The more US President Donald Trump floats plans to reduce aid for Ukraine and appears to promote a quick peace, the more Kyiv focuses on “kinetic sanctions” to inflict maximum pain on Russia’s oil producers.

The industry is already under mounting pressure on multiple fronts, including increased shipping costs as a result of sanctions, drone attacks on oil facilities, and the new US administration’s push for lower oil prices.

“Between September 2023 and February 2025, Ukraine has conducted approximately 100 strikes on oil refineries and depots across Russia,” said Serhii Kuzan, chairman of the Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Center and former adviser to Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense. “Some facilities, such as the Afipsky, Ilsky, Novoshakhtinsky, and Ryazan refineries, have been hit multiple times.” On February 13-14, drones hit the refinery in Slavyansk-on-Kuban in Southern Russia, the third strike on that facility.

These attacks represent a sustained campaign to disrupt Russia’s ability to finance and sustain its war, Kuzan said in an interview. Of 24 drone strikes on Russian territory in January, 12 were on critical infrastructure sites linked to the oil sector, including refineries, storage sites, and pipelines.

“These attacks have resulted in substantial damage to Russian oil refining infrastructure, forcing temporary shutdowns,” Kuzan said. “The Russian government has classified its diesel and gasoline production statistics in an attempt to conceal the full extent of the destruction.”

Despite Moscow’s efforts to obscure the effects, signs of strain are visible. Drone attacks and sanctions rendered 41.1 million tons — over 12% — of Russia’s total production capacity inactive and oil refining volumes in 2024 dropped to their lowest levels in over a decade. The Russian deputy prime minister admitted there was a 6.2% decline in gasoline production and 7.3% drop in diesel fuel production in 2024.

Kyiv has broadened its list of strategic targets to maximize disruption across Moscow’s war infrastructure, building on the success of its long-range capabilities as the land war has become increasingly attritional.

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Ukraine now builds its own missiles again and is producing more than a million drones a year, according to President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The long-range drones used to attack facilities near Russian cities like Saratov and Engels were homemade, albeit with some foreign assistance.

Long-range attacks on airfields, supply depots, and critical infrastructure have intensified in a bid to weaken the Kremlin’s war machine and disrupt its ability to sustain the invasion. Beyond oil depots and refineries, drone operations have expanded to target key sites used to supply the frontline.

These have included oil transportation hubs, explosive and gunpowder factories, and non-hardened ammunition storage facilities in a calculated effort to cripple supply chains and undermine wider military capabilities.  

The ability to strike deep inside enemy territory “brings the war home to Russia and limits its ability to earn oil export revenue,” Tymofiy Mylovanov, president of the Kyiv School of Economics, wrote on Twitter/X. Russian military bloggers have taken to Telegram to express their fury at the lack of effective defense, although given the sheer number of drones now being used, the vast range of targets, and the limited numbers of air defense batteries, it’s unclear how Russia can fix the problem.

Ukraine’s January drone strikes demonstrated how depleted Russian air defenses have become, and that they are ineffective in the face of swarm attacks, which include the use of decoy drones to clear the path. More than two-thirds of Russia’s 30 largest refineries were hit in just a month, according to Die Welt. The attacks included:

  • Early January: Long-range drone strikes reached Ust-Luga Seaport (January 4) and an oil depot in Engels (January 8) — both over 900km (560 miles) from Ukraine.
  • Mid-January: Missile and drone attacks (January 10-18) on military infrastructure in Rostov, Kazan, Saratov, Bryansk, Voronezh and Tambov, striking oil depots, propellant plants, weapons warehouses, and airfields.
  • Late January: Drones hit Ryazan, Bryansk, Smolensk, Tula, and Kaluga (January 20-26), revisiting key sites like the Engels oil depot (January 17) and Ryazan Oil Refinery (January 26.)
  • January 29: Ukraine struck one of Russia’s largest oil refineries in Kstovo, 800km from the border.
  • January 31: A drone strike on a Lukoil-owned facility in Volgograd Oblast, one of Russia’s 10 largest refineries.
  • Early February: Ukrainian drones hit energy facilities in Astrakhan and Volgograd oblasts (site of 4.9% of Russia’s total refining output in 2023) overnight on February 3. Two days later, a drone started a fire at an oil plant in Krasnodar Krai.

While Ukraine has carried out many such strikes since 2023 — at times to the frustration of the Biden administration — its latest operations are a clear demonstration of growing strength. Kyiv is not only exploiting Moscow’s vulnerabilities but also sending a message to Biden’s successor that Russia is weaker than it appears.

David Kirichenko is a freelance journalist and an Associate Research Fellow at the Henry Jackson Society. He can be found on X/Twitter @DVKirichenko. 

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.

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CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America.
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