In US President Donald Trump’s view, NATO countries have every right to shoot down Russian jets and drones crossing into their airspace. The alliance Secretary General Mark Rutte took a similar stance, saying members can target Russian drones and airplanes “if necessary.”
CEPA asked its military and security experts: How should NATO respond? Their warning is clear — the alliance must establish and enforce clear red lines or risk the collapse of the very deterrence on which it relies.
There have now been a welter of incidents across Poland, Romania, the Baltic states, and — most recently — the Nordic countries. Incidents were occurring almost daily at the end of September and beginning of October, and while not every incident has been attributed to Russia, events follow a familiar pattern. Drones now regularly close Nordic airports, including Copenhagen, the region’s biggest, on September 22.
Russian combat aircraft and drones have also been active, with three MiG-31 jets encroaching on Estonia’s airspace on September 19 and a large-scale drone attack of more than 20 military unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) into Polish airspace on September 9.
The 12-minute MiG-31 incursion was the fourth violation of Estonian airspace by Russian aircraft this year, according to a ministry statement. While being intercepted by Italian Air Force F-35 fighter jets, the Russians ignored signals from the NATO aircraft. Norway, too, said Russian aircraft had been entering its airspace.
“Russia should be in no doubt . . . We will continue to respond in the manner, timing, and domain of our choosing,” NATO said on September 23.
Jason Israel, CEPA Fellow and a former member of the White House National Security Council, puts the incidents in the context of a long-standing pattern of behavior in which Russia probes and tests the alliance. The incidents show that the Kremlin is not currently deterred from entering NATO territory, he argues.
“Invoking [NATO’s] Article 4 allowed for a more formal process for that dialogue, but that is not a sufficient response. A solid outcome would be a strong unified statement that communicates consequences for such attacks, coupled with actual military posture movements to show resolve,” he said. Israel added that it should be coupled with an announcement of a longer-term commitment to Ukraine and NATO’s eastern states.
While Putin’s objective is to fracture the alliance, it also gives its members an opportunity to show collective resolve. He stressed that for the Russian president, the incursions come with a risk that they could contribute to unifying the alliance.
The Kremlin’s goals might be manifold, according to Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Gordon B. “Skip” Davis, a CEPA Fellow and former senior NATO official. He mentions the possibility of Russia probing to test NATO’s reaction time, thresholds for action, the alliance’s coordination, to divert resources, while also signaling Russian capability to threaten and intimidate
On the question of shooting Russian aircraft down, he differentiates between manned and unmanned aircraft, and whether they represent a lethal threat.
An armed Russian aircraft failing to respond to communication could justify lethal use of force through warning or engagement, Davis argues. However, drones are different, and the threshold to shoot them down is much lower, whether or not they are armed. He notes that Poland has declared its intent to shoot down any Russian drone penetrating its airspace. “I think all allies should consider such a policy, publicly declared or not,” he states.
Furthermore, there is a broader question of NATO capabilities. Currently, the alliance has the ongoing peacetime mission NATO Air Policing, as well as Operation Eastern Sentry (OES), a response to the recent drone incursions into Poland.
“OES is a good start, but the forces involved appear to be largely fighter aircraft and thus insufficient. Nations must have forward-deployed air defense forces and systems authorized to use force, especially multi-layered counter-drone systems, capable of detection, identification, and lethal fires,” according to Davis.
Admiral (Ret.) Andrew “Woody” Lewis, CEPA Fellow and former commander of the US Second Fleet, adds a question of equipment. He points out that an incursion into Poland can be over and done in a short time, and that the recent statement from the NATO Secretary General is clear. “At that point it’s just a matter of doing it – having the capability to respond,” he says.
“If the alliance doesn’t make a clear decision one way or the other, that’s not a very effective position, because it doesn’t deter the Russians,” Lewis argues. As incursions do not fall under Article 5 per se, the key to deterrence is NATO making a firm decision about how to respond, he says.
However, predictability is not without its drawbacks, argues Jan Kallberg, CEPA Fellow, a former Fellow at the Army Cyber Institute at West Point and former Swedish army officer. NATO should respond by shooting aircraft or drones down, but it must also inject uncertainty.
“First, uncertainty is a force multiplier. If Russia can’t gauge the response, it will tread more carefully. Mechanically measurable responses incentivize. Second, uncertainty is a loss of control, and control is key for Russia, like the former Soviet Union, because if you can’t control your outer sphere, it can’t be too far until you don’t control your inner sphere,” Kallberg says less discussion can be useful to avoid being “played by the Russians.”
He also argues that deterrence requires a proactive approach, including a large-scale disruptive campaign against the Russian information space. “After an incident, use the AI power of the West to drown the Russian internet with communications exposing corruption, strategic failures, and death tolls in the war,” he states, explaining that it would be Russia’s own playbook flipped.
“Dictators are always paranoid and think they will be hanging like Mussolini or get the Gaddafi treatment. Feed that notion, that is the only thing they are afraid of,” Kallberg argues.
For Emily Otto, fellow at CEPA and a US former Cyber Operations Officer, incursions into NATO airspace should prompt a clear response. Unmanned aircraft should immediately be shot down, she states. Regarding manned aircraft, NATO should deliver a warning and then destroy the aircraft if it does not immediately change course to return to Russia. “If they conclude that a state’s declarations are hollow or inconsistently applied, deterrence collapses,” she says.
Deterrence is not merely about declaring boundaries or issuing threats, according to Otto. “It rests on your adversary believing in your resolve and capability. Adversaries constantly assess whether those red lines are backed by the political will, resources, and institutional alignment necessary to enforce them,” she says.
Lt. Gen. Lance Landrum (Ret), CEPA Fellow and former Deputy Chair of NATO’s Military Committee, underlined a critical need for the alliance to back up its words with action. “Otherwise, its statements about defending every inch of NATO territory will ring hollow in the ears of adversaries, which will only embolden them further,” he argues. According to Landrum, Putin will continue to push until he meets firm resistance.
Landrum, Davis, Lewis, Otto, and Israel each note in different ways that NATO’s credibility hinges on its ability to enforce red lines in the air.
Whether through clearer rules of engagement, stronger air defenses, or unconventional measures, CEPA’s experts argue that Moscow will only be deterred if NATO shows it is willing to act.
Heine Sandvik Brekke is an Editorial Intern at CEPA. He is currently studying at the American University in Washington, DC. Heine is pursuing a degree in journalism and has worked in a variety of editorial roles, including at the daily newspaper Aftenposten. He also served in the Norwegian Army as a conscript in Northern Norway.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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