Europe’s northern waters are cold (5 degrees centigrade) at this time of year. But the geopolitics are steaming hot. A Russian corvette, the Merkuriy, last month launched flares to deter scrutiny from a German naval helicopter, the Wall Street Journal has just reported. A week earlier, NATO countries’ naval vessels detained a Chinese-owned bulk carrier, the Yi Peng 3, on suspicion that it deliberately dragged its anchor in order to cut two data cables in the Baltic Sea. Since then the Chinese ship has been at anchor—apparently on the instruction of the Beijing authorities—in the Kattegat, the straits between Denmark and Sweden.
The WSJ also quotes investigators who say that Russian intelligence “induced” the merchant ship’s Chinese captain to conduct the sabotage. Western officials would like to quiz the crew about this. China, so far, says no. Meanwhile Russia has sent the Merkuriy, which is more often seen escorting sanctions-busting freighters in the Mediterranean, to join the party and conduct electronic surveillance.
This is a classic “gray zone” attack. It falls well below the threshold of armed conflict. It is complicated. Attributing definitive blame and motive is hard. It could easily escalate, something that Western decision-makers regard nervously. All responses therefore look difficult. Yet doing nothing sets a horrible precedent, that attackers act with impunity.
One big problem is international law. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) gives strong protection to any ship in international waters. The right of “innocent passage” allows vessels strong rights to move unhindered. If Nato countries break that principle for their convenience in Europe, the Chinese Communist Party will be thrilled. It can then start interfering with merchant shipping around Taiwan. A huge Chinese naval exercise is under way around the self-governing island: a rehearsal, perhaps, for a blockade. Bouncing Western countries into ditching UNCLOS would be a great launch-pad for that.
Another problem is political. Nobody wants to be the first to pick a fight with the thin-skinned and vindictive Chinese Communist Party.
All sides seem content to let the impasse continue. But that is not a neutral outcome. It ties up scarce resources. Sweden has already withdrawn its coastguard vessels from the Kattegat for other duties. And it underlines the real point: that Western countries do not know how to react to these attacks.
Make that “most Western countries”. Estonia has since 1998 pioneered a more robust approach to Russian mischief. Its security police publishes an annual report detailing the stunts and plots it has uncovered. Estonia prosecutes spies and traitors rather than hushing up their doings. And it hits those it catches hard. A court has just handed down a six and a half year sentence to a 47-year-old man called Allan Hantsom. He is a notorious pro-Kremlin activist who organised acts of vandalism starting in October 2023, such as breaking the windows of the interior minister’s car. He was charged not with simple hooliganism though, but with working on behalf of Russia’s GRU military intelligence. Hence the hefty sentence.
Using the courts to the fullest extent, Estonian-style, is one option. Innocent passage must be “continuous and expeditious” and must not harm coastal states’ “peace, security, or good order”. Lawyers might find some scope there. Other options include suing Yi Peng 3’s owners, Ningbo Yipeng Shipping, and secondary sanctions on those who insure, fuel or unload its vessels.
But real deterrence means real costs and risks. Western countries are still looking for magical responses: effective, ethical and painless. Like Santa Claus, they don’t exist. But attacks on our decision-making do. And they are getting worse.
Edward Lucas is a Non-resident Senior Fellow and Senior Advisor at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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