Public support for NATO membership in both countries remains strong, with more than 60% in Sweden and 80% in Finland backing the alliance. With such support for abandoning neutrality, Stockholm and Helsinki have been able to focus on their commitments to NATO’s command and force structures.
A lot of work had already been done to integrate into the alliance before they officially joined, through planning, identifying integration and investment opportunities, and their contributions to the NATO Battlegroups in Latvia.
Since joining, both have signed defense cooperation agreements (DCAs) that would allow the stationing of US forces and equipment in their countries, with a particular emphasis on establishing a presence above the Arctic Circle.
Allies can expect much more, particularly in areas where they have substantial resources and expertise, such as the production of domestic European defense systems. Sweden, which designs and produces everything from submarines and frigates to fighter jets and air defenses, maintains one of the most robust and sophisticated defense industries in Europe, amounting to around $3bn in 2022.
While Finland doesn’t host massive industrial players, apart from Patria and Nammo, its defense sector is sophisticated and made up of small, rapidly growing manufacturers, especially for dual-use technologies. Between 40% and 60% of production is exported and totaled around $2bn in 2024.
Both countries are adept and experienced in civil defense, cold weather operations, and understanding the threat posed by Russia, all areas in which they can take a lead in the alliance and support security in the region.
They are more advanced in civil defense than the US and many other allies, with Sweden returning to civil defense in earnest after Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014.
Finland, which never divested its civil defense culture, infrastructure, conscription, or reserves, can muster 980,000 military personnel in wartime and has a well-established command and control organization at the ready.
As it shares a 1,340km (833 mile) border with Russia, Finland also monitors the Kremlin’s activities closely and takes measures to counteract them, whether hybrid or direct. A large portion of the responsibility lies with the Border Guards, a robust and professional force that is very familiar with Russian behavior and made significant technical improvements, though staffing in some areas is thin.
Sweden has a new National Security Council, which operates under the Office of the Prime Minister and coordinates the country’s national security strategy and crisis management. Established to streamline the response to threats, the council includes representatives from a range of ministries and agencies, ensuring collaboration across government.
There are, however, areas where Stockholm and Helsinki need to spend more time and resources. Both countries have maintained a relatively small active full-time military across all branches, with Finland about 30,000 strong and Sweden around 27,000, though many of the population are trained for combat and reserve forces can be mobilized at scale.
The small standing forces mean both countries have relatively low numbers of senior military and civilian personnel. Contributions of military personnel to NATO are based on the size of the country, so both will have to increase their NATO personnel commitments, especially in NATO Joint Force Command Norfolk, the likely operational headquarters for the Arctic and High North regions.
Growing their officer core and expanding the number of civil servants will take time, but both countries are aware of the issue and are investing to fix it.
Both countries have also been inwardly focused. Their defense planning and ability for force projection stops at, or close to, their borders, and movement, transportation, and sustainment has been developed for that purpose.
As a result, they have understandable concerns about their capability and capacity to deliver for NATO, especially in out-of-area operations and force projection to places where the alliance may need support.
Sweden and Finland can and should take on a substantial leadership role in the alliance. As much as the alliance brings stability and security to both nations, they also increase the security of NATO allies and its combined warfighting capabilities.
Both countries will be at the forefront on a bevy of issues, including Arctic security, allied policy planning and implementation, regional alignment, cold weather operations, Russian expertise, and civil defense.
The Nordic-Baltic region is becoming a new center of gravity in Europe, and the US should encourage all NATO states to engage with their new partners across the full spectrum of national influence, not the least of which is meeting NATO defense and deterrence requirements.
Lt Gen Lance Landrum (ret.) is a Non-resident Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA.) He served in the US Air Force for over 31 years developing leadership experience in global operations, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and joint requirements and capability development. Currently, he is the President of Team Landrum Advising and Consulting, LLC. Lance served as the Deputy Chair of NATO’s Military Committee (2021-2023)
Arnis Cimermanis is a recipient of the Baltic American Freedom Foundation (BAFF) professional internship scholarship and is currently an intern with the Transatlantic Defense and Security program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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