What is the situation and what is needed?
After Ukraine’s summer counter-offensive in the south brought only partial success, the Ukrainian armed forces are continuing to prepare for a new phase of the war. This could lead to new developments on the Southern and Eastern fronts.
The still-unclear budgetary situation in the US is forcing Ukraine to allocate critical resources for the time being. At the same time, it is regrouping to accept F-16s into service in the coming weeks.
Almost unseen, Ukraine was able to establish a bridgehead on the east bank of the Dnipro not far from Kherson. The work here, involving marine amphibious units, aims to achieve the slow, systematic elimination of Russian artillery south of the village of Krynky but has not yet expanded the bridgehead much further.
In the main axis of the Ukrainian counter-offensive near Robotyne and Verbove, both sides are currently only making very limited advances and counterattacks.
Map: Ukraine occupied and controlled territories, October 2023. Source: warmapper.org
Russia is continuing its massive attacks near Avdiivka. In the Soviet style, Russian commanders are sacrificing a lot of their own material and soldiers and thus are achieving some slow progress, especially in the north of the city.
Russia continues to carry out air strikes along the entire front line. That can be expected to change once Ukrainian F-16s are deployed for the first time and can force Russian fighter jets to keep a greater distance.
Ukraine is also holding resources back with a view to the F-16’s arrival. This may open new opportunities for the expansion of the bridgehead, advances near Verbove, and further pressure on Crimea.
Nonetheless, it currently appears that Ukraine will have to switch to strategic defense and delay in the east if it wants to maintain its own attack potential in the south. The next phase of the war could therefore result in a division of the frontline.
While it would be incorrect to give up hope for the future, the latest attempts at strategic communication by the commander-in-chief and the response of the president’s staff have been suboptimal.
Ukraine needs a steady supply of long-range precision weapons. The effect of the limited-range ATACMS ballistic missiles in the southern coastal strip against airfields, helipads, command and control, communications, and logistics of the Russian armed forces has already materialized.
The delivery of further ATACMS variants, including those with monobloc warheads, ground-launched small diameter bombs (GLSDB), and the German Taurus cruise missiles are necessary and very helpful for the Ukrainian way of fighting.
Ukraine needs ammunition for F-16s, including newer longer-range AIM-120D air-to-air missiles, to keep Russian aircraft at a distance and remain beyond the range of the Russian S-300 and S-400 air defense systems.
The F-16s could also become an instrument against Russian glide bombs equipped with Glonass guidance, against which Ukraine currently has no answer.
Ukraine also needs a larger and faster supply of artillery ammunition, otherwise, it will be forced to give up parts of its territory in order to straighten out the front line.
The answer to this (tiresome) problem is for European allies to utilize and expand industrial capacities with long-term national purchase guarantees while also supporting the expansion of industry in Ukraine and joint production. The EU promise of a million 155mm shells by the spring of 2024 will not be met, but the bloc’s production, supplemented by British and Norwegian output (the UK is raising its 155mm production by a factor of eight), is fast rising under significant new investment programs.
Ukraine needs more means to counter Russian electronic warfare, which currently limits the effectiveness of GPS-guided ammunition. This includes radar-seeking ammunition, precision weapons with inertial navigation, and greater Ukrainian electronic warfare capabilities.
The country also needs significantly more mine clearance systems. Recent trials funded by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and Croatia that use advanced computer programs and AI may indicate a future path for the world’s most-mined country. At the same time, Ukraine will need more of its own mine launchers and mines where it needs to transition to strategic defense.
It must have masses more drones, components for mass drone production, and work to secure drones against Russian jamming, as well as more systems for drone defense.
Maintenance and repair of Western weapon systems in use for Ukraine must take place closer to the front. Joint workshops and joint production by Ukrainian and Western companies in Ukraine should be ramped up quickly.
The Armed Forces of Ukraine need new efforts to support reserve units. This training should also be lengthened and its quality improved.
Meanwhile, the West must take much firmer action to halt the much too widespread circumvention of sanctions against Russia. It is made too easy for Russia to obtain armaments, machinery, and dual-use goods via Central Asian states, Turkey, or China.
The gradual approach to providing military assistance to Ukraine, given the risks of escalation, has contributed to Ukraine’s partial successes, but now risks unwittingly creating the opposite outcome.
Ukraine’s partners will only be able to bring the war closer to military and political success if they swiftly switch to faster support with stronger categories of weapons and ammunition with long-term industrial backing.
Nico Lange is a Senior Fellow, Transatlantic Security and Defense, with CEPA. He was Chief of the Executive Staff of the Federal Ministry of Defense until January 2022. Prior to that, Lange served in Ukraine and Russia. post@nicolange.eu
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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