In 2024, off the coast of Crimea, swarms of uncrewed boats braved choppy waters and streams of bullets to attack a Russian warship. Had the vessels been crewed, they would have been suicidal or impossible. Instead, the missile corvette Ivanovets was sunk at no human cost to the attackers.
Ukraine’s campaign led to the rout of a larger and more powerful navy. It claims to have sunk or disabled a third of the Kremlin’s fleet and has demonstrably confined the rest to port, fearful to leave in case of attack. The campaign was so effective that Ukraine’s grain and other exports resumed.
It has now become a model for others, showing that the nature of naval warfare has very probably changed forever. Not only do smaller forces now have a real opportunity to launch devastating campaigns, they also proved that this can be done with few, if any, casualties.
It’s a model that could soon be useful to Taiwan. China is openly preparing for an invasion, both with tailor-made infrastructure like 2,700 ft-long beach-assault barges, and through ever-more menacing and large-scale rehearsals of a blockade.
If Taiwan is to win such a confrontation, it urgently needs the capabilities to deter a naval blockade and invasion, limit Beijing’s access to the strait between the two countries, and deny Chinese cross-Strait naval domination.
Despite the differences between Ukraine and Taiwan’s strategic and geographical situations, the two have a key similarity; a vast naval disparity with their expansionist neighbor.
Ukraine has compensated for this with a strategy combining precision-guided munitions, special forces raids, airstrikes, and uncrewed air and sea drones.
The first lesson Taiwan can learn from Ukraine is to invest in low-cost systems that can be deployed en masse. Uncrewed sea vessels (USVs), like the Magura V5, crippled Russian warships, while uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) have been used in swarm attacks on oil and gas refineries, overwhelming Russian defenses and impeding logistical support for the Russian fleet.
In the event of a cross-Strait invasion, Taiwan could use such systems to strike at China’s ports and logistical nodes, in addition to its warships, making resupply more difficult.
Ukraine has developed a strategy that incorporates uncrewed systems with more traditional capabilities. While some of these methods are not applicable to a Taiwanese deterrence and defense strategy, a concerted effort to integrate innovative capabilities with established ones is very relevant.
Doing so would sharpen a “porcupine strategy” where Taiwan defends itself with a large number of small weapons systems and technological innovations, while giving it the ability to strike at Chinese naval assets in the Strait.
Mike Rogers, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, and Ranking Member Adam Smith have warned that attaining these systems will take a concerted effort, not just from Taiwan and the US but from other allies and partners.
Beijing’s maritime ambitions go beyond the Taiwan Strait and take in Vietnam, the Philippines, and other coastal nations in the South China Sea, where it has established heavily defended manmade islands to extend its illegal and expansionist claims. Taiwan and other states in the region could work together to develop and procure uncrewed systems to collectively deter Beijing’s aggression.
Ukraine could also play a crucial role by providing the technical and strategic advice needed to deploy these capabilities. This might be delivered through an expanded version of AUKUS, the security partnership between Washington, London, and Canberra, which could focus on emerging defense capabilities and incorporate a wider group of allies.
This would help the US defense industry and bolster Taiwan’s efforts to increase defense spending.
Beyond procurement, Taiwan and the US need to focus on applying the right lessons from Ukraine’s defense to Taiwan’s deterrence. Establishing a shared lessons-learned working group would enable routine, structured dialogue to identify shared priorities and needs.
Such a working group could also be a venue for analysts from Europe, Ukraine, Taiwan, and the US to pool their experience of Russia’s efforts to counter drones, giving Taiwan access to the full array of options to deter a Chinese attack.
Taiwan will need the asymmetric capabilities Ukraine has developed since Russia’s full-scale invasion, and learn the right way to apply them, if it hopes to preserve its independence. The blueprint for Taiwan lies in the ingenuity of Ukraine’s defenders. Done right, it would provide a powerful deterrent and would extract a heavy toll on future Chinese aggression.
Peter Roberto is a Program Assistant with the Transatlantic Defense and Security program at the Center for European Policy Analysis. Peter’s research interests include Ukraine security, defense industry, and conventional military posture. He received a B.A. in Criminology, Law and Society from George Mason University and a M.A. in Diplomacy and International Relations from Seton Hall University.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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