It is widely accepted that Russia faces a surge in crime on the return of soldiers from the front, many of whom will have been engaged in war crimes and other acts of depravity. It presents a threat to society which is even clear to the “Z-Community” of ultranationalist war supporters.
The conservative-right television channel Tsargrad warned that “Special Military Operation (SVO) participants” might seek revenge on their return, which will be “worse than the Prigozhin rebellion.” An article on the station’s website claimed, “A fifth column is trying to stir up a conflict between front-line troops and the country’s top leadership,” identifying the “fifth column” as a group of mysterious “traitors” in positions of power.
Tsargrad is significant because it was founded by the so-called “Orthodox oligarch” Konstantin Malofeev, who has been actively financing pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine since the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the early stages of the war in Donbas.
The influence on President Vladimir Putin of Malofeev and other right-wing radicals, such as the philosopher Alexander Dugin and writer Alexander Prokhanov, has increased since 2022 according to reports citing people close to the Kremlin. Putin’s administration has asked Malofeev and his associates to “explore some contours of a new ideology,” the reports said.
The primary objective of the supposed fifth column, according to Malofeev’s channel, is to prevent veterans becoming a “new elite of Russia” and to encourage increases in both abortion and immigration, issues he and his allies are seeking to weaponize. The channel claimed they are major concerns for soldiers returning from the front and veterans are sharing conspiracies about “an all-powerful sect of doctors gutting our Russian children for organs.”
A group of veterans did record a video attacking abortion and threatening doctors involved, but surveys suggest it is wrong to claim it is a major issue for returning veterans.
Tsargrad referred to the “lawlessness” of immigrants as a second focus of discontent, and “Espanyola,” an organization of veterans and former football fans, declared its readiness to resist “ethnocriminality,” demanding an investigation into all national diasporas in Russia and “corrupt officials” associated with them.
It argued there needs to be a fight with the “fifth column,” and it should not be allowed to “push through a shameful peace.” Veterans should have freedom to run for office and organize mob justice, the news channel said.
But the Kremlin knows that following the advice of Malofeev’s outlet and using soldiers to attack migrants, could quickly get out of control.
In the three years since the full-scale invasion, veterans from the front have killed and maimed more than 750 people after returning home. Most often, their victims were relatives and friends, and most of the crimes were of a domestic nature.
Consolidating those with criminal pasts and PTSD around some “common enemy” would be extremely difficult, while strengthening radical paramilitary groups would risk additional social tension across Russia.
Rather than integrating front-line soldiers into politics or law enforcement, the Kremlin is doing everything possible to stop them returning home. Russian army commanders are reported to be forcing mobilized soldiers to sign contracts with the Ministry of Defense by threatening to send them on a “meat assault” in which their chances of survival are almost nil.
Attempts to deliver on Putin’s call for war veterans to become a “new elite” have also faltered. In September’s regional elections, participants in the war in Ukraine won only 5% of the seats in Russia’s regional parliaments, while the overwhelming majority of candidates identifying themselves as “SVO veterans” failed to make it through the United Russia party’s primaries.
In Moscow, all 15 military candidates lost the preliminary vote, while in the Bryansk border region United Russia did not nominate a single war veteran.
There are claims that the leadership of pro-Kremlin parties sabotaged plans to make war veterans a new elite, and even those who were elected were unable to take office. Denis Tadyshev, who was elected head of the Balyktuyul rural settlement, for example, was forced to leave for the front after winning the vote.
The government also appears in no hurry to restore the health of veterans. Former soldiers complain they must wait months for prosthetics, and even pro-government media outlets have admitted that many end up homeless and receive no medical care. British military intelligence said on March 14 that 160 Russian hospitals were closed last year, probably because medical resources were being redirected from the civilian to the military sector.
It is inevitable that some will “seek the truth” and begin to pose a threat to the authorities. The ultra-nationalist part of the elites will seek to take advantage of this, causing the authorities to court their support — a process that already appears to be underway.
Pro-Kremlin Telegram channels claim that up to a quarter of new State Duma deputies will be recruited from “SVO veterans” as the authorities and nationalists join forces to target liberals, migrants, and the LGBT+ community. The Kremlin also regularly adopts nationalist slogans and allows radical groups to participate in maintaining law and order to ensure their loyalty.
But radical-conservative rhetoric does not resonate with the majority of Russians or with a significant number of returning soldiers. By following the lead of the far right, the Kremlin will not reduce the outrage caused by veterans’ crimes, but might instead stoke new hotbeds of societal tension.
Kseniya Kirillova is an analyst focused on Russian society, mentality, propaganda, and foreign policy. The author of numerous articles for CEPA and the Jamestown Foundation, she has also written for the Atlantic Council, Stratfor, and others.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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