Assailed by waves of Russian assault troops, short of personnel and ammunition, and with some questioning their stomach for the fight, Ukraine’s army has once again reminded us of its core strength — it fights for national survival, and that makes it a formidable defensive force.
The Russian campaign began on May 10 and was described by some analysts as seeking to establish a buffer zone near its border with Kharkiv district. But it was much more than that — it was an opportunity to test Ukrainian units stretched along a 1,000km (620 mile) front line. Almost two months later, they have passed a bloody examination.
What now? The aftermath of the failed Russian springtime offensive offers a crucial insight into the evolving conditions of both the Russian and Ukrainian militaries in the third bloody year of the Kremlin’s “special military operation”.
Following the intense combat in the Kharkiv region, the relative strengths and weaknesses of each side have become more apparent, influenced by their strategic decisions, military capacities, and the international support they have received. How will the conflict evolve in the coming months?
The Russian military’s failure highlights several critical aspects of their operational capabilities and limitations.
Russia launched the offensive with a significant force, attempting to breach Ukrainian defenses north of Kharkiv city, near Vovchansk. Moreover, this offensive was designed to draw Ukrainian reserves from around Vuhledar (Luhansk) and Chasiv Yar (Donetsk), where Russia’s grinding offensives have failed to achieve the desired breakthroughs. (It has made some progress in the latter area of operations.)
Despite initial territorial gains, the Kharkiv campaign had stalled by early June due to fierce Ukrainian resistance and logistical challenges exacerbated by Ukrainian targeting of supply lines across the border in Russia’s Belgorod region (something made possible by the Biden administration’s agreement to the use of weaponry over the border and fresh US supplies of artillery ammunition and ballistic missiles.)
Russia’s inability to break Ukrainian forces underscores persistent issues within its military structure, including poor planning and coordination, inadequate logistical support, and low troop morale.
Despite the lessons from 40 months of intensive combat, Russia’s military relies on outdated tactics and equipment. While it has attempted to modernize its forces, much of its military hardware dates back to the Soviet era and lacks the technological edge seen in Western equipment.
Moreover, Russian forces have struggled to maintain a steady supply chain, crucial for sustained operations. The offensive’s failure also revealed weaknesses in Russian flexibility and command structures, which were outmaneuvered by more agile Ukrainian forces.
This rigidity is also a direct result of poor pre-combat training, with an increasing percentage of men fed into the Ukrainian “meat grinder” with little preparation. Since the launch of the full-scale invasion in February 2022, Russia has lost most of its first-line modern main battle tanks (T-90M and upgraded T-72B3M) and severely depleted its Soviet-era reserve stocks of older models (original T-72s and T-64s.) Open source material shows Russia has suffered confirmed losses of almost 3,200 tanks, along with multiple thousands more armored vehicles and artillery pieces.
Despite criticisms of the sanctions regime against Russia, the measures are having a significant effect on its military-industrial complex. While weapons production has dramatically increased with the shift to a full wartime economy, these sanctions and the contraction of Russia’s petrochemical industries have hindered its ability to procure advanced technology and equipment.
For example, the effect of these sanctions and economic factors have driven down the production of Su-34 fighter bombers, with 20 produced in 2022, 12 in 2023, and only eight projected for completion in 2024. Russia has lost over 82 of these aircrafts, with an estimated total value of nearly $3bn, to Ukrainian fire or accidents since February 2022.
Conversely, the Ukrainian military has demonstrated significant resilience and adaptability in response to the Russian offensive. Following the initial shock, Ukrainian forces quickly regrouped and mounted a successful counteroffensive, stabilizing the frontlines and reclaiming key territories by mid-June.
This success is indicative of several key strengths within the Ukrainian military. The rapidity and intensity of Ukraine’s counterattack have shaken the confidence of Russian formations facing them in Kharkiv, with the 83rd Airborne Brigade reportedly destroyed and other Russian troops mutinying around Vovchansk.
Firstly, the Ukrainian forces have benefited immensely from Western military aid, including advanced weaponry, intelligence support, and training. That much of this recent aid began to arrive in Ukraine just weeks before Russia’s Kharkiv offensive, yet following months of unnecessary legislative and bureaucratic delays, was a tremendous boon for Kyiv’s forces at a critical time.
The provision of fresh supplies of modern anti-tank missiles, drones, artillery systems, and ammunition enhanced Ukraine’s defensive and offensive capabilities directly contributing to the defeat of Russia’s offensive. Additionally, the Ukrainian military’s ability to rapidly integrate these technologies into their operational strategies effectively has been a key factor in their success. The support from NATO countries has not only supplied much-needed equipment but has also boosted morale and provided strategic depth to Ukrainian defense operations.
Ukraine also boasts highly motivated and adaptable combat units. These formations have shown a remarkable capacity for rapid learning and adaptation in the face of evolving battlefield conditions. Their decentralized command structure allows for more flexible and responsive decision-making, contrasting sharply with the more rigid and hierarchical Russian command. This has enabled Ukrainian units to exploit Russian tactical errors and maintain the initiative in critical engagements.
Moreover, the Ukrainian military’s emphasis on territorial defense and partisan activities in occupied areas has created a challenging environment for Russian forces. Local resistance movements have disrupted Russian supply lines and conducted intelligence operations aiding Ukrainian deep strikes, adding behind-the-lines challenges for the ongoing offensive. These grassroots efforts have underscored the widespread national commitment to repelling the invasion and reclaiming occupied territories.
However, this tactical-level decentralization has also created challenges in operational command and control as well as the logistics necessary for sustained offensive operations. While more junior Ukrainian leaders demonstrate greater flexibility, many senior commanders adhere to the older Soviet doctrine under which they were trained.
This operational rigidity squanders much of the lower-echelon initiative. Competition for logistical support, sometimes relying on personal relationships and corrupt practices, has undermined overall effectiveness. Unless addressed, these shortcomings will reappear more vividly once Ukraine resumes counteroffensives, as was observed during the failed offensives in southeastern Ukraine during the summer and fall of 2023.
Most pressing, Ukraine needs to overcome its significant recruitment issues to keep fighting. With a potential military population several times larger than that of Ukraine, Russia has an obvious quantitative advantage, forcing Ukraine to focus on a strategic defense for the foreseeable future.
Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently claimed that Russia has suffered eight times more casualties than Ukraine in its failed Kharkiv offensive. That may seem encouraging, but Ukraine’s forces are undermanned, have suffered serious losses, and have an inadequate pipeline of new people. Ukraine can win an attritional conflict only if it can improve recruitment and Russia continues to squander its manpower on such poorly planned, resourced, and executed offensives. And in any war, it’s not a great idea to bank on the enemy’s incompetence, because that can change.
The fighting in Kharkiv has starkly revealed the relative conditions of the Russian and Ukrainian militaries. Russia continues to grapple with systemic issues, including outdated equipment, logistical inefficiencies, and poor strategic planning.
In contrast, the Ukrainian military has capitalized on international support, technological advancements, and high morale to mount a robust defense and some limited counteroffensive operations.
The war is at a stalemate and, unless the Russian military collapses into complete indiscipline (as with the Wagner mutiny last year), there are no foreseeable opportunities for a large-scale Ukrainian counteroffensive. If attempted, it would play out much like last summer’s bloody and ineffective campaign.
In this war, defense is king.
Doug Livermore is the vice president of operations at The Hoplite Group, a global threat analysis company providing bespoke support to government and commercial clients. Doug also continues his military service as the Deputy Commander for Special Operations Detachment – Joint Special Operations Command in the North Carolina Army National Guard. In addition to his role as the Director of Communications for the Irregular Warfare Initiative, he is the National Director of External Communications for the Special Forces Association, National Secretary for the Special Operations Association of America, Secretary of the Corioli Institute, and serves on the Board of Directors for No One Left Behind.
Disclaimer: The views expressed are the author’s and do not represent official US Government, Department of Defense, or Department of the Army positions.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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