If you asked anyone a year ago what urgent international challenge would be top of mind for global leaders gathered at Davos 2026, no one would have said Greenland. Yet, in the lead-up to the Forum, President Trump’s focus on the world’s largest island ensured that this would be the issue dominating the Alpine gathering.
Amidst US threats of tariffs on European countries, and Europe’s retaliatory warnings of blacklisting billions of US imports, it seemed that an off-ramp was nowhere in sight. Yet, shortly after his arrival, Trump ruled out the use of force to take the island and announced that he and NATO Secretary General Rutte were working on a framework to secure an expanded US presence on the island.
The deal is still light on details but reportedly aims to re-establish US bases across the island, which would include some territorial autonomy for the areas. The rapid de-escalation is good news for an already tense Europe-US relationship following disagreements over trade, tech regulation, and the negotiations to end Russia’s war in Ukraine. But what have we learned from the Greenland affair so far?
The Arctic is important. For years, President Trump has talked about the strategic importance of the Arctic and Greenland, in particular for US national security. And it’s true: the island sits at the intersection of security, economics, and strategic competition. Because Greenland links North America and Europe geographically and politically via Denmark, it’s become strategically central to NATO and broader transatlantic relations. The newly released US National Defense Strategy also elevates Greenland as a core US security concern, while downgrading US engagement with Europe, further driving the point that Europeans will need to shoulder the responsibility for their own defense.
Russia and China also see the Arctic as a key area for competition with the United States, which Trump also alluded to in the lead-up to his trip to Davos. The dispute has also underlined that the US president isn’t bound by traditional notions of national sovereignty and international security.
A greater US presence in the High North and in Greenland would buttress US security and NATO security, which are mutually reinforcing. It is true that the US significantly cut its previous presence in Greenland, opening potential vulnerabilities for adversaries to exploit. At the peak of the Cold War, the US garrisoned Greenland with 17 bases and roughly 10,000 troops. Now the only US base in Greenland, the Pituffik Space Base, houses fewer than 200 US troops.
European engagement and diplomacy with the US works. Europeans, and of course Denmark and Greenland, were and are opposed to any encroachment on Greenland’s sovereignty through force. In the lead-up to Davos, many European leaders reached out to the US president directly to express their concerns and position, which didn’t seem to work, until it did. US allies have historically welcomed more US engagement and, in the case of Greenland, a larger US military presence. The US remains the indispensable ally because it enjoys an international network of willing partners and allies providing an unrivalled global web of military bases. This serves US vital interests across the world, from the Western Hemisphere to the Indo-Pacific and in Europe. US global power thus rests on this network of trust and cooperation, which means that achieving wider security objectives is best done by sustaining cooperation and cohesion among allies. This, among other things, will prevent ambitious authoritarian adversaries from exploiting cleavages and advancing their own interests.
Taking our eyes off the most significant threat only serves our adversaries. For NATO, this is Russia, which continues its brutal war against Ukraine while intensifying its shadow war against Europe. The diplomatic drama over Greenland almost derailed the very delicate negotiations that the US has been leading with Ukraine, Europe, and Russia.
This is exactly what Putin wants. Such distraction also benefits China, which will use the frustrations and high emotions in both the US and Europe to present itself as the more reliable partner. Europeans should not fall for this façade, but tensions between the transatlantic allies will embolden those who seek closer cooperation with China.
We know from experience that working with our natural allies multiplies our power and influence. The leadership in Moscow and Beijing know this too, which helps explain why they have deepened their relationship. Democracies are in a better position to defend their interests and security when they are aligned rather than divided.
Dr. Alina Polyakova is President and CEO of the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) as well as the Donald Marron Senior Fellow at the Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS).
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
War Without End
Russia’s Shadow Warfare
CEPA Forum 2025
Explore CEPA’s flagship event.
