attack penetrated as far as 200 miles into Poland and was engaged by Polish and allied combat and AWACS aircraft. But while the drones only inflicted limited damage, it did mark the first time NATO has fired on the Russian military since its all-out war of aggression against Ukraine began in 2022.
So this was far more than a local nuisance. The danger now is that a feeble alliance response — the familiar diet of public statements without action — risks becoming a perilous new normal, as the Baltic states have been warning all summer. There are only a number of occasions, “the world’s most successful military alliance” can be revealed as powerless before it loses any claim to that title.
The alliance cannot continue to simply soak up the punishment. Deterrence by denial is not enough; deterrence by punishment is required. That means imposing costs on Moscow every time it violates NATO airspace (as it has repeatedly done in Poland and the Baltic states), and raising the price beyond a few disposable drones.
What can be done? There is now a clear need for a military response. NATO does not have to attack Russia to show real toughness. As Ambassador Kurt Volker has proposed, extending the coverage of NATO air defense batteries that are based on allied territory to bring down Russian drones and missiles over Western Ukraine would aid that country and the West. It is absolutely in accordance with international law, and while it would infuriate Putin, he would not act — past experience shows that he backs down when he faces real opposition.
In addition, the UK defense secretary has suggested British units may now be deployed to Poland and others — principally the US to ensure the message is heard — should do likewise.
Much more serious sanctions would reinforce the impact. Existing measures need to be better tailored and enforced to strike at the backbone of Russia’s drone production in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone, where versions of Iranian Shaheds that fall upon Ukraine every night by the hundred are assembled by the thousand.
Many of the core entities involved are already sanctioned both by the US and Europe, but there are huge gaps in enforcement. The United Arab Emirates and other Gulf states, for example, still enable transfers between Alabuga’s partners and its Iranian suppliers, while crucial machine tools and precision equipment are acquired through middlemen in Turkey, China, India, Switzerland, and Thailand.
Although the EU’s latest export controls prohibit new software sales and updates to Russian entities, there is still no formal mechanism to force manufacturers to revoke existing software keys, firmware, or after-sales support for equipment already at sanctioned sites.
Evidence from wreckage shows Western electronics and components are still being used in Russian and Iranian drones, demonstrating persistent leakage in procurement networks and the need for urgent action.
NATO nations and other allies also need to clamp down on the shipping of drone components, which have been moving for years along the Caspian corridor from Iran to Astrakhan and Olya. A version of the attestation regime already built for Russian oil exports could be used to monitor vessels and operators and empower insurers and ports to act.
Shaheds rely on imported microelectronics, engines, and composite materials sourced through Tehran, Hong Kong, and other hubs. Export controls should be tightened by blacklisting the components most often recovered from drone wreckage and tracing serial numbers and gray-market resellers.
The West has already demonstrated the ability to seize illicit weapons shipments at sea, including UK interceptions of vessels carrying Iranian missiles, and stepping up the consistency of such seizures would force Tehran to pay more to keep its networks alive.
NATO needs a graduated response ladder that makes every airspace violation costly for Moscow. Cyber operations would be especially effective, and the framework for action already exists in the 2024 Washington Summit Declaration, which explicitly recognized cyber capabilities as part of NATO’s deterrence and defense posture.
The Kremlin’s push is deliberate. Every drone sent across NATO borders is meant to measure how far the alliance will bend. Allies who respond with a shrug are playing a perilous game. The incursions are not random, but are a calculated move to check NATO’s resolve and foster division.
Differences between the US and Europe over Russia remain real, with some in Washington eager to cut a peace deal with Putin, but it is no longer a matter of preference or posture. It has become a transatlantic issue, with all allies sharing an interest in containing Russia’s military industrial complex.
What is needed above all is a genuine shift in paradigm. NATO cannot remain trapped in static defense and ritual condemnation; it must prove it can seize the initiative.
That means moving beyond interception toward calibrated offense, including hard power but also using hybrid tools, cyber disruption, and financial pressure as deliberate instruments of deterrence. If the alliance does not set the rules of the next engagement, the Kremlin will.
Maciej Filip Bukowski is the Head of the Energy and Resilience Program at the Casimir Pulaski Foundation in Warsaw, and is a non-resident fellow with the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), where he writes about issues including Central European security.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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