In the blizzard of announcements from Washington following the Congressional agreement on a $61bn Ukraine-related aid package, it was easy to be overwhelmed by the numbers and the sometimes hard-to-grasp detail.
Given the sheer sums of money involved and the plethora of military systems, contracts, and loans involved, that’s unsurprising.
The first tranche of US aid was clearly stated. Following President Biden’s April 24 signature of the supplemental, he approved $1bn in immediate assistance largely composed of what Ukraine lacked — artillery ammunition, air defense missiles, mines, and armored vehicles. These supplies are drawn from existing stocks.
This is authorized under the Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA.) This system was created by the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act and gives the president the right to provide immediate military assistance to a foreign country without Congressional approval. The latest legislation caps this at $7.8bn, which is estimated to include about $5.3bn for Ukraine. Another $2.9bn is also available from the previous year. It also defines how much money the Department of Defense (DoD) will receive to replenish its own stocks (buying new equipment to replace the old stocks.)
DoD will get $13.4bn to replenish the weapons to be sent to Ukraine. — the mismatch between the two numbers can be explained by the difference in the price of the old weapons sent to Ukraine and the new ones to replenish DoD stocks.
There have been 56 drawdowns to assist Ukraine, with military aid now totaling $20.9 bn (after an accounting error worth $6.2 is included.) Once approved, these authorizations are limited to one fiscal year but can be used in the following year if the administration notifies Congress. Should it fail to, these funds would expire (as happened in the 2022 fiscal year, when $1.6bn for Ukraine expired).
What about the rest of the money?
On April 26 at the Ramstein group meeting of Ukraine’s military aid suppliers, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin announced the largest US sum so far sent, totaling $6bn.
This money forms part of the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI.) This comprises military aid that will take longer to arrive since it is purchased by the American government from weapons manufacturers in the US.
The new package is expected to include air defense missiles, counter-drone systems, and artillery ammunition.
Before the latest package was agreed on, the US had allocated $19bn for the production of new arms. These funds are not being spent at once, but divided into numerous small orders. That is why as of January, $6bn of that sum has not yet been contracted. The new law suggests another $13.8bn will be invested into the production of new arms for Ukraine; the $6bn announced by Austin will be covered by this money.
So, Ukraine is now beginning to receive arms ordered in earlier years. For example, it took US defense firms 12 months to manufacture new ground-launched small-diameter bombs (GLSDBs), a new system. It is unclear how many backorders are still in the system and have not yet been delivered.
The $61bn total also includes $7.8 bn as a loan for economic aid to Ukraine. While this is repayable, it can be forgiven by the president if he or she chooses.
The rest of the supplemental will be spent exclusively on the US armed forces “to respond to the situation in Ukraine and for related purposes”. These include extra procurement of weapons for the Pentagon; spending on military personnel, operations and maintenance, and research, often referred to as “US military operations in the region.”
Acknowledging this, the supplemental legislation calls for a new multi-year strategy of support to be agreed “to help hasten Ukrainian victory against Russia’s invasion forces.”
A sustainable approach is required by the European allies as well. Greater certainty is needed, both to aid Ukraine and to signal to Putin that the West will continue to resist his war of imperial conquest.
Marianna Fakhurdinova is a Visiting Fulbright Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) and Associate Fellow at the New Europe Center (Kyiv).
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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