The news for Ukraine is grim. Russian forces are relentlessly advancing, stretching Ukrainian forces to the breaking point. Donald Trump is back in the White House, populist and Kremlin-friendly parties are rising in Europe, and there are fears that Ukraine may be abandoned by the West.
So what else is new? The news from Ukraine is usually grim. There are never enough soldiers and weapons, the Russians keep coming and coming, and Western support is erratic at best.
And yet Ukraine survives.
Which is why the current situation is ominous but not alarming. There is reason for concern, but that’s not the same — as some reports suggest — as saying that Ukraine is on the brink of defeat.
Russia now occupies about 43,000 square miles of Ukrainian territory, or about 18%, which pre-war comprised about 600,000 square kilometers (233,000 square miles.) This loss is substantial but not necessarily crippling. No one knows this better than the Russians themselves: by 1942, Nazi armies had captured much of the western Soviet Union, including a large part of the USSR’s coal, iron and steel, and nearly half of the Soviet population.
Indeed, when Germany invaded in June 1941, there were many in America and Britain who expected the Soviet Union to collapse within a few weeks. Instead, it was the Third Reich that capitulated in May 1945.
2024 seemed to be a successful year for Russia, which captured 4,168 square kilometers (1,609 square miles), including some Russian territory recaptured from Ukraine’s counteroffensive in the Kursk region, according to the Institute for the Study of War. Much of that success came in the autumn, when Russia managed to capture hundreds of square miles in the Donetsk region, advancing at a speed not seen since 2022.
But successful relative to what? The Russian advance only seems impressive because Russian military performance has far been anything but. To capture less than a fifth of Ukraine, Russia has suffered more than 800,000 casualties. Just to grab 4,168 square kilometers last year cost approximately 102 Russian casualties per square kilometer, with 126,000 casualties from September through November alone, ISW calculated.
Had this been the Western Front in 1916, historians would have judged the Russian offensive a pyrrhic victory. Battles for small Ukrainian cities and obscure villages took on mythic proportions not because they were decisive, but only because Ukraine was able to hold them for so long against overwhelming odds. Losing Bakhmut or Mariupol was symbolically painful, but losing Kyiv or Kharkiv would have been a lot worse.
After an estimated 400,000 casualties and persistent shortages of equipment and munitions, it’s no surprise that there are reports of low morale and desertion in the Ukrainian army. Years of combat wear down even the best militaries.
But there is a difference between an army that is tired and one that is ineffective. Through whatever combination of skill, ingenuity, and endurance — as well as Russian mistakes — Ukrainian troops have consistently been able to limit Russia to small gains at staggering cost. Ukraine’s Kursk counteroffensive may not have achieved decisive results on the ground, but it signaled that Ukraine was capable of launching a surprise attack that seized 400 square miles of Russian territory. Ukraine still holds half of that ground, even after Russian counterattacks that have included thousands of North Korean soldiers.
There are several conditions that could give Russia victory: a collapse of the Ukrainian army, a defeatist government taking power in Kyiv, curtailment of Western aid, or some miraculous improvement in Russian military efficiency. All of these are possible, but none appear likely at this point.
Absent these events, Putin’s legions will continue to face a grinding battle of attrition that can be sustained only by a lavish loss of manpower and money. Russia enjoys more resources than Ukraine, but supplies are not infinite, and neither is the endurance of the Russian people.
It is reasonable to ask whether the current situation is sustainable for Ukraine in the long run. Can Ukraine win? That depends on how we define winning. If victory means the Ukrainians will eject all Russian troops from its territory — including Crimea and the annexed eastern lands — then it is unlikely.
But if winning is Ukraine emerging from the war as an independent nation that is economically and politically viable, then victory is more than achievable. Ukraine may not have won yet, but it is far from beaten.
Michael Peck is a defense commentator. He can be found on Twitter and LinkedIn.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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