For the first time in decades, European NATO must consider fighting without the critical support and capabilities of the US military, the backbone of the alliance. The US is no longer “primarily focused on the security of Europe,” Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth told allies in Brussels on February 12.

Europe is not defenseless. Its militaries have well-trained forces, but they lack the strategic capabilities, command structures, and the sheer firepower necessary to sustain a prolonged conflict independently. From missile defense systems to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, Europe’s security is still heavily dependent on American support, raising urgent questions about what happens if that vanishes.

That’s the bad news, says Maj. Gen. (rtd.) Gordon “Skip” Davis, a senior fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) and former deputy assistant Secretary General at NATO. The somewhat better news is that Russia continues to fight an exhausting war against Ukraine and is not yet ready to move westward.

But that will change if Russia is given “two, maybe three to five years”, to rebuild its forces while Europe fails to rearm at the same pace, at which point “they would be at a significant disadvantage in a high-intensity fight,” he warned.

Davis says Europe’s shortcomings without the US fall into three critical categories:

1. Strategic capabilities
2. Operational and Theater-level capabilities
3. Firepower and military mass

Strategic Capabilities

Europe’s most significant defense shortfalls lie in strategic enablers, the high-level capabilities, assets, and resources that enhance the effectiveness of military operations and support the execution of strategic plans. Without these, European forces would struggle to sustain operations on their own.

“What the US brings is capabilities like strategic command and control systems and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets. At a strategic level, we’re talking about systems to command and control multi-domain operations, high-altitude, long-endurance platforms, space capabilities, cyber capabilities, and strategic airlift to move forces quickly,” he said.

NATO assessments confirm that Europe remains overly dependent on the US for these enablers, particularly ISR, including uncrewed systems and space-based capabilities, integrated air and missile defense, long-range precision strike capabilities, and strategic airlift and air-to-air refueling.

The EU’s Capability Development Plan (CDP), which identified eight priorities related to strategic capabilities and recent NATO initiatives to improve passive air surveillance and counter low-level air threats, aim to address some of these deficiencies.

However, these programs remain in the early stages, leaving European forces with limited independent capacity.

Operational and Theater-level capabilities

Another key challenge is operational command. NATO’s top operational commands, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), Allied Air Command (AIRCOM), Allied Land Command (LANDCOM), and Joint Forces Command Naples, are all led by US officers.

“I don’t think that NATO could operate without US commanders and staff. That would be extremely difficult,” said Davis.

Whether or not these commands could continue to function under US leadership in the absence of US forces is uncertain. “It’s possible that even if US forces are not engaged, US commanders, including the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, SACEUR, would continue to command allied forces,” Davis said.

The European Union (EU) lacks a unified military force and is politically divided on defense matters. While France and Germany have advocated for greater European strategic autonomy, last week’s emergency summits in Paris has highlighted divisions among member states on how to approach European security and support for Ukraine.

Beyond leadership, the US provides the experience and operational tools to command large land, air, and maritime forces across an entire theater of war. Among the most critical assets are its command and control (C2) and situational awareness systems, as well as its long-range precision strike capabilities, including the HIMARS missile system with ATACMS, which enable deep strikes into enemy territory and that have been deployed in Ukraine. While France and the UK have long-range cruise missiles such as SCALP and Storm Shadow, they don’t have the long-range strike systems at the scale the US can provide.

Firepower and Military Mass

The US also provides critical tactical-level forces that fill out NATO’s land forces. These include artillery, air missile defense capabilities, engineering, intelligence, and electronic warfare, which NATO allies have but lack in sufficient numbers to fight alone.

In fact, these assets “are lacking from most of the high readiness force corps the allies have,” said Davis.

European nations have airpower, including a growing fleet of F-35 fifth-generation combat aircraft, but these alone cannot compensate for shortfalls in ground-based firepower and raise the question of excessive reliance on a single weapon system.

Right now, European NATO lacks the integrated air and missile defense it needs for modern high intensity warfare, Davis says, while noting that many allies have the Patriot and shorter-range systems, and that Germany has begun its Sky Shield program, while other NATO programs are also underway. It will also need “some of the tactical capabilities that we’ve learned from watching the Russian forces fight in Ukraine”, like “a greater electronic warfare capability, greater air and missile defense at the tactical and theater levels, [and] lots more uncrewed aerial systems and counter-drone systems.

The war in Ukraine has exposed Europe’s weaknesses in munition stockpiles and the industrial capacity required to refill inventories, Davis said. The EU failed to deliver on its promise to supply Ukraine with 1 million artillery shells by spring 2024, while the US succeeded in doubling monthly production of 155mm shells. Meanwhile, Russia has significantly ramped up its ammunition production, reportedly producing about 3 million artillery munitions annually while also procuring large numbers from North Korea

“That’s where European production has not reached the level of need yet and certainly not stockpiled the requirements for a potential fight with a peer adversary,” Davis added.

While the world awaits the outcome of ceasefire negotiations between the US and Russia, one thing is clear: the threat posed by Russia will not go away any time soon. If Europe wants to stand up to a rearmed and reconstituted Russian armed force, they will need to increase their defense budget for several years. A goal of 5% of GDP is about right for the near term, according to Davis.

However, political feasibility remains a major obstacle. While Central and East European countries, particularly Poland and the Baltic states, have aggressively ramped up their defense spending, public sentiment in Western Europe remains divided on military investments, and domestic politics may make it difficult for leaders to justify such a dramatic increase in spending.

As for the national security implications for the US, Davis says it’s hard to see the benefits from the administration’s approach.

The danger, Davis argues, is that a message is sent saying, “strength against Europe and the US will lead to concessions and could provide a dangerous signal to China over Taiwan, that aggression will be rewarded, that bullying will be accepted and accommodated.”

As for Putin: “It will embolden him, and more likely make him believe that he can seek greater gains, perhaps at the expense of weaker countries, think Moldova and Georgia. This would only incite further aggression by Russia and undermine US security by causing instability in Europe and trigger instability in the Indo-Pacific.”

Davis concluded: “The most important things that European leaders can do right now are to unify around a single message that peace cannot be bought at the expense of Ukraine’s future in Europe and without Ukraine’s and Europe’s participation in peace talks, and also that Europe will increase defense spending, defense production, to meet its own needs and those of Ukraine.”

Maj Gen (Ret) Skip Davis is a Non-resident Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). He was NATO’s Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Defense Investment after retiring from the US Army after more than 37 years of service. Commissioned in the infantry he served the first half of his career in rapid deployment airborne and infantry units and spent over 20 years abroad including command in Iraq and Afghanistan, and multiple operations in Africa and the Balkans.

Interview conducted and written by Mila Tanghe, Mila attended Columbia University and is currently an Intern with the Editorial team at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.