Enable Long-Term Planning, US Leadership, and Presence

  • Reauthorize, extend, and increase funds to USAI and other authorities: The USAI train-and-equip authority should be extended for a five-year period, covering Fiscal Years 2026 through 2031 which will enable consistent planning as the current annual/semi-annual reauthorization process can create unnecessary delays in execution.
    • In addition, increasing the total appropriation to accompany USAI cover two years (currently a portion of the appropriation is 1-year money, a portion is 2-year money) will further support effective long-term planning and capability needs which will be part of a broader effort to develop Ukrainian capabilities. Longer lead appropriations enables longer-term contracting on larger platforms and capabilities, increases planning and oversight for the authority, and allows both the US and Ukraine to better plot out the authority and appropriation’s objectives.
    • Total US funding for support to Ukraine needs to be approximately $40 billion/year, over the course of the next several years, using the bevy of authorities and funding lines including FMS/FMF/USAI and others to meet urgent requirements and plan for long-term security needs. That allocation of resources will be dependent on numerous factors including budget priorities, objectives, planning lead time, and the situation on the ground in Ukraine.
  • Memorandum of Understanding & Strategic Vision: The US and Ukraine should seek an initial MoU for five years, which will establish mutual priorities and objectives for their security partnership. The MoU should include planning timelines, including capability targets, committed yearly resourcing over five years from both sides, international partnership opportunities, and structured oversight mechanisms. This would be supported by a strategic vision for Ukrainian success and stability which is informed by a clear and collaborative policy towards Russia.
    • Though negotiated in the Executive Branch traditionally, the US/Israeli MOU example is then reviewed and approved by Congress. This format is critical for identifying multi-year objectives, reforms, oversight, and needs leading to a document of accountability and a roadmap for the US/Ukraine partnership. An MOU can help implement some of the goals of the signed-BSA, as well as stand as a touchpoint for the evolving battlefield and dynamics of the partnership. Congressional support is very much needed to make a US/Ukraine MOU successful.
    • While the 10-year bilateral security agreement is a step in the right direction, most of the agreement is not codified, endorsed, or resourced by Congress. An MOU can be a more structured and collaborative approach which can be updated intermittently. We envision the MOU process to work in tandem with BSA goals and objectives. We advocate for an initial 5-year MOU to lay the groundwork for a multi-decade partnership allowing for clear identification of objectives, collaboration, and cooperation. This allows a new format such as the MOU to be clearly overseen by Congress and the Executive Branch and revisit objectives sooner to then plan for a longer (10-year) MOU.
  • Appoint/Nominate a Special Envoy or Representative: The US administration should designate either a Special Envoy or a Special Representative for Ukrainian defense and security. This person and office would serve as an advocate for Ukrainian defense issues and wield a budgeted authority, enable senior political support, lead US engagement, and coordinate with the US, Ukraine, NATO, and other partners.
    • Congress should support a Special Envoy/Representative. Our study showed a great deal of support from current and former US officials as well as European and international partners for this role. When the right person with the right authorities and empowered by the President and Congress is put in place, efficiency increases, objectives are met, and oversight is robust.
  • Expand professional education and training: The US and Ukraine should increase Ukraine’s participation in professional military education (PME) and International Military and Education Training (IMET) programs, which would build trust between the US and Ukrainian militaries, enable relationship building, and support reforms within the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
    • Congress should increase funding and support for PME and IMET programs. These programs consistently show a massive ‘bang for your buck’ in terms of effective soft power, the ability to shift professional culture with partners, and does so relatively inexpensively. To the maximum extent possible, in order to continue with reform efforts, professional military objectives, and Western principles, Congress should appropriate the maximum extent possible participation by Ukrainian military and civilians.
  • ITAR reform: We are all tracking the delays and restrictions associated with ITAR and export controls especially in light of technology transfers and technology developments as a result of the last almost three years of war. A persistent issue across partnerships needs deep Congressional oversight and leadership. The recent ITAR amendments in relation to the AUKUS partnership (the “AUKUS Exemption”) might serve as a good first step template for the US partnership with Ukraine and perhaps other European allies and partners. Seeking to eliminate regulations enacted prior to the speed of technology we are seeing today is in the best interest of the US industrial base, US innovation, and Ukraine’s ability to win.

Strategic Messaging, Oversight, and Anti-Corruption

  • Engage in strategic messaging: The US, Ukraine, and their allies should launch and maintain a comphrehevise strategic messaging and branding campaign which emphasizes the need and rationale behind security assistance and cooperation measures with Ukraine.
    • Congressional messaging is critical for setting the tone on US policy and is sometimes discounted in its importance. Congressional ability to set forth priorities, resourcing, and objectives is needed to consistently make the case on why support to Ukraine is so important to European and global security and its secondary and tertiary impacts on other security challenges including China and the Middle East.
    • This messaging also pertains to the leadership of NATO and its support to Ukraine. The report’s assumption is that Ukraine will eventually be a NATO member. The Congressional role in messaging and support for the trajectory of the NATO/Ukraine partnership and membership is essential.  
  • Streamline oversight and standardize anti-corruption: A single, interagency body should oversee US security assistance to Ukraine and provide periodic updates, publicly available documentation, reporting, and briefings to US Congress. Additionally, the DoD and State Department should develop a universal template for anti-corruption goals which would cover oversight, transparency processes, bidding and budgeting practices, and auditing alongside other areas.
    • We understand the overwhelming data Congress is receiving on support and assistance to Ukraine and the question is how does the USG translate that information into helpful and persistent oversight? Streamlining the oversight requirements with a sustainable model of reporting is beneficial to both the Executive Branch and Congress.