Ever since the full-scale invasion, Ukraine has compensated for its disadvantage in traditional firepower through innovation. Unmanned systems, particularly first-person view (FPV) drones, helped its forces blunt Russian offensives and impose heavy costs on attacking units. Over time, this approach hardened into what was described as a drone wall, a layered defense that has turned many Russian assaults into fields full of bodies.
That kill zone has expanded steadily and now stretches roughly 15-20km (9-12 miles) from the frontline. It has proved an effective defensive mechanism. But it is also increasingly clear that it is not decisive, especially as warnings grow that Ukrainian units lack enough drones.
Throughout 2025, Russia adapted and learned from its mistakes, narrowing Ukraine’s early drone advantage by accepting heavy infantry losses and relocating critical assets deeper behind the frontline. Artillery, air defense, and command and control nodes have been moved beyond the range of most short-range strike systems and provided with dense electronic warfare protection.
The message from Moscow’s commanders is clear: Infantry can be quickly replaced, but high-value systems cannot.
Ukraine faces growing constraints in responding to this shift. Manpower shortages limit the ability of its forces to follow up drone attacks by clearing and holding ground, and Russian infiltration tactics have become more effective, allowing small units to slip behind Ukrainian lines and disrupt its drone and mortar teams.
Weather further complicates matters, degrading drone operations and creating windows for Russian artillery to operate with reduced risk.
Ukrainian equipment losses began exceeding Russian losses in 2025, according to the defense analysis website Oryx, reversing a trend that had held since the full-scale invasion. A Ukrainian officer told Radio Liberty that this reflects Russia’s growing focus on striking Ukrainian logistics and vehicles deep behind the frontline, while Ukrainian forces continue to prioritize destroying Russian assets at the line of contact.
Ukrainian logistics hubs and rear infrastructure have come under increasing pressure from Russian mid-range drone strikes and glide bombs, which flatten treelines where drone operators are based, as well as entire buildings in urban areas. Russia dropped more than 3,500 glide bombs in November alone.
Russian attacks strain supply chains, disrupt rotations, and impose heavy physical and psychological costs on the defenders. “Naturally, not only are lines of communication wrecked; the very idea of a secure rear is fading,” said General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, Ukraine’s former Commander-in-Chief.
And Ukraine has struggled to respond in kind.
A former Ukrainian officer noted in June that significant gaps remain in Ukraine’s ability to target force concentrations and key logistical hubs behind the frontline. Drones, even larger ones, are insufficient on their own due to limits in warhead size and speed.
“Russia adapted to HIMARS [truck-mounted rocket launchers] by moving its assets farther back,” said General Ben Hodges, former commander of US Army Europe. “Ukraine must be able to reach wherever the enemy relocates.”
That capability is currently lacking. Ukraine has the F-16 aircraft to replicate these tactics, but has insufficient Western-supplied bombs to arm them. According to Bryan Pickens, a former US Army Green Beret who has fought alongside Ukrainian special forces, this absence is among Ukraine’s most serious operational weaknesses.
“Most of what matters now sits in the 30-100km range,” Pickens said. “Russia pushes expendable infantry forward while holding its most valuable systems deep and protected by electronic warfare. Ukraine does not have scalable systems that can reliably strike there.”
In December, Russia’s elite Rubicon drone formation released footage showing drone strikes on high-value targets at claimed ranges of roughly 60km to more than 200km beyond the front line. The videos show strikes deep inside Ukraine’s rear, including in Mykolaiv and Poltava regions, using drones such as the Molniya-2, a fixed-wing kamikaze drone equipped with a Starlink terminal.
Electronic Warfare (EW) has become decisive, Pickens added. In contested sectors, satellite and radio links often fail, and many Western-supplied loitering munitions have proved ineffective. Systems designed for permissive environments struggle to function under sustained jamming, he said.
For Pickens, Ukraine will only overcome these limitations in the middle-strike zone with increased autonomous targeting.
Ukraine is attempting to compensate. According to defense analyst Olena Kryzhanivska, Kyiv has increasingly focused on developing mid-range strike drones to offset shortages in conventional systems.
“As with other Ukrainian unmanned innovations, these efforts are driven by necessity,” she said. “Drone interceptors are used where air defense missiles are lacking, and small and medium-range drones are used where artillery systems and ammunition are insufficient.”
Such improvisation has been a strength throughout the war. But it has its limits, not least because Russia is continuing to raise production of glide bombs and has invested heavily in mid-range strike drones with the backing of China.
Ukraine lacks sufficient stationary EW coverage to protect rear areas 30-40km deep. Meanwhile, air defense missiles are too scarce and costly to counter large numbers of increasingly EW-resistant medium-range Russian drones, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) reported, citing Serhii Beskrestnov, a Ukrainian electronic warfare specialist.
A Ukrainian drone pilot told the New York Times that Russian forces are deploying fixed-wing Molniya drones alongside waves of mini kamikaze drones carrying explosives — and Ukraine has nothing comparable that it can mass produce.
With an operational range of up to 60km and speeds of up to 120kph (75mph), the Molniya 2 is cheap and can reach into the middle-strike zone. On roads in its range, the Ukrainians have built wire and net tunnels to protect logistics routes.
Ukraine’s domestic missile production will play an increasingly important role in long-range strikes in 2026. Its successful drone campaign against Russian oil refineries, for example, will need larger warheads so it can inflict greater damage. “Ukraine’s focus on developing long-range strike capabilities is exactly right, and that is where I would encourage investment,” Hodges said.
Kyiv should also focus on improving its capability to hit targets in the intermediate 60-100km range, the ISW’s George Barros wrote. Russia is already reported to be fielding fiber optic drones with ranges of up to 50km, while Kyiv is likely deploying similar systems at comparable distances.
The trajectory is clear. Russia has adapted by pulling back critical systems farther from the front, and shielding them with electronic warfare, while relying on manpower to absorb losses closer in. Ukraine is strongest at the front but increasingly constrained at depth, and, with enough time, Russia will look to close the flanks, narrow the supply routes, and squeeze the defenders.
Unless Kyiv closes its mid-range strike gap through systems that can be produced at scale and operate under sustained jamming, it risks fighting an efficient but ultimately reactive war shaped by Russian adaptation rather than Ukrainian initiative.
David Kirichenko is a freelance journalist and an Associate Research Fellow at the Henry Jackson Society. He can be found on X/Twitter @DVKirichenko.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
War Without End
Russia’s Shadow Warfare
CEPA Forum 2025
Explore CEPA’s flagship event.
