A Czech engine manufacturer’s decision to move production to the US underscores a key vulnerability in Europe’s missile industry: The continent relies on America’s turbofan engines for its most capable cruise missiles, and lacks the industrial base to build its own.
Prague-based PBS Group announced a two-phase investment in the US, first $20m for a jet engine production facility at Roswell, Georgia, then a further $90m to increase production and relocate its supply chain to the US. Though modest among the multi-billion-dollar investments in the defense sector, the decision is a bad omen for Europe.
Jet engines are a critical and complex component of the cruise missile supply chain. And, while jet engine production itself is demanding, the miniaturization required to fit one inside a cruise missile presents additional challenges.
There are two broad types of jet engines: turbojet and turbofan. Cruise missiles powered by turbofan engines generally achieve a greater range than those of similar size powered by turbojets, but most existing subsonic cruise missiles use turbojets because they are easier to produce and need less advanced materials.
The jet engines are further divided into high-end, military-grade engines; cheaper mini-cruise missile engines; and non-military-grade engines with limited performance.
The highest-grade engines have long shelf lives and high reliability, but cost between $200,000 and $500,000 per unit. Before the war in Ukraine, which highlighted the need for larger numbers of lower-cost missiles, these were the engines used in almost all modern cruise missile designs.
The second type is capable, but lower-end military-grade products, which are priced at or below $100,000. They are smaller and less powerful and used in the emerging category of mini-cruise missiles, which have demonstrated their utility in Ukraine and are increasingly being considered elsewhere.
The third, non-military-grade engines, are used particularly by Ukraine. They deliver low thrust-to-weight ratios, constraining payload capacity and range, but are typically priced below $10,000, making them more affordable.
The fact that the US is now the only supplier of turbofan technology to Europe is far from ideal at a time when the continent urgently requires more guided missiles from reliable suppliers. Turbofan engines are essential to produce heavy cruise missiles that can carry large payloads over long distances while maintaining a stealthy flight profile.
While turbojet engines can, in principle, power longer-range land-attack cruise missiles, their performance is inferior.
European cruise missile programs, including Ukrainian and Turkish designs, currently rely on four main engine manufacturers for propulsion: Safran, Motor Sich, Kale Arge, and Williams International.
French manufacturer Safran has traditionally supplied most of the mini jet engines used in Europe’s cruise missiles, while Ukrainian and Turkish manufacturers Motor Sich and Kale Arge have supported their national programs.
Turkey has emerged as a major player in recent years and continues to invest in indigenous mini-jet engine technology. Destinus, a Dutch-based firm, is the newest entrant in the European cruise missile market, producing the T150 turbojet engine used in Ukraine’s RUTA mini-cruise missile.
Czech manufacturer PBS produces engines used in some target drones for training, and its portfolio includes several jet engines, particularly in the lower-end military-grade segment, which could be of interest for European mini-cruise missile designs.
Given the critical importance of these systems for Europe’s missile rearmament, PBS’s pivot toward the US market is a troubling sign. Even worse, the US manufacturer Williams International is the only supplier of high-performance mini turbofan engines to Europe.
From a strategic autonomy perspective, continued reliance on US technology in 2025 is not ideal, especially in such a critical sector, but Europe lacks alternatives. While developing a European mini turbofan engine would theoretically be possible, it’s not a solution that would bring quick results.
For example, if German engine manufacturer MTU were contracted to develop a turbofan engine for use in the Taurus cruise missile, it would likely take several years before a suitable design was available. It is somewhat puzzling that Safran, Europe’s leading engine producer, has yet to develop a turbofan engine suitable for cruise missiles — a desire to maintain economies of scale by not expanding the product line is a likely explanation.
While increasing European mini jet engine production may not appear as important to decision-makers as building new artillery shell factories, it is just as critical and should be supported accordingly, including with both national and European funds.
In December 2024, Michigan-based Williams was awarded more than $250m by the US government to expand mini jet engine production in support of the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM-ER), Long-range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM), and Tomahawk production lines, showing that US decision-makers understand that scaling missile production is impossible without a robust industrial engine base.
European leaders should take note.
While in the short term it is unlikely Europe can move away from its reliance on US turbofan technology, developing a European alternative should be a priority.
European manufacturers, if entrusted with a dedicated development project, could deliver a high-thrust, fuel-efficient mini turbofan engine in several years. Unless Europe invests now, its long-range strike capability will remain dependent on and constrained by US priorities.
Fabian Hoffmann is a Doctoral Research Fellow at the Oslo Nuclear Project (ONP) and a Non-Resident Fellow with CEPA’s Transatlantic Defense and Security program. His research focuses on missile technology, nuclear strategy, and European deterrence. His PhD project examines the implications of conventional long-range strike weapons on strategic stability. His research has been published in the Journal of Strategic Studies, European Security, War on the Rocks, and The Washington Post, among others.
This is an edited version of an article that first appeared on Substack (Missile Matters — with Fabian Hoffmann).
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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