Russian attacks on seaports and commercial vessels in the Odesa region and the Danube Delta have critically reduced Ukraine’s grain corridor after three years of successful operation.
The 2026 harvest needs to be sold and, while Ukraine and its partners have developed alternative routes, none come close to the volumes or costs of sea transportation.
Agricultural produce accounts for 60% of Ukraine’s exports, and 90% are usually carried by sea, underlining the importance of the corridor to the country’s beleaguered economy.
While Russia increases its attacks, it is important to focus not only on resolving the current situation, but also on a strategic plan to reorient Ukraine’s industry and economy to a different model. Without change, depleted grain exports will trigger an even larger chain of economic and food crises next year.
As of October, Ukrainian granaries were almost full, and there was a critical shortage of free capacity for late crops.
The issue of storage can be temporarily resolved with the help of alternative solutions, such as polymer grain sleeves, but such temporary workarounds do not address the risks if space cannot be freed up.
Filled granaries are the working capital of farmers and are vulnerable to destruction by shelling or sabotage, meaning the Ukrainian economy and global food security depend on the harvest’s sale and the release of funds to prepare for the next growing season.
The escalation of Moscow’s military operations in the Black Sea poses threats not only to Ukraine, but also to the rest of the region, particularly Turkey. And Ankara has a considerable ability to help with Ukraine’s grain exports, if there is political will and economic expediency.
Turkey is the largest importer of Ukrainian grain, has a powerful naval fleet at its disposal, and controls the Bosphorus Strait and the Dardanelles — the arteries for traffic to and from the Black Sea. One possible mechanism could be long-term purchasing contracts with Turkish companies, which could take on the organization of grain transportation, processing, and subsequent sale.
However, there is no guarantee that Russia will refrain from attacking vessels carrying Ukrainian grain, even if they are owned by Turkish companies. Recently, Russia has repeatedly attacked commercial vessels owned by companies registered in Turkey. Ukraine is working to strengthen the protection of seaports, infrastructure and assets used to support alternative grain export routes.
This includes electronic warfare systems to protect railways used to send grain to neighboring countries for forwarding to international markets.
Investment in the development of technology, up-to-date defenses and preparedness will strengthen Ukraine and the rest of Europe’s capabilities in the face of expanding Russian aggression.
A jet-powered drone or missile can reach Ukraine’s coast in minutes, leaving air defense systems little time to respond, and Russian attacks on commercial vessels have expanded into the waters of NATO member states. Degrading Russia’s ability to launch attacks could help restore the security of maritime navigation.
This includes destroying launch systems in occupied Crimea and on Russian territory; neutralizing underwater and surface systems used for drones and missiles; strengthening air defense for transport corridors and port infrastructure; and continuing the work of the Turkish-Romanian-Bulgarian mine-countermeasures coalition.
These efforts must be accompanied by the continuation, strengthening, and effective enforcement of sanctions, as well as measures to prevent Russia and its allies from obtaining Western technologies used to manufacture and launch drones and missiles.
Ukraine’s strategic objective should be to develop a production and export system capable of adapting to the loss of individual transport routes, maintaining access to international markets, and sustaining domestic production even under prolonged external pressure.
Exporting grain in its unprocessed form allows Ukraine to sell large volumes relatively quickly, but it misses out on a substantial share of the value added through processing, packaging, the manufacture of finished products, and access to end consumers, which happens outside the country.
A geographically distributed network of small and medium-sized grain-processing enterprises in Ukraine, integrated through cooperative arrangements and coordinated logistics and export marketing, could help address several structural challenges.
Decentralizing storage capacity and reducing its concentration would make it more difficult for Russia to destroy a significant share of the country’s infrastructure in a single attack. It would create jobs across the country, strengthen local communities, and increase tax revenues while accelerating Ukraine’s transition from a commodity-based economy to diversified production capable of sustaining further development.
The finished goods would also not necessarily need to be transported by sea. The use of packaged or containerized transport would enable export by rail and road.
Implementation would need support from the Ukrainian government and international partners to finance equipment purchases, establish regional storage facilities, provide training, and develop policies to promote exports of finished goods.
A geographically distributed model of storage, processing, and transportation would significantly reduce the concentration of assets exposed to Russian attacks and could strengthen the resilience of Ukraine’s exports. Physical damage to one facility or logistics hub would not bring the entire production and trading network to a standstill.
Olya Korbut is an analyst on sanctions at the Black Sea Institute of Strategic Studies (Ukraine) and a Non-resident Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA,) She has worked on OSINT monitoring and analysis of Black Sea militarization by Russia since 2014.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
