Yes, David used a slingshot to topple a much larger and more heavily armed Goliath. “Davids” in Algeria, Vietnam, and Afghanistan fought and drove out more powerful antagonists, but those examples are remembered because they are rare.
Britain’s North American colonies began their war for independence with poorly trained “Minuteman” militias confronting the redcoats, one of the world’s largest and most professional armies. Under a British-trained general, George Washington, this ragtag force gradually expanded and, financed by the 13 colonies, fought the British army nearly to a draw.
It was only when French money, arms, advisers, and warships arrived that the Continental Army could defeat the British on land and sea. The colonies needed a semblance of symmetry to win.
Benjamin Franklin persuaded King Louis XVI to help the colonies weaken France’s foe across the English Channel, but it seriously depleted the French treasury. US military and economic aid to Ukraine, by contrast, cost only a third of one percent of US GDP in the first 15 months of the war, while greatly undermining a major US adversary.
The term asymmetric warfare is misleading if it is used to imply a cheap way to military success. Most confrontations are asymmetric because the combatants are unequal in some respects. The USSR had more troops and nuclear warheads than the West but lacked long-range bombers and a strong navy. It had far more land, but a third-rate economy, and spent heavily in a failed attempt to keep up with US military technology.
Ukraine is the biggest country in Europe, but small next to the Russian Federation. Its population is not one-third that of its belligerent neighbor and it has no nuclear weapons because, pressured by the White House and Downing Street, it gave them up in the 1990s.
Like most of Europe, it permitted its army, navy, and air force to shrink and deteriorate in the glow of the post-Cold War era. Kyiv’s attitude changed after 2014 but not sufficiently to deter an overconfident Vladimir Putin in February 2022.
Though outgunned in every way, Ukraine drove back Putin’s forces, but not with slingshots. Brave Ukrainians on Snake Island defied the Russian navy but were soon conquered until, after four months, Ukrainian firepower and military acumen drove away the occupiers.
Closer to Kyiv, Ukrainians demolished columns of tanks and armored vehicles with modern weapons. Home-made drones at first merely harassed Russia’s Black Sea fleet but, as these drones became more sophisticated, they destroyed major ships and compelled most of Putin’s navy to retreat from Crimea.
Despite great shortfalls in military hardware and numbers of troops, Ukraine’s counteroffensives in 2022 and the first half of 2023 pushed back Russian forces in the north, east, and south — but not much in Donbas or Crimea.
The two sides stalemated as Ukrainian forces met Russian mines and well-fortified trenches. Without effective air support, the Ukrainians have been deeply vulnerable to artillery and airplanes.
Not just morale, but ingenuity and persistence have helped Ukraine against Russia. We can call it asymmetric warfare, but it did not come cheap. Ukraine needed billions in foreign aid to cope with budget deficits, pay salaries, and compensate its workshops and factories for whatever weapons and other supplies they produced.
Ukraine’s experience shows that surface-to-air missiles and abundant drones can deny an invader air superiority, while sea drones have helped drive much of the Russian fleet from Crimea. (Yet another Russian vessel was sunk by sea drones on February 13.)
To shield cities and protect forces advancing into occupied territory will probably require many powerful aircraft like the F-16 (some are due to arrive this year.)
In August 2023, Ukrainian Su-24 bombers destroyed a Russian S-400 air defense system in Crimea using British-supplied Storm Shadow cruise missiles, clearing the path for an attack on Russia’s naval base at Sevastopol.
Today’s reliance on unmanned aerial vehicles has rapidly become conventional. Ukraine’s counteroffensive requires more parity of combatants, as well as fire support and engineering superiority.
All these experiences show why Ukraine urgently needs money and materiel to defeat and expel all Russian forces from its territories.
Timing is crucial. The time to act is now.
Walter Clemens is an Associate, at Harvard Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies and Professor Emeritus of Political Science, at Boston University. He wrote Blood Debts: What Putin and Xi Owe Their Victims.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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