The Russian president’s priority is to continue the fight in Ukraine at any cost, and he is waging what allies have called a “holy war” on the domestic front against everything that can be associated with “extremist” Western values. This includes pacifism, freedom of speech, human rights, and women’s and LGBT+ rights, all of which have women in the vanguard.
Surveys show Russian women are more critical of the full-scale invasion than men, and they have been skillful at organizing grassroots protests under a highly repressive regime. Women have been at the forefront of local demonstrations in Russian regions since the attack on Ukraine in February 2022, leading protests against the war and compulsory conscription.
Soon after the full-scale invasion, activists launched the Feminist Anti-War Resistance Initiative (FAS), which focused on the links between the war, growing social problems, and violations of women’s rights. Active both inside Russia and among Russians in exile, it has been working to convince women of all social backgrounds and political views, including Putin loyalists, to oppose the war.
FAS is also active as a driving force behind the reconstitution of Russian anti-regime civic activism in exile, based on broad societal representation.
The Way Home, a movement of the wives and mothers of mobilized soldiers, emerged in 2023 and has been a growing cause of concern for the Kremlin. Initially a fully loyalist network that demanded the rotation of forces on the frontline, it has become increasingly politicized and critical of Putin.
While this is the most vocal among a whole array of female initiatives, including those fighting against widespread domestic violence or helping women political prisoners, both movements are marginal in terms of visible support. FAS, for example, has just 34,000 subscribers on Telegram, while The Way Home has fewer than 62,000, though many sympathizers are known to keep their support secret for fear of being identified and punished.
Similarly, Yekaterina Duntsova, a female anti-war politician who was blocked from running in this year’s presidential election and is trying to set up a political party, is not widely known in Russia. Support for such movements may be much broader than admitted, as the space to express views freely has been narrowed by the regime.
Anti-war sentiment across society can be expected to grow, especially in the longer term, as socio-economic grievances accumulate and the war-related violence on Russia’s streets and in its homes disrupts the stability Putin has promised his people during his 24 years in power. Casualties are estimated by Western foreign intelligence to be rising at around 900 a day, and tens of thousands of men are returning home without limbs or with serious psychological problems.
Russia’s war against Ukraine has been marked by rampant growth of war-related crime and violence at home, including a surge in serious crimes, illegal arms trafficking, and offenses committed by soldiers returning from the frontline, many of whom were in prison before they were sent to the front.
The long-ignored and widespread problem of domestic violence is likely to be exacerbated by the high psychological trauma rates among those returning from the front.
Instead of addressing this growing problem, the state apparatus is spreading ultraconservative narratives, based on what it claims are “traditional values.” They boil down to propagating crime and violence in Russia’s foreign and domestic policies, in line with the criminal mindset that many top officials embraced during the turbulent 1990s.
Putin and his henchmen have enthusiastically adopted a cult of unapologetic ultra-masculinity, based on the ideas of strict hierarchy, top-down control, and legitimization through force. Within this model women are objectified and their key function is primarily to produce cannon fodder for future wars. Contesting these “values,” by promoting gender rights and opposing violence, is framed by the Kremlin as “hostile” to Russian civilization.
While a mass crackdown on politically active women before the presidential election in March might have backfired on Putin’s ratings, nothing can prevent the Kremlin from acting to “solve” the issue now.
In April, FAS was declared an “undesirable organization,” which means its activities in Russia are illegal. More than 100 of its activists have faced various forms of persecution.
State propaganda also discredits The Way Home, accusing it of collaboration with foreign intelligence services and subversive activities. Criminal cases have been launched against feminist activists, and Russian officials and propagandists have been pushing for a ban on feminism as an “extremist” ideology, preparing a draft bill in 2023.
While an official abortion ban seems unlikely, due to mass social resistance to something that would be seen as an excessively oppressive measure against women, it is already being implemented through the back door (for example by restricting access to clinics.)
Putin is determined to destroy all horizontal bonds that exist in society without authorization from above, and women’s networks will be no exception.
Peaceful protest and self-organization are dangerous in the eyes of a leader who sees wars of aggression and the hunt for internal enemies as the best way to preserve his power.
Maria Domańska is a Senior Fellow at the Warsaw-based Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW) and a Visiting Fellow at CEPA. She specializes in Russia’s domestic politics.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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