Ukraine: Faith in US Dwindles But We Won’t Fold

Ukrainians are ready for peace, but not at any price.

January 12, 2026

There has been intense debate in Ukraine and beyond after a survey by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in December showed a sharp decline in trust in the US, to just 21%, amid evidence that Ukrainians are increasingly open to ending the war.

Taken at face value, the findings appear alarming. Yet many conclusions were based on findings taken out of context, which risks reinforcing a misleading narrative about Ukrainian “war fatigue.”

A close look at the data suggests that, rather than a collapse of resolve in Ukraine, there is a crisis of expectations shaped by inconsistent signals from the outside world and the use of opinion polls for short-term political purposes.

While 72% of Ukrainians say they could support a peace plan that freezes the conflict along the current front line, for example, this support is strictly conditional. Any agreement that lacks concrete security guarantees, limits Ukraine’s armed forces, or demands troop withdrawals from Donbas would be rejected by 75% of respondents.

And the distinction is critical. Ukrainians are not willing to accept territorial concessions or unilateral demilitarization. Their views reflect security-based realism shaped by their experiences since 2014: without enforceable guarantees, they see any “peace” as a temporary pause before renewed Russian aggression.

Other indicators further undermine the narrative of exhaustion: 63% of Ukrainians, for example, say they are prepared to endure the war for as long as necessary, a figure that has remained strikingly stable over time. That is all the more remarkable when, for months, Russia has been attacking electricity and heating infrastructure, leading to winter blackouts in brutal weather conditions.

Domestic political attitudes also point to consolidation rather than breakdown. Trust in President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stands at 61%, while only 9% of Ukrainians support elections before the end of active hostilities, suggesting acceptance of wartime governance rather than pressure for immediate political change.

At the same time, however, relatively high trust in the president coexists with deep skepticism toward most political institutions.

According to a December survey by the Razumkov Center, public faith in the Ukrainian Parliament is exceptionally low, with 76% expressing distrust, while 73% distrust the government, 75% distrust the state apparatus, and 66% don’t trust the courts.

Trust remains highly personalized and is concentrated in figures associated with national defense, like Zelenskyy, rather than in representative or bureaucratic institutions. This distinction is important when interpreting poll results about elections, governance, and political stability.

Despite the KIIS survey being based on only 547 respondents, a quarter of the number for its previous nationwide surveys, and less than the 2,000 respondents in the Razumkov survey, trends across the surveys are broadly consistent. Ukrainian public opinion remains responsive to perceived external and internal signals, not structurally demoralized.

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Where attitudes shift more sharply is in perceptions of external partners. Trust in the European Union remains relatively stable at 49%, with distrust at 23%. By contrast, trust in the US has slumped dramatically — from 41% in late 2024 to 21% a year later. Trust in NATO has also fallen, though less steeply.

This divergence suggests Ukrainians are not turning away from the West, but rather that they are reacting to uncertainty surrounding the US’s strategic direction as advanced by the current administration. For Ukraine, the US is not simply another ally, it is the key player whose political decisions most directly shape battlefield dynamics and long-term security prospects. When Washington appears divided or ambiguous, the impact is immediate.

Survey trends closely track US political developments, underscoring how closely Ukrainians watch signals from Washington. Trust in former President Joe Biden declined sharply during his final year in office, largely due to prolonged delays in military assistance and legislative deadlock in Congress. For many Ukrainians, the delays reinforced the perception that their defense was hostage to US domestic political calculations rather than a matter of strategic resolve.

Trust in Donald Trump has also been volatile. After his election victory, trust among Ukrainians initially rose to 45%, higher than in most European countries, as a result of expectations of decisiveness and clarity rather than ideological affinity. Many hoped the new administration would either accelerate support or articulate a coherent strategy.

By December, trust in Trump had fallen to 24%. The President’s suggesting that Ukraine “cannot win,” that NATO membership is unrealistic, and elections should be held during wartime were widely interpreted as signals of a potential imposed settlement rather than a negotiated peace.

These perceptions were reinforced by remarks from Vice President JD Vance, who argued Ukraine should accept territorial losses and questioned whether continued US support served American interests.

In Ukraine, public opinion research does not exist in a neutral vacuum, and survey findings are frequently deployed to shape narratives, legitimize policy positions, or amplify certain expectations. In wartime, this has intensified, and polls can exert outsized influence on public discourse.

Russian information operations have been quick to exploit these dynamics, and pro-Kremlin outlets amplify narratives suggesting “the West is tired of Ukraine,” selectively quoting American politicians who question continued support.

Ambiguity about negotiations, NATO membership, or long-term guarantees is reframed as proof that Ukraine has already been abandoned. These narratives do not invent skepticism from nothing, but magnify real uncertainty.

The erosion of trust in the US does not suggest a rejection of transatlantic partnership but reflects uncertainty about American resolve in an environment where signals matter as much as material support.

Strategic clarity matters, and communication is deterrence, with unified signals reducing the space for disinformation. Polls themselves are also part of the battlefield and should be engaged with critically rather than ignored.

Ukrainian society remains resilient and clear-eyed about the risks it faces. The central question is not whether Ukrainians are ready to surrender, but whether the US and the rest of the West are prepared to communicate their commitment with the consistency required in a war fought over expectations as well as territory.

Kateryna Odarchenko is a political consultant, a partner of the SIC Group Ukraine, and president of the PolitA Institute for Democracy and Development. A specialist practicing in the field of political communication and projects, she has practical experience in the implementation of all-Ukrainian political campaigns and party-building projects. 

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.