Zelenskyy’s Victory Plan and Possible Negotiations

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has outlined a strong plan for keeping the peace, but first, the guns must be silenced. And to do that, there will have to be talks with Moscow.

By Mykyta Vorobiov

October 29, 2024

After Kyiv exited peace negotiations with Russia in Istanbul in the spring of 2022, talk about ending the war through diplomacy almost vanished, and those in Ukraine proposing it as a way forward risked denunciation.

Ukrainian officials argued history showed that Moscow could not be trusted, and Zelenskyy ruled out the very idea of peace talks with the Russian government on an official level, cementing the approach of “victory through strength” adopted in May 2022.

Now, in the fall of 2024, Ukraine’s approach seems increasingly unrealistic. The Russian advance in the country’s eastern regions, while not as fast as the Kremlin expected, is far from being stopped. Sacrificing thousands of soldiers, Russia is slowly advancing town after town and reportedly replenishing its human resources with troops from North Korea.

Ukraine needs 200,000 new soldiers to maintain the situation on the front line, according to some estimates, and mobilization is struggling to keep pace with Moscow’s remorseless rhythm. Those enthused about going to war have already done so over the past two-and-a-half years, and scandals about forced mobilization, corruption, and more than 100,000 cases of desertion in the Ukrainian army are not helping.

The incursion of Ukrainian troops into Kursk was an attempt to change the game but did not fully succeed. Russian forces are regaining land, using a substantial advantage in cannon fodder and ammunition.

Despite the alarming situation on the frontline, the Ukrainian president stated on October 9 that the battlefield situation “creates an opportunity” to end the war next year. A week later, Zelenskyy presented his Victory Plan which is intended to help achieve that goal.

The plan includes five public points and three secret provisions passed privately to core Ukrainian allies. The openly stated points include:

An immediate invitation for Kyiv to join NATO.
More weapons for Ukraine, the end of restrictions on their use so they can be used in Russia, and air defense help from allies.
Allies deploying on Ukrainian soil to provide non-nuclear deterrence.
A special agreement with Western countries on the joint use and protection of Ukraine’s critical resources, including titanium, gas etc.
A vision for post-war military cooperation between Ukraine and its allies.

Some core Ukrainian allies, such as France and Germany, welcomed the plan. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz had already outlined his view that it is time to use diplomacy to find ways to end the war, saying in September he was ready to negotiate with Putin, though not over the heads of the Ukrainians.

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A plan for negotiations with Moscow will be ready in November, Zelenskyy told reporters on October 18. While its content remains vague, German newspaper Der Spiegel reported Kyiv is considering the previously unthinkable idea of compromise over land.

As Zelenskyy presented his plan to the parliament, the number of appeals to “partners” was noticeable. The word was repeated dozens of times, more often than any other word in the speech. It was clear the Ukrainian president had not given up on his central demands for support, some of which have faced strong resistance from NATO member states.

The clearest example is the appeal for allies to help shoot down the missiles and drones fired into Ukraine by Russia every day. It has been a key plea since the very first day of the full-scale invasion, and NATO politicians and officials have dismissed it many times. This resistance is widely attributed to the US and Germany.

The same applies to any immediate invitation to join NATO. Western officials have repeatedly rejected the idea of Ukraine joining the bloc during the war, and another demand might not bring the outcome the President desires. Even so, alliance membership, or something very similar, remains the central element of a Ukrainian post-war state; anything else would leave it at the mercy of Russia.

The Victory Plan does not propose tangible steps to end the war, although it coherently frames the notion of post-war security.

That’s because of understandable nervousness about the potential backlash from the Ukrainian people, who have suffered so badly from Russian aggression. Polls earlier this year showed 88% of Ukrainians believed their country could win the war without negotiations, while a similar number said Moscow could not be trusted in talks and would break any peace agreement.

As a result, the government risks losing public support if it calls for a diplomatic solution. While the polls have indicated some movement toward a settlement since then, there is still considerable resistance to the loss of sovereign territory (by 55% to 32% in a July survey.)

The Ukrainian president has begun to talk of negotiations but in opaque terms. Kyiv could look for inspiration in Cyprus, part of which has been occupied by Turkey for decades. Its division and occupation did not prevent the country from developing and even entering the European Union.

But there remains a huge stumbling block — Russia’s attitude. As the British analyst Lawrence Freedman pointed out on October 29: “The compromise peace [advocated by some] is not, however, on offer. It bears very little relationship to the one that Putin proposes, which involves no compromises at all. He only demands Ukraine’s surrender.”

Freedman makes the case that while a reelected Donald Trump could exert enormous pressure for Ukraine to enter talks, that would not necessarily bring Putin to the table because anything other than a clear victory might accelerate his day of reckoning with the Russian people.

This war is likely to end in official negotiations of some sort, but quite how we get there remains far less clear.

Mykyta Vorobiov is a Ukrainian political adviser, journalist, and political science student at Bard College Berlin. For the last two years, he has been developing articles on politics and law for CEPA, VoxEurop, JURIST, and others.

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.