Since Russia’s full-scale invasion, millions of Ukrainians have built lives abroad. What was expected to be short-term displacement is increasingly becoming long-term migration, as many adapt to Western European labor markets, universities, and social systems.
At the beginning of this year, almost 5.8 million Ukrainians remained under temporary protection, mostly in the EU and other European countries, according to the UN. Among them were 1.2 million aged 18–34 in the EU alone — the age group Ukraine will depend on for reconstruction, innovation, modernization, entrepreneurship, administration, and rebuilding its population.
And surveys show the longer the war continues, the weaker the intention to return. In 2024, 32% said they definitely planned to go home, but by 2025, that figure had fallen to 22%. The number of those who said they did not plan to return was up to 31% from 19%.
The trend presents an urgent strategic challenge for Kyiv as it seeks to protect the country’s economic resilience, demographic stability, and long-term national security.
Young Ukrainians are mobile, adaptable, digitally skilled, and internationally connected, just what their motherland needs. Many have acquired professional experience abroad, enrolled in European universities, improved language skills, and benefited from more stable institutional environments.
Their decisions are not just about avoiding war, but are based on an evaluation of returning home compared to the future they could have elsewhere.
It’s no longer whether they love their country enough to return — most still do — the question is whether Ukraine can make returning a rational and attractive choice.
Many young people are driven by aspirations for education, self-realization, global experience, and professional growth. And it’s not just those already abroad, nearly 30% of the 18–29 group still in the country say they would consider leaving permanently if borders were fully open.
Ukraine competes with Europe not just for investment, but for human capital. The country cannot rebuild successfully if its most ambitious and globally competitive generation establishes permanent lives elsewhere.
It’s a challenge that cannot be solved through restrictions, pressure, or emotional appeals alone. Attempts to limit mobility or guilt people into returning would likely deepen alienation rather than reverse migration trends.
Instead, Ukraine must focus on becoming a country where talented people can envision professional success, personal security, and long-term stability. Economic opportunity will be central to that.
Many young Ukrainians abroad cite higher incomes and broader professional options as key reasons for staying away. If Kyiv hopes to reverse this trend, it must prioritize the creation of high-value industries, innovation sectors, and competitive labor markets capable of offering comparable salaries and career opportunities.
Recovery cannot rely solely on rebuilding destroyed infrastructure, it must also involve an economy centered on productivity, technology, entrepreneurship, and integration into European markets.
That transformation requires long-term investment in education and talent development, alongside strategies to harness the same sort of innovation, invention, and technical skill that has driven Ukraine’s rapid and successful adaptation to drone warfare.
The needs of the young Ukrainian diaspora present an opportunity to position itself as a dynamic innovation economy capable of attracting globally minded professionals.
And some initiatives already show how this approach might work.
Create Ukraine, for example, is a program to encourage internationally experienced young Ukrainians into public administration and reform-oriented governance. It recognizes that many have skills, networks, and perspectives that could strengthen state institutions for reconstruction and European integration.
The Mariupol Reborn initiative emphasizes modern education, urban redevelopment, and the creation of conditions that would encourage young people to return. Its plans include rebuilding schools, investing in universities, constructing housing, and supporting professional development.
The rationale behind both projects is that young people will not return just because there are jobs, but when they can imagine building meaningful lives.
Housing policy will matter almost as much as economic policy, as many are uncertain about where and how they will live. Reintegration programs must include affordable housing, co-financing, rental compensation, and targeted support for internally displaced people and the repatriated, as well as military veterans.
Policymakers will also need to carefully balance the interests of different groups affected by the war. Encouraging Ukrainians abroad to return is a strategic priority, but reintegration measures must not be perceived as coming at the expense of veterans, internally displaced people, or those who remained in the country throughout the conflict. Ensuring that support is fair, transparent, and broadly accessible will be essential to maintaining social cohesion during reconstruction.
And tackling corruption is vital. Young professionals who have spent years living in European systems will compare not only salaries and housing, but also transparency, predictability, and fairness.
For many Ukrainians, especially younger professionals, institutional quality remains decisive. Corruption, weak courts, arbitrary law enforcement, and a lack of rule of law continue to undermine their confidence in the country’s future.
Action on corruption is not secondary to reconstruction. It is reconstruction.
A country that cannot guarantee equal rules, independent courts, and protection for business will struggle to persuade internationally experienced citizens to return.
There will be a delicate balance to strike between the different needs of veterans, refugees, the internally displaced, and people who stayed during the war.
Return programs perceived as excessively favorable to refugees abroad could generate resentment among other groups, so they must be fair and effective, ensuring all Ukrainians affected by the war receive meaningful support and opportunities.
Europe’s long-term security depends on the existence of a stable, economically viable, democratic Ukraine capable of defending itself and contributing to regional stability. A permanently weakened Ukraine, suffering from demographic decline and brain drain, would create lasting vulnerabilities on the continent’s eastern frontier.
Helping Ukraine retain and return its people is therefore not only a humanitarian task for the rest of Europe, it is a strategic investment in the continent’s security.
Ukraine’s most important post-war asset is neither steel nor concrete. It is people. Cities can be rebuilt. Roads can be rebuilt. Power plants can be rebuilt. A lost generation is far harder to recover.
Kateryna Odarchenko is a political consultant, a partner of the SIC Group Ukraine, and president of the PolitA Institute for Democracy and Development. A specialist practicing in the field of political communication and projects, she has practical experience in the implementation of all-Ukrainian political campaigns and party-building projects.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
