World War II marked the last time the US Navy fleet engaged in active warfare when it concurrently defeated German U-boats and the Imperial Japanese Navy. The US military and its allies must now modernize their strategy for two-ocean warfare to deter Moscow and Beijing’s encroaching military postures.
In a simultaneous war in the Atlantic and the Pacific, cooperation between Russia and China would pose severe security threats to the stability and strength of the US and NATO.
Growing Russian-Chinese cooperation creates new risks that can magnify their formidable undersea threat. The increasingly global People’s Liberation Army Navy — already the world’s biggest in terms of quantity if not quality — would gain significant capabilities if partnered with Russia, ultimately impeding maritime operations in both the Atlantic and the Pacific while expanding strategic maritime competition.
If Russia provided China with access to the Northern Sea Route, for example, Beijing would gain an economic advantage and significantly improve its ability to quickly transport goods and even troops through the Arctic. As the strength of a state’s logistical chain determines a fleet’s mobility, a Chinese presence in the region would give both countries increased freedom of navigation.
Leveraging this power to become a “Near-Arctic Nation” would not only encourage China to exploit new transport routes but also the region’s vast resources of oil, natural gas, minerals, and fisheries, which are becoming more readily available as a result of ice-melt caused by climate change.
Russia and China both possess strategic nuclear, hypersonic anti-ship missiles, and anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) weapons, which would push naval adversaries farther out to sea or keep them trapped in port.
These weapons could complicate naval warfare and limit the role of aircraft carriers, destroying ships’ air defenses and fleet architecture in milliseconds. Collaboration or possible consolidation of these weapons could directly instigate a two-ocean war with escalation to nuclear war, positing an existential threat to the US homeland and European continent.
The US has long postured, through its capabilities and military expansion, to fight and win in one theater while holding onto another. But, given Russia and China’s imperialistic objectives, it is likely a partnership would severely test the US and its allies.
The NATO Command and Control (C2) structure is not the primary issue raised by those concerned with the US and Europe’s ability to manage a two-ocean war, as it would prove adequate with competing conflicts. The problem instead centers around the alliance being stretched too thin.
With emerging threats, new technologies, and the state of naval warfare rapidly changing, today’s warships require far more advanced experience, expertise and robust civilian contractor support than they did during World War II. To combat this deficit, the US and its allies must prioritize the improvement of their interoperable capabilities and maintain ocean-to-ocean deterrence.
As there is no perfect C2 structure, and there are varying perspectives among subordinate commanders under Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), NATO must strategically understand the challenges to ensure C2 does not become an operational vulnerability.
Efforts should prioritize the cross-cutting nature of Multi-Domain Operations, which threaten to undermine the command structure and expose the personnel and geographical gaps in alliance missions.
The ideal structure to counter Russia and China would focus on the Arctic, with the entire Scandinavian Peninsula, now including Finland and Sweden, assigned to NATO Joint Force Command Norfolk (JFC-NF.) Surface combatant presence in the Arctic is crucial to expand NATO surveillance and tackle the security challenges from Russia’s heightened activity in the region.
Such action should include more frequent, comprehensive, and routine Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS), either undersea or by surfacing during the summer melt season. Exercises for enhancing interoperability in the Arctic between the US and allies, such as the biennial ICe EXercise (ICEX), must be also expanded to maintain mission readiness and response.
Most importantly, consistency with NATO’s new Concept for Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic (DDA) will ensure purpose-driven military deterrence in peacetime as well as robust, integrated force defense on an alliance-wide operational-strategic scale.
This strategy would support adaptability to the demands of modern warfare, a changing security environment and enhance the US and NATO’s capability to prevent the emergence of a two-ocean war.
Admiral Andrew “Woody” Lewis is a Non-resident Distinguished Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). Admiral Lewis culminated his 36-year-long military career as a 3-star officer. He commanded the US Second Fleet, and played a key role in developing the 2018 Navy Strategy, influencing the National Defense Strategy and NATO’s military strategy.
Krista Viksnins is a Senior Program Officer with the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). She received her J.D. from the University of St. Thomas School of Law and her B.A. in Political Science and Spanish from St. Olaf College. She is also a licensed attorney.
Ginger Matchett graduated from American University in 2023 and is a former intern with the Transatlantic Defense and Security program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA.)
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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