When Ukraine began acquiring a conventional long-range strike arsenal around mid-2023, it was almost entirely dependent on Western partners. Although it started producing its first long-range drones around that time, these early systems lacked maturity, and production scaled up slowly. As a result, deliveries of Storm Shadow and SCALP-EG missiles from the United Kingdom and France were not simply beneficial, but essential to enable and maintain a Ukrainian long-range strike capability.
Things began to change in 2024. Aware that European support in the long-range strike domain was limited (not least because European partners failed to restart missile production at scale) and that American missile systems, while available in larger numbers, were likely always subject to strict targeting restrictions, Ukraine invested heavily in developing an indigenous missile and long-range drone program.
Ukraine’s long-range strike program began to bear fruit by late 2024. By then, several types of long-range drones, including the AN-196 Liutyi, AQ-400 Scythe, and FP-1, were being delivered in growing numbers across multiple production lines. This was complemented by what appeared to be a fairly robust supply chain for mini-cruise missiles. Unlike long-range drones, these missiles, though lighter and less heavily armed than larger Western models, offered greater speed and payload capacity and, most importantly, were free from Western targeting restrictions.
In December, President Zelenskyy announced that the armed forces would receive 30,000 long-range and deep-strike weapons in 2025. What seemed an optimistic projection at the time now appears to be materializing. While exact numbers of long-range drones and mini-cruise missiles are difficult to verify, Ukraine’s ongoing strike campaign indicates access to hundreds, if not thousands, of drones and missiles each month.
And now Ukraine is taking the next step in the evolution of its long-range strike arsenal.
While the country has built up a formidable set of long-range weapons in a relatively short time, it has so far lacked an indigenous heavy missile capability. Indeed, apart from Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG and ATACMS, where Ukrainian arsenals are likely depleted by now, Ukraine has not had access to a “heavy hitter missile” combining long range with high speed and high payload capacity.
From a warfighting perspective, this is suboptimal. While Ukraine’s long-range drones and mini-cruise missiles can reach deep into Russian territory — in fact, theoretically much farther than Western-supplied missiles — they carry relatively small payloads, often only 10 to 100 kilograms (22lbs-220lbs). Moreover, many Ukrainian long-range strike weapons, especially its long-range drones, are slow. This makes them easier to intercept and reduces warhead penetration due to low kinetic energy on impact. These design characteristics limit both lethality and survivability on the modern battlefield.
Enter the Flamingo. In August, Ukrainian manufacturer Fire Point drew attention by unveiling the FP-5 Flamingo, a large, heavy cruise missile reportedly capable of carrying a 1,150-kilogram payload over a range of up to 3,000km (almost 1,900 miles). The company stated it can currently produce a missile per day, or about 30 per month, with the ability to scale production to more than 2,500 per year given sufficient funding.
These numbers are without doubt optimistic. In addition, initial use of the Flamingo indicated mixed results. Of the three missiles launched against a relatively undefended target in Northern Crimea, only two arrived on site. One missed the target by a distance of around 100 to 200 meters (109-218 yards) while the other impacted on the target and caused significant damage, although this too was likely 15 to 40 meters from its aimpoint.
This result shows the continued challenge of manufacturing high-quality missile system, especially as Ukraine moves from manufacturing light and relatively unsophisticated long-range drones and mini-cruise missiles, toward heavier and more complex alternatives.
Still, the trajectory of Ukraine’s missile arsenal is clear. The Flamingo, which is only one of several Ukrainian heavy missile programs nearing mass production — others including the Hrim-2 short/medium-range ballistic missile and the Korshun land-attack cruise missile — is indicative of Ukraine’s ambition to complement its missile arsenal with a much-needed heavy hitter.
From the Russian standpoint, the future looks worrying. If and when such a missile capability is deployed, Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign will increase in intensity — likely to the detriment of Russia’s critical oil and gas infrastructure, which is already struggling under Ukraine’s persistent attacks using existing capabilities.
That said, as Ukraine shifts toward fielding heavier missile systems in larger numbers, the costs of its arsenal will rise. The Flamingo, for example, is likely priced between $500,000 and $1,000,000 per unit, making it around 10-20 times more expensive than the affordable long-range drones produced in mass. Foreign financing of Ukraine’s indigenous missile capabilities will therefore become increasingly important and should be prioritized.
Fabian Hoffmann is a Doctoral Research Fellow at the Oslo Nuclear Project (ONP) and a Non-Resident Fellow with CEPA’s Transatlantic Defense and Security program. His research focuses on missile technology, nuclear strategy, and European deterrence. His PhD project examines the implications of conventional long-range strike weapons on strategic stability. His research has been published in the Journal of Strategic Studies, European Security, War on the Rocks, and The Washington Post, among others.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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