Ukraine has taken a decisive step by ending the transit of Russian gas. It aims to deprive the Kremlin of around $6.5bn in revenue from energy exports — money that is used for armaments to kill its citizens.
What of the European Union (EU)? It has not had the same courage. EU imports of Russian gas increased last year, especially supplies of liquefied natural gas (LNG), which is cheaper than its US equivalent but comes at the cost of arming Russia. That’s why it’s referred to as “blood gas.”
The EU has said it will end all Russian gas imports by 2027, as it has already done with coal, but last year the continent imported a record amount of Russian LNG. This was equivalent to 20% of the total of this form of energy. Most shipments have been offloaded at French and Belgian ports.
In total, the EU bought 16% of its gas from the Kremlin, both pipeline and LNG, down from around 40% when Russia launched its all-out war of aggression against Ukraine three years ago. That’s just not good enough.
It is clear that Europe, as the purchaser of gas, should have made the decision to terminate Russian gas imports much earlier, rather than waiting for Ukraine — the transit country — to be forced to do so.
Russia is gradually expanding its footprint in the European gas market. Even after Austrian company OMV stopped receiving Russian gas via Ukraine last fall, overall Russian gas supplies did not drop, indicating that Gazprom has successfully redirected these volumes to Europe’s spot market. Since there is no formal ban on importing Russian gas into the EU, energy traders freely purchase it.
At this critical juncture, Europe must take robust measures to significantly strengthen sanctions against Russian energy exports. It should also carefully monitor the risk of Russian pipeline gas returning to Europe through Turkey under the guise of “Turkish” or “Azerbaijani” gas. Russia and Turkey’s Erdoğan government have long been exploring the idea of a joint gas hub that could launder Russian gas before sending it to the EU.
Russia currently operates two gas pipelines to Turkey: Blue Stream (with an annual capacity of 16 billion cubic meters) and TurkStream (with a capacity of 31 billion cubic meters.) Half of TurkStream’s volume is destined for European countries via the Bulgarian Stream (15.8 billion cubic meters), which passes through Bulgaria, Hungary, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Because this pipeline is nearly at full capacity, significantly increasing Russian gas supplies to Europe is challenging. However, new proposals suggest using other pipelines, the Trans-Balkan, the “Vertical Corridor,” and others to deliver Russian gas through Turkey to Europe. If Russia and its allies succeed with such schemes, it would be a major setback for the EU.
In response, the EU should urgently adopt concrete measures, including a complete ban on imports of Russian pipeline gas and LNG, as well as effective sanctions on Russia’s LNG fleet — something Moscow is attempting to expand in a manner similar to its shadow fleet for oil. The new LNG projects in the US and Canada, scheduled to commence in 2025-2026, are expected to enable Europe to replace Russian LNG without significant losses.
While Slovakia and Hungary are solidly in favor of imports from the Kremlin, the EU does now have Poland holding its rotating presidency, which could lead to meaningful new sanctions. Pressure will also come from the new Trump administration, which has demanded that Europe buy more US LNG. That idea appeals to Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, she said in November.
Continuing Europe’s cooperation with the Kremlin during wartime is shortsighted and irresponsible, especially given remarks by Russian Defense Minister Belousov, who pointed to the high likelihood of a “possible military conflict with NATO in Europe in the next decade.”
Europe can revisit the issue of Russian gas after the war in Ukraine ends, but any such move should safeguard the continent’s energy security and independence.
Sergiy Makogon is a Non-resident Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA.) He is a seasoned executive and energy expert with over 20 years of expertise in the Ukrainian and Central and Eastern European (CEE) gas markets, as well as European security.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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