France’s Emmanuel Macron described Donald Trump’s return to office as an “electroshock” for Europe. Comments by Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth on February 12-14 were seen by Europeans as the moment the administration threw the switch. Nothing that followed in the February 18 US-Russia talks in Saudi Arabia has changed this.
There is now some serious soul-searching as leaders consider their next steps on Russia’s war in Ukraine and for transatlantic relations more broadly. Those first steps were taken at the emergency summit of European leaders (including British Prime Minister Keir Starmer) in Paris on February 17.
In searching for a way forward, there are two important elements to remember: one historical, and one contemporary.
History first. The shock, distress, or confusion in European capitals is real, but it is also naïve. When the former French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin claimed in a press conference after Vance’s remarks that Europe’s leaders “cannot accept the fact that what was the US is not the US anymore,” one might have asked him, “When was the US the US?”
Was it in the early 2000s when the war in Iraq caused a painful crisis in relations between the United States and many of its largest European allies, not least France? Was the US the US in the 1990s when another French politicians, the foreign minister Hubert Védrine, warned against American “hyperpower” as if it were a negative for global security?
Was the US the US, according to European politicians, in the 1980s when Reagan rearmed and European leaders felt that America was too hawkish toward the Soviet Union? Was the US the US in the 1970s when Nixon pursued détente over the heads of European leaders who feared they were being sold out to the Soviets without being given a seat at the table? Or when NATO was turfed out of its Paris headquarters by de Gaulle’s France-First government in 1966?
Was it in the 1960s, when American requests for assistance in Vietnam were ignored by its European allies and the US fought with Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, the Philippines, and South Korea at its side? Was it in the 1950s when the US refused to give France nuclear weapons to defend its empire in Indochina? Or was it when the United States threatened economic action against Britain over Suez in 1956?
The United States was perhaps even less the United States during the two world wars when it stubbornly clung to declared neutrality during Europe’s largest conflicts, showing up almost too late in 1917 and in 1941 only after it was attacked at Pearl Harbor by the Japanese and Nazi Germany declared war on Washington. For the past century and a quarter, the United States has enjoyed the luxury of being able to choose whether and how involved in European politics it wishes to be.
Right now, the signal from Washington is for a rebalancing away from European affairs and toward Asia. This appears to be the bedrock of the Trump administration’s strategic vision. America’s European allies must recognize that critical influences on transatlantic relations will take place far away from European capitals.
This leads us to the present.
It is no accident that while European leaders prepared for the Munich Conference, President Trump met with Prime Minister Ishiba of Japan. During the Munich Conference itself, the president chose to remain in Washington, where he welcomed Narendra Modi, the prime minister of India.
While discussions in Munich with Trump’s vice president and his secretary of defense were contentious and at times awkward, the president’s discussions with the heads of government of two Asian giants went off extremely smoothly. Compliments and diplomatic courtesy were the order of the day along with tangible progress on issues of importance.
Nippon Steel’s proposed takeover bid of US Steel (which was blocked by the Biden administration) was dropped by the Japanese in favor of a substantial “investment.” Trump touted the “fantastic relationship” between the US and Japan, while Ishiba spoke of Japan’s desire to increase investment in the United States and seemed receptive to reducing some of America’s trade deficit with Japan.
With the Indian prime minister, the agenda was even more ambitious. Trump and Modi indicated a willingness to reduce tariffs, announced plans to conclude a US-India trade agreement by the end of 2025 and double Indian-trade with America by 2030. India is also shifting weapons procurement from Russia to the United States, with the potential for the United States to sell India the fifth generation F-35 fighter at some point in the future.
If we are indeed at “the mountain passes” of a new Cold War, as described by the late Henry Kissinger, we must recognize the implications.
During the first Cold War, the Soviet Union threatened security in Europe, while China, as a junior partner, was the foe to contain in Asia. In those days, Asia was the “secondary” theater, and proved the more volatile with the Korean War, the Vietnamese campaign against France, the American war in Vietnam, civil war in Cambodia, and the Sino-Vietnamese war, among other violence. Europe, the “primary” theater, was nevertheless peaceful, with no major conflicts breaking out between NATO and the Soviet Union or Warsaw Pact.
During the First Cold War, Asian countries like South Korea, the Philippines, and South Vietnam (until it was overrun) fought hard for their own and regional security. They devoted enormous resources to their militaries. While backed and supported by the United States, they had to contend with restrictions created by America’s fear of escalation, the potential for American détente with China or the Soviet Union, and real limits to America’s appetite for intervention overseas.
During the Second Cold War, it is likely Europe will be forced into a similar position. During the first quarter of the 21st century, the continent has already proven to be more volatile than Asia, with large-scale shooting wars in Georgia in 2008, Ukraine in 2014, and again from 2022 to the present. Multiple conflicts have taken place between Azerbaijan and Armenia on Europe’s periphery and in Moldova the issue of Transnistria remains unresolved.
Like America’s Asian allies during the First Cold War, America’s European allies must prepare for volatility and violence as geopolitical realities are shaped by the rivalry between China and the United States. European nations must be able to work with the US, when possible, to maintain their security and act alone, when necessary.
Above all, they must have the physical capability and willingness to do so and can hope that like Japan during the Cold War, they can deter violence through strength.
Whether politicians like Dominique de Villepin wish it or not (and he’s by no means an outlier in terms of European strategic thought), the United States is still the United States, focused on what it considers to be its primary adversary and “peer competitor” — China — and is willing to prioritize its national security strategy accordingly. Europe must do the same.
Andrew R. Novo is a professor of strategic studies at the National Defense University in Washington, DC.
The views expressed are entirely his and do not reflect the views of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the United States Government.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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