Executive Summary

• Penny Pritzker, the former US Special Representative for Ukraine’s Economic Recovery (SRUER), spent a year focused on Ukraine’s reconstruction.
• Her job was to coordinate US government efforts to help Ukraine’s economy. She has leveraged her personal clout and connections to the Biden administration to achieve this.
• In public appearances, she focuses on the need for private investment to create a democratic Ukraine in the European Union (EU).
• The work of SRUER is too important to not have a designated representative in that specific role. The next US president should appoint a similarly qualified candidate in Pritzker’s place with congressional approval.

Introduction

As the US Special Representative for Ukraine’s Economic Recovery (SRUER), former Commerce Secretary Penny Pritzker’s yearlong mandate was to serve as the focal point for disparate US government efforts to sustain and renew Ukraine’s economy. Pritzker’s stature, credibility with business, and connections across the Biden administration enabled her to help move projects forward through US and international bureaucracy. Her speeches, attendance at international conferences, and leadership of investor delegations highlighted the need to facilitate private investment in the Ukrainian economy to strengthen Kyiv, enable the Ukrainian state to fulfill a democratic future in the European Union (EU) and defend itself against Russian revanchism. Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources Richard Verma is now continuing Pritzker’s work since her term ends in September 2024 until a new administration takes office.

Appointment and Mandate

Ukraine’s economic recovery and eventual reconstruction is a massive and ongoing process that needs strong transatlantic support.¹ Pritzker’s September 14, 2023, presidential appointment to the new and necessary special representative role was intended to facilitate efficient mobilization of public and private resources to assist Ukraine. Her experience as a billionaire investor, Ukrainian ancestry, insider’s knowledge of the US government, and extensive political network made her an ideal candidate for the position.

Her appointment was complicated by internal US government disagreement over the character of special representative appointments in general and by increasing opposition to support for Ukraine. The 2022 National Defense Authorization Act required special representatives nominated by the president to receive Senate approval. Given the increasing skepticism of the Biden administration’s Ukraine policy among congressional Republicans, the administration did not seek congressional approval. Pritzker instead received a temporary one-year appointment that will not be extended. Verma will continue her work.²

Simultaneously, congressional opposition resulted in a monthslong delay in the approval of “the fifth supplemental” appropriation for Ukraine. While most of this funding was security-related, its delay raised doubts about the United States’ commitment to Ukraine, further complicating Pritzker’s ability to achieve results in the limited time available.

In a September 14, 2023, statement announcing Pritzker’s appointment, US President Joe Biden described her role as to “drive the United States’ efforts to help rebuild the Ukrainian economy” in conjunction with the Ukrainians and other partners. Biden said Pritzker’s job will include:

1) Mobilizing public and private investment, shaping donor priorities, and working to open export markets and businesses shut down by Russia’s brutal attacks and destruction.

2) Work[ing] with Ukraine’s other international partners, including via the G7 coordination platform, to ensure that international efforts are complementary and mutually reinforcing, as well as to encourage international partners to keep stepping up their support for Ukraine’s immediate economic recovery needs.

3) Help[ing] the Ukrainian government make reforms needed to strengthen its economy, and Special Representative Pritzker will work with Ukraine to help ensure that as Ukraine begins to rebuild, it rebuilds stronger.³

Pritzker’s mandate was clearly ambitious: helping resuscitate the Ukrainian economy in wartime while also laying the groundwork for its postwar integration into the global economy.

A special representative is intended to cut across government departments from outside the bureaucracy. Although appointed by the president, Pritzker’s small staff of about a dozen are housed at the State Department under the acronym “SRUER.” A European diplomat noted that the staff seems very small for the number of projects and suggested that assigning more personnel would increase the office’s ability to push initiatives to completion.⁴

Governance almost always involves orchestrating different individuals and offices to affect a policy. Various departments, agencies, and offices are involved in the effort to aid and advise Ukraine’s economy, including the State Department, US Embassy in Kyiv, US Agency for International Development, Department of the Treasury, Department of Commerce, and US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC). It is difficult to parse responsibility for achievements shared among officials working across the government in tandem.

Pritzker’s role also interacts with the Ukrainian state in all its complexity, other donor governments, and international institutions. These internal and external forces complicate policy generation and implementation, underscoring why someone of her stature and credibility was necessary to achieve positive results in this role. Her authority rests in the prestige of her career, her ability to speak credibly to investors as a peer, and her high-level contacts within the Biden administration.

Conversations with US and foreign government officials suggest Pritzker appreciated her personal advantages and made effective use of them. In a brief time, she was able to carve out an important diplomatic role as an advocate to “move the ball forward” on Ukrainian economic recovery and reconstruction in a way that would have been impossible otherwise.

Following her yearlong mandate, it is critical to analyze what changed under her leadership, what work remains, and channels for future high-level US leadership on Ukrainian recovery.

Efforts and Achievements

With limited time and resources, Pritzker focused on several discrete areas within her broad mandate. During her tenure, she made six trips to Ukraine and visited other donor countries like Poland to meet with senior officials. She also attended major multilateral meetings such as the Berlin donors’ Conference and Steering Committee meetings of the Multi-agency Donor Coordination Platform (MDCP) for Ukraine.

Observers note that Pritzker’s office prioritized projects that enabled the Ukrainian government to pay for itself by investing in those parts of the economy that could increase tax revenue. In remarks at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) on September 21, 2023, she defined her approach as “Ukraine driven, Western facing, and American backed.”⁵

Advocacy: Although not strictly spelled out in Pritzker’s mandate, advocating for Ukrainian reconstruction and educating US and foreign audiences about the challenges ahead was a vital part of her role and one in which she excelled. She eloquently communicated the economic state of Ukraine and the need for various forms of assistance, including direct budget assistance. Her descriptions of Ukraine’s physical and human resources are compelling appeals to potential investors, but her remarks are buried in a dated file incorporating the entire Europe and Eurasia Bureau’s public diplomacy output. To build and maintain public support for assistance, the State Department should more effectively highlight Pritzker’s work through additional dedicated public diplomacy assets and engagement.⁶

Mobilizing Private Investment: Despite expectations that Pritzker’s own wealth and network might make it easy for her to encourage investment in Ukraine, an ongoing war, potential political instability, and a legacy of corruption present serious impediments to attracting investment. The foreign investment that has taken place since 2022 has tended to come from corporations that already had a presence in Ukraine.⁷

Pritzker’s approach recognized that rebuilding Ukraine in a sustained and serious way is predicated on the creation of a relatively secure economic activity zone. As Russian missile attacks against civilian infrastructure continued throughout her tenure, she found herself unexpectedly using her position to advocate for additional transfers of air defense equipment from allies, lending her voice and investment-based arguments to those of security officials.

Additionally, Pritzker lent her credibility as a businesswoman to US efforts to stress the need for continued domestic reform with Ukrainian officials. At the CSIS conference in 2023, she said, “[T]o secure a durable peace, Ukraine must transform itself economically during the war.” She argued that Ukraine’s reputation for corruption is a major impediment to attracting foreign direct investment and raised the need to change centuries of supply chains, alter trade routes, realign business practices, and update infrastructure.

One of Pritzker’s most visible achievements was bringing potential investors and the Ukrainian government together. Examples include holding an event with the Chicago and Midwest business community and Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal in April 2024. She also led two delegations of US CEOs to Ukraine for meetings at the highest levels of the Ukrainian government. The first delegation included the heads of agricultural giant Archer Daniels Midland, management consulting firm Oliver Wyman in January 2024.⁸ The second delegation in July 2024 included the CEOs of engineering firm Amentum, construction firm Clayco Inc, and Westinghouse Electric Company.⁹ The initial results of these trips have been positive and have led to cooperation.

These delegations appear to make tangible progress, and their number should be increased if the United States is serious about attracting private investment in Ukraine’s recovery. The State Department could facilitate more such delegations by changing its regulations, which limit delegations to six people in Ukraine at a time. The State Department also can, and should, change its travel advisory for Ukraine to reflect that many parts of the country may be visited with significantly less risk. For example, the United Kingdom’s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office advises against all travel to most of Ukraine but distinguishes regions of relative safety where “essential travel” might be undertaken.¹⁰ Japan is also in the process of changing its advisories for its citizens involved in reconstruction activities.¹¹

Risk Management: Grain export via the Black Sea is vital to Ukraine’s ability to fund itself. Pritzker was critical to the development of model projects to increase the attractiveness of the Ukrainian market to investors. Building on British initiatives to support Ukraine’s vital export trade via Black Sea shipping, she worked with the DFC and the Ukrainian government to introduce “war risk” insurance for companies investing in the country.¹² Insurers Marsh McLennan, Lloyd’s of London, and Aon were private sector partners in these initiatives designed to attract “public and private institutions globally to work with local Ukrainian carriers to scale and replicate these models.”¹³

Russian State Assets: At the time of Pritzker’s appointment in September 2023, there was reticence within the US government to seize Russian state assets to fund Ukraine’s reconstruction and concern that seizing these assets could have serious ramifications for the dollar’s use as a reserve currency. Pritzker used her personal network to assertively push the idea that justice requires that Russia pay for the damage it has done through its unprovoked aggression, making a serious contribution to change minds on both sides of the Atlantic.

Donor Coordination: There is a need to provide the limited publicly funded recovery assistance in a non-duplicative and efficient manner. Since 2022, a coalition of donor countries known as the “Ramstein Group” has operated something like this for security assistance with some success. The MDCP, the civilian counterpart of the Ramstein Group, was created following a decision by the G7 in December 2022 to coordinate support for Ukraine’s ongoing financing and reconstruction. The MDCP Steering Committee consists of the Ukrainians, the G7, and the EU and meets quarterly. Pritzker represented the United States in these meetings.¹⁴ She also supported the addition of a Business Advisory Council to provide a private sector perspective to MDCP decision-making.¹⁵

The MDCP’s objective is to match donors with Ukrainian needs, which is challenging because different donors have different agendas. Observers describe it as a laudable effort that is not necessarily yet functioning as intended. A Ukrainian official cited the related “G7+ Energy Coordination Group” as an example of this kind of assistance coordination that functions better; possibly because of its urgency, it has received more high-level political attention.

There is little doubt that SRUER and associated offices and agencies throughout the US government should give more attention to this kind of cooperation on economic recovery and reconstruction to maximize impact moving forward. Pritzker has reportedly advocated moving more of the MDCP secretariat to Ukraine to give it greater familiarity with the situation on the ground.¹³

Reform: During an appearance at the Kyiv School for Higher Economics in January 2024, Pritzker spoke about the need to increase Ukraine’s capacity to rebuild by equipping its younger generation with the necessary skills. However, the scale of reconstruction and recovery in Ukraine is so enormous that it also requires a new administrative and technical architecture, what Pritzker has referred to as “a cross-ministerial planning capability.”

Pritzker’s office promoted the idea of creating an “engineering hub” that would assist the Ukrainian government in prioritizing reconstruction projects. The hub would consist of 50 to 150 multinational experts, including engineers, planners, and project managers, who would produce feasibility studies and ensure projects align with a consistent plan for reconstruction. This “hub” would ideally be headed by someone possessing an international reputation to leverage their credibility and contacts to get results as Pritzker has done.¹⁶

In general, Pritzker elevated the US presence in recovery conferences and shaped policy both within the US government and with Ukrainian officials and others through the strength of her reputation and relationships. She used her own reputation and visiting investors to bolster the US government’s message that continued anti-corruption reforms and greater transparency will be decisive in attracting investment in Ukraine’s recovery.

The Future

What will become of SRUER and its work after Pritzker’s departure in September 2024? Given the US presidential election in November 2024, there is no guarantee that SRUER and Pritzker’s successor will have the same mandate in 2025 or that the United States will retain the same level of commitment to Ukraine’s recovery. Kamala Harris, the Democratic Party’s presidential nominee, has delivered messages of strong support for Ukraine at successive Munich Security Conference’s as vice president.¹⁷ If she wins the election, her administration is likely to continue most elements of the current policy.

If Donald Trump, the Republican Party’s nominee, wins, it is less certain how his administration would handle the assistance issue or the special representative position.¹⁸ Trump’s opposition to the fifth supplemental is believed to have been the principal factor in its delay; his running mate, Sen. JD Vance, led the opposition in the Senate. There are national security Republicans who support Ukraine, but it is unclear how much influence they would have.

Prior to Biden’s decision not to seek reelection, there were rumors that Mitt Romney, a former governor, business executive, senator, and Republican presidential nominee, might be nominated special representative.¹⁶ However, Verma ultimately has the responsibility to carry the torch. The deputy secretary of state has a rich career leading the State Department’s role in modernization and foreign assistance, and experience in the private sector. With Verma’s new role, it is essential that he utilizes his prestigious business and political experience and personal connections to continue to support Ukraine.

Regardless of the election’s outcome, the next presidential administration should recognize that Ukraine is a serious national security priority and that the substantial investment the United States has made to help it win the war was only worth it if we help them win the peace through a sustainable economic recovery.

Conclusion

Establishing a sovereign Ukraine on a firm economic foundation warrants more than a dozen staff and a special representative limited to a yearlong appointment. The next president should obtain congressional approval for the special representative and back it up with adequate resources befitting a multiyear mission. Most assistance will be from the private sector, and Pritzker has demonstrated the value of having a non-career diplomat who relates to investors on their own terms. Pritzker reportedly did not wish to leave the role. If she can be persuaded, she or someone with a similar profile should be nominated for a multiyear term.

The following are recommendations to continue and expand on Pritzker’s accomplishments:

• The next president should keep the position of special representative and appoint someone with a similar profile to Pritzker’s. This is a multiyear mission that requires a longer commitment.
• The special representative should lead more delegations of private investors to Ukraine. Investment in Ukraine cannot wait until the end of hostilities.
• The State Department should consider a bespoke travel advisory for Ukraine to recognize that different levels of threat exist within the country. This would create more space for engagement with potential investors in Ukraine’s recovery.
• The MDCP should be relocated from Brussels to Kyiv. There is no substitute for having staff in Ukraine living with the ongoing reconstruction.
• Pritzker’s efforts to advocate for the Ukrainian government to equip young Ukrainians with the skills they need to rebuild their country should be continued.
• The administration should seek to communicate the vision for Ukrainian recovery and the necessity of support to US audiences with an eloquence equal to Pritzker’s own.
• The Ukrainian government should establish an Engineering Planning Hub in Ukraine to help generate realistic feasibility studies for a coordinated reconstruction effort.
• The United States should increase the amount of air defense provided to Ukrainian cities now to not only save lives but also preserve the infrastructure that will underpin Ukraine’s recovery.
• The US government should devote additional resources and attention to the public diplomacy side of messaging and outreach commensurate with the importance of the mission.
• The US government should include additional resources for Ukraine’s reconstruction in future budgets. Even if the US government focuses primarily on security assistance, it should not entirely relinquish influence over Ukrainian recovery to the EU. Some public programs may complement and encourage private sector investment.
• Additional staff and resources should be allocated to SRUER.

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my gratitude to those US officials, experts, and diplomats generously gave their time and assessment, Ashish Sen for his editing, as well as CEPA staff, Edward Lucas, Sam Greene, SaraJane Rzegocki, Sarah Krajewski, and Michael Newton, and other experts, for their feedback on various drafts of this report and their invaluable advice and expertise during the project. 

All opinions in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the position or views of CEPA.

CEPA is a nonpartisan, nonprofit, public policy institution. All opinions are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or CEPA.

Author Biography

Jason Bruder is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis and an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University. He is a former Senior Staffer of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Foreign Service Officer and holds a PhD in International Relations from the University of St. Andrews in the United Kingdom.

CEPA is a nonpartisan, nonprofit, public policy institution. All opinions expressed are those of the author(s) alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.

1. On the many issues surrounding Ukraine’s reconstruction see, Elina Ribakova, Sam Greene, and SaraJane Rzegocki. “Resilience, Reconstruction, Recovery: The Path Ahead for Ukraine.” Center for European Policy Analysis, April 15, 2024. https://cepa.org/comprehensive-reports/resilience-reconstruction-recovery-the-path-ahead-for-ukraine. [↩]
2. Antony Blinken. “On the End of Penny Pritzker’s Term as U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine’s Economic Recovery.” U.S. Department of State. August 6, 2024. https://www.state.gov/on-the-end-of-penny-pritzkers-term-as-u-s-special-representative-for-ukraines-economic-recovery/ [↩]
3. “Statement from President Joe Biden Announcing the New U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine’s Economic Recovery.” The White House. September 14, 2023. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/09/14/statement-from-president-joe-biden-announcing-the-new-u-s-special-representative-for-ukraines-economic-recovery/. [↩]
4. Assessment of European diplomat, telephone call July 2024. [↩]
5. Penny Pritzker. “‘Doing Business in Ukraine’ Keynote Remarks by Secretary Penny Pritzker, U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine’s Economic Recovery.” Center for Strategic and International Studies. September 21, 2023. https://www.csis.org/analysis/doing-business-ukraine-keynote-remarks-secretary-penny-pritzker-us-special-representative. [↩]
6. Penny Pritzker. “Ukraine’s Path to Prosperity.” U.S. Department of State. July 31, 2024. https://www.state.gov/ukraines-path-to-prosperity/. [↩]
7. Dzvenislav Karpluk. “McDonald’s to Open 6 New Restaurants in Ukraine: Two of Them in Uzhhorod and Chernivtsi - Ukrainian Kommersant.” Комерсант Український. March 26, 2024. https://www.komersant.info/en/mcdonald-s-vidkryie-6-novykh-restoraniv-v-ukraini-dva-z-nykh-v-uzhhorodi-ta-chernivtsiakh-3/. [↩]
8. “U.S.’s Pritzker Wants to Expand Private Sector Role in Rebuilding Ukraine.” Ukrainian Journal, January 12, 2024. http://www.ukrainianjournal.com/index.php?w=article&id=37777. [↩]
9. “Pritzker Arrives in Kyiv alongside CEOS of Three U.S. Companies.” Ukrinform, July 29, 2024. https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-polytics/3889958-pritzker-arrives-in-kyiv-alongside-ceos-of-three-us-companies.html. [↩]
10. “Ukraine Travel Advice.” GOV.UK. May 3, 2024. https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/ukraine. [↩]
11. Yomiuri Shimbun. “Japan Eyes Easing Travel Restrictions to Ukraine for People Involved in Reconstruction Projects.” The Japan News. February 14, 2024. https://japannews.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/politics-government/20240214-168745/. [↩]
12. Mark Weintraub. “Aon launches insurance package to spur rebuilding in Ukraine: The insurance giant will act as a broker for a $50 million fund of insurance policies to cover damages for companies operating in Ukraine.” Crain's Chicago Business. June 24, 2024 [↩]
13. Penny Pritzer. “Ukraine’s Path to Prosperity.” U.S. Department of State. July 31, 2024. https://www.state.gov/ukraines-path-to-prosperity/. [↩] [↩]
14. Office of the Spokesperson. “Media Note: Special Representative for Ukraine’s Economic Recovery Pritzker’s Travel to Ukraine.” U.S. Department of State. July 30, 2024. https://www.state.gov/special-representative-for-ukraines-economic-recovery-pritzkers-travel-to-ukraine/. [↩]
15. Office of the Spokesperson. “Media Notes.” [↩]
16. Assessment of senior US officials in online meetings July 2024. [↩] [↩]
17. Owen Racer. “With Biden out, What Could a Kamala Harris Presidency Mean for Ukraine?” The Kyiv Independent. July 22, 2024. https://kyivindependent.com/with-biden-out-what-could-a-kamala-harris-presidency-mean-for-ukraine/. [↩]
18. The Trump Administration did appoint current Distinguished CEPA Fellow Ambassador Kurt Volker as a Special Representative for Ukraine, but with a different brief. [↩]