Some Western diplomats in Kyiv have reportedly begun contingency planning to relocate to Lviv or eastern Poland if Russian attacks on the capital intensify further. Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry later said that no diplomatic mission had formally notified it of plans to leave Kyiv.
The reports may never translate into actual relocation, but they highlight a potentially much bigger problem: what happens if Russia’s growing pressure on the capital succeeds in persuading Ukraine’s international partners to abandon Kyiv, as many did in 2022?
That question has become more urgent as Moscow’s campaign against Kyiv grows increasingly disruptive. Recent strikes have hit energy infrastructure and the bridges connecting the two banks of the Dnipro. More than a third of Kyiv’s residents live on the left bank while many work on the right, making these crossings central to the city’s daily functioning.
Their targeting also marks an evolution in Russia’s campaign. Bridges are difficult and inefficient targets for expensive missiles, but increasingly precise and relatively cheap drones make repeated strikes more feasible. Russia does not need to destroy them outright. Even limited damage can force closures, inspections and delays, creating disproportionate disruption and adding another pressure point in a broader campaign against Kyiv’s economy and everyday life ahead of winter. On October 21, it fired ballistic missiles with warheads designed to rain cluster munitions across the city.
Moscow has made the diplomatic dimension clear. On October 3, its Foreign Ministry again urged foreign nationals and diplomatic personnel to leave Ukraine while saying that strikes on Kyiv and other cities would continue.
Embassies embody a serious political symbolism, but they are much more than mere flags planted in a capital to demonstrate solidarity. They are part of the machinery through which Western support for Ukraine actually works. Diplomats maintain regular contact with Ukrainian ministries, the presidency, parliament, military officials, businesses, civil society organizations and one another. They help coordinate military assistance, reconstruction, sanctions policy, economic support and Ukraine’s integration with European institutions.
Moving that machinery hundreds of kilometers west, possibly to Lviv, or outside Ukraine altogether, would inevitably introduce additional disruption. Meetings currently held across Kyiv would require long-distance travel or be reduced to video calls. Everyday interaction would become less frequent and more formal. Diplomats would spend more time moving to and from the government to which they are accredited and less time actually working with it.
The events of 2022 provide an uncomfortable parallel. In the weeks before Russia’s full-scale invasion, the United States temporarily relocated its embassy operations from Kyiv to Lviv amid growing fears of a Russian assault, and the United Kingdom followed days later. Many others did the same. Those decisions reflected the extraordinary uncertainty of the moment and genuine fears that Kyiv might soon fall into Russian hands.
Four and a half years later, the circumstances are fundamentally different. Kyiv remains the functioning political center of a state that survived Russia’s attempt to capture it. Recreating the images of early 2022 now would therefore carry a different message. It could suggest that sustained bombardment had achieved politically what Russian forces failed to achieve militarily.
If embassies relocate in response to Moscow’s pressure and explicit calls for diplomats to leave, it could also reinforce the perception in the Kremlin that such coercion works, encouraging further pressure on Ukraine’s foreign partners. Nor would relocation to Lviv remove the threat altogether. Russia’s newest jet-powered Geran-5 drones reportedly have a range of more than 600 miles, putting western Ukraine within reach as well. Relocation might therefore reduce some of the immediate risks and operational disruption associated with Kyiv, but it would not provide complete protection from Russian long-range strikes.
So far, Western governments have remained unmoved. EU Ambassador Katarína Mathernová said on October 5 that all 25 EU member states with embassies in Kyiv intended to remain, alongside the EU Advisory Mission. She also stressed that Russia’s warnings would not reduce the bloc’s support for Ukraine.
That presence is not merely rhetorical. EU ambassadors met President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Kyiv on October 1 to discuss air defense, financial resilience, sanctions and Ukraine’s EU accession process. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz travelled to Kyiv days later as the city continued to come under Russian attack and announced additional military and energy support.
Those visits matter symbolically. But permanent working-level presence matters even more. A succession of visiting ministers cannot replace diplomats who understand Ukrainian institutions, maintain relationships and solve problems on the ground every day.
The answer is not to pretend that remaining in Kyiv is risk-free, or to ask diplomatic staff to demonstrate courage for its own sake. Some may decide to offer staff a chance to stay or leave. Governments have a duty to protect their employees. The better approach is to treat diplomatic continuity as another resilience problem.
Missions should plan for protected working facilities, reliable shelters, backup electricity and communications, flexible and remote working during prolonged alerts, alternative transport arrangements when bridges are closed, and staff rotations where necessary. With Kyiv divided by the Dnipro, missions may also need to rethink daily movement and ensure that temporary transport disruption does not paralyze their work.
Above all, strengthening Ukraine’s air defense remains essential. The case for providing more interceptors and air-defense systems is already overwhelming on humanitarian, military, and economic grounds. Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities remain vulnerable as Russian aerial attacks intensify and shortages of effective air defense persist. But there is an additional benefit: protecting Kyiv’s airspace helps keep not only Ukrainian government institutions and infrastructure functioning, but also the international network that supports them.
Life and work in Kyiv may become considerably harder this winter. Western governments should plan accordingly. But resilience means adapting institutions to continue functioning under pressure. Russia failed to force Ukraine’s government and its partners out of Kyiv in 2022. Its allies should make sure that sustained bombardment cannot accomplish the same thing four years later.
Margaryta Khvostova is a PhD Candidate in Politics in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Surrey, a PhD Fellow at the Centre for Britain and Europe (CBE), and Programmes Manager at the Centre for the Study of Global Power Competition (CGPC).
Professor Amelia Hadfield is Head of the Department of Politics, Founding Director of the Centre for Britain and Europe (CBE), and Associate Vice President of External Engagement at the University of Surrey.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
