President Volodymyr Zelenskyy keeps coming back to security in all his meetings and public statements, not because he is being stubborn or inflexible, or pursuing personal interests served by opposing peace, but because he is reflecting the mood of Ukrainians.
Whether those Ukrainian requirements are being heard may emerge from talks between Russia and the US slated for March 18. The signs are not promising.
From the political elites to the military, and across the broader spectrum of the public, everyone in Ukraine wants to know what security guarantees are being offered, if any, before proceeding with discussions. There is a strong sense that proceeding without clarity on security guarantees will simply create future insecurity.
It is clear Ukraine is already making a lot of meaningful and tough concessions. The most obvious is being prepared to acknowledge that Russia will, temporarily, keep the Ukrainian land it currently occupies.
This should have been the end of compromises on Ukraine’s part and, in return, there should have been concessions and compromise on the part of the aggressor. Instead, Moscow keeps issuing more and more one-sided demands (for example that arms imports are halted during any ceasefire), to force Kyiv into ever-greater concessions.
The Kremlin is holding hostage the 30-day ceasefire as it adds demands and seeks further concessions, according to the Institute for the Study of War on March 17.
This is clearly unfair and reinforces Ukrainians’ perception that the long-term security of their state is being sidelined. The country would remain highly vulnerable, at the mercy of its powerful and belligerent neighbor, which has never abandoned its publicly declared aim of destroying Ukraine as a nation.
Another feature of Ukraine’s realism is the recognition it will not become a member of NATO any time soon, so won’t enjoy its collective security. Kyiv should not abandon its strategic course of joining the alliance, but, until it can, must have some other security fallback against what most Ukrainians see as the near-certainty of a future resumption of Russian aggression.
These could come in a variety of forms.
There’s a tendency to assume the only thing that can be done is deploying European military units to (potentially) fight alongside Ukrainian troops, but Kyiv understands there is no appetite among its partners, including its most persistent supporters, to be involved in a direct confrontation with Russia. As a result, deploying troops to prop up Ukraine’s security can only be seen as an element of a broader “peace plan.”
There is currently no consensus on the issue of a stabilization force in Ukraine, even though Kyiv would welcome this and its European allies are working intensively to prepare for a so-called tripwire force if a ceasefire is agreed. It has been discussed at a number of meetings in London, Paris and Brussels, and momentum had been building for a force of perhaps 30,000 backed by combat aircraft.
Yet Moscow’s formal statements suggest it is still adamantly opposed, illustrating that Russia is not ready for real peace. If it wants peace, why oppose a peacekeeping force?
Washington has not shared its position on the issue, but Europeans acknowledge the need for an American backstop for a peace-keeping operation to work. What if the US says no? What if Washington opposes the European plan in principle, with or without an American backstop? And what if Russia continues to oppose it as well?
Will Europeans be ready to go it alone in such circumstances? This is an issue on which Ukraine desperately needs clarity, before agreeing to sign any truce or ceasefire.
Americans like to say the devil is in the detail. Ukrainians agree fully, especially on an issue of such existential significance.
Dr. Volodymyr Dubovyk is a Non-resident Senior Fellow at CEPA. He has been working at the Odesa I. Mechnikov National University since 1992, as an Associate Professor at the Department of International Relations since 1996, and has acted as a Director of the Center for International Studies since 1999.96, and has acted as a Director of the Center for International Studies since 1999.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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