The appointment of Mykhailo Fedorov as minister of defense in January followed years of criticism of corruption and inefficiency, and complaints that the ministry was detached from the needs of active personnel, veterans, and new recruits.
Known for his focus on digital governance, fast implementation, and data-driven management, Fedorov promised a deep audit of the Defense Ministry and the Armed Forces. The plan was not only to find money and fight corruption, but to make mobilization sustainable and national service fair. On July 15, he was sacked for what he claimed was a campaign by the old guard around Commander-in-Chief Syrskyi.
There were mass protests in Kyiv following his dismissal. President Zelenskyy said he could not allow the feuding between Fedorov and Syrskyi to continue.
His six months in charge won over many of the public, 50% of whom said they trusted him in a June poll, and among foreign diplomats.
One of the key elements in Fedorov’s whirlwind changes was unveiled on June 12, when Fedorov’s ministry announced reforms aimed at making military service more predictable and attractive through fixed-term contracts, higher and better differentiated pay, temporary discharges after contracts were completed, easier transfers between units, and a simplified route back for the estimated 200,000-plus personnel who are AWOL.
Fedorov said further changes would follow, and it is unclear what will survive his removal, but the reform process exposed the deep fragmentation in Ukraine’s system for wartime personnel.
For a lot of soldiers at the front, the discontent they feel isn’t just about money or contract length, it’s about justice.
For many, especially those who have served since the 2022 full-scale invasion or before, the new rules appeared aimed at attracting future recruits rather than fairly addressing the grievances of those already fighting.
They had, after all, signed up to serve without a clear end date and had limited control over where they would be assigned or whether they could transfer.
The most generous offer in the new system was the contract for assault infantry, the highest-risk and hardest-to-fill frontline role. It offered terms of 14 months for civilians, 10 months for those already serving, and six months or more for some previously discharged personnel.
Average monthly pay was projected at 300,000 hryvnia (roughly $6,900), with a cap of 460,000 hryvnia. Longer 24-month contracts would cover the rest of the force, including drone pilots, electronic warfare specialists and artillery personnel, with monthly pay ranging from 30,000-120,000 hryvnia. There was also a basic contract for positions outside combat units, starting at 30,000 hryvnia per month.
The fixed terms were significant because the old system made service seem indefinite, but there was anger that the new contracts favored future recruits. Soldiers who joined in 2022 were “not taken into account,” one soldier now stationed in the rear told me.
“I am already in my fifth year of service,” he said. “Now I sign up for two more years, while a new recruit will also serve only two. We are equal, but somehow we are not.”
The contract system also raised questions over which military service the state should give the highest rewards. While the assault infantry contract reflected a need to attract people into the army’s most dangerous roles, some soldiers argued the new structure incentivized risk more than effectiveness.
In a war increasingly shaped by drones, electronic warfare, and other high-skill disciplines, critics say Ukraine needs “more effective” soldiers as well as “more heroes.” Under the plans, UAV pilots would be paid much less than assault infantry, for example, even though their training is complex and their battlefield impact can be enormous.
A similar concern appeared in rear-area pay. Under the plan, the basic contract would start at 30,000 hryvnia per month, increased from 20,000 hryvnia, but many soldiers said it was still far too low given inflation, wartime prices, and the need to support families.
Many have parents, spouses or children depending on them, and are forbidden from taking other work, they are forced into the black economy to earn extra cash.
One soldier I spoke to, who is currently stationed in the rear, said many of his comrades work as taxi drivers at night, a practice so widespread that Fedorov mentioned it in an interview.
The issue is even more sensitive when it comes to wounded or medically limited personnel. Soldiers say any serious reform must include better support for those injured in service, especially when they are moved to lower-paid rear positions.
“One of my guys was injured and later transferred to the rear. His wife served too, but now they have twins,” a Ukrainian officer told me. “They have to survive on this ridiculous 30,000, with two babies and crazy inflation. It’s good that the boys and I help them financially from time to time, but what about others?”
Another major element of the reforms was the promise of temporary discharge after contract completion. This would start from a six-month base and increase depending on combat participation and previous years served.
While not full demobilization, it was a partial answer to the problem of open-ended service. Fedorov described the reform as only a first stage, with further changes planned in the fall, including clearer rules on the demobilization of those with long service. It is unclear if that will now happen.
Transfers were another vital part of the changes. The inability to move between units has long been a painful grievance in the army, especially for those stuck in unsuitable roles, under difficult commanders, or where their skills were poorly used.
Under the Fedorov reforms, a new mechanism using the Army+ app would allow eligible service members to request a transfer within the same corps structure once each year. The move, which was positively received, was intended to shift at least part of the process from informal negotiations and paper bureaucracy to a digital system.
One soldier told me a “digital army” could make procedures more transparent and harder to manipulate. “Before, everything was on paper,” he said. “And a logbook could be rewritten overnight.”
His response reflected the popularity of Fedorov’s desire to use audit, data, digital tools, and clearer procedures to reduce arbitrariness in the system.
The ministry also created a simplified return route for personnel listed as AWOL, replacing a process that could involve reserve battalions, long court procedures, and suspended pay.
The mechanism offered a 100-day window to return through Army+, with verification within seven days and the possibility of choosing from 55 top-rated units.
It suggested state recognition that soldiers going AWOL are not just a discipline issue, but a symptom of a personnel system that had lost people through exhaustion, poor placement, and lack of mobility.
Fedorov’s reforms were an attempt to create structure where soldiers and recruits have often seen uncertainty and threat, but predictability may not have been enough.
For many current soldiers, the deeper question was whether any new rules would recognize those who have already spent years fighting for Ukraine, and whether they are treated fairly. That question remains.
Sofia Slonovska is a CEPA Editorial Intern and a graduate of Bard College Berlin, where she studied politics, economics, and social thought. Ukrainian-born, her research interests include European security, Russia’s war against Ukraine, and transatlantic relations.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
