The close relationship between Turkey and Azerbaijan has been a reliable and longstanding feature of geopolitics at the often-disputatious junction of Europe and Asia.
The 2021 Shusha Declaration formalized a relationship that had provided Azerbaijan with the drones and other equipment to defeat Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh the previous year. It extended Turkish influence into the South Caucasus and crowned Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as a powerful figure in the region.
Is that really now at risk from a dispute over girls’ schoolwear?
On 12 October, the Azerbaijani government introduced new school uniform regulations that effectively barred hijab-wearing female students from attending classes, triggering public criticism and protests in several schools. While authorities cited Azerbaijan’s constitutional commitment to secularism and its long-standing secular traditions, the decision has exposed deep societal divisions, with some segments of the public supporting the policy and others viewing it as a restriction on religious freedom.
The government’s decision to adopt this position may be viewed as consistent with its efforts to safeguard the country’s secular model and as broadly in conformity with other secular-Muslim states, namely Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan, which took this step long ago.
Regardless, the decision did not go down well in Turkey. Its conservative government has long sought to advance its influence across the Turkic world by promoting a shared Turkic identity infused with strong Islamic elements. So while the government did not publicly criticize Azerbaijan’s decision, comments did emerge from members of the ruling establishment.
In particular, Oktay Saral, a chief adviser to President Erdoğan, publicly criticized the new Azerbaijani dress code. Azerbaijani officials condemned the remarks as inappropriate and characterized them as interference in the country’s domestic affairs.
In reality, the dispute is about much more than school uniforms. It is noteworthy that President Ilham Aliyev underscored at his party congress in early October that “no one should interfere in our affairs”, and that Azerbaijan “does not need a patron”. The criticism appeared shortly after an anti-Azerbaijani campaign in the Turkish government-linked media over its deep ties with Israel.
As such, the current hijab protests and Turkey’s tacit support added more fuel to the fire. As a result, Azerbaijani media accused Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan of arranging “secret meetings and talks in Baku during the CICA summit [on confidence-building in Asia in mid-October] in order to organize a plot against the ruling government.”
The current rhetoric shows that Baku refuses to acknowledge Turkey’s leadership within the Turkic community despite its superiority in number of fields, such as economics, demography, the defense industry, and soft power, and is far from embracing the Islamic narratives and agenda of the ruling AKP government.
From Baku’s perspective, Ankara’s growing emphasis on religious narratives and affiliations with Islamist movements and networks constitutes a source of concern for secular yet pragmatic states in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Azerbaijan’s political leadership views the increasing politicization of religion through the prism of national security, social cohesion, and the preservation of the country’s secular governance.
On the other hand, given decades of close cooperation across multiple strategic sectors, including defense industrial collaboration, energy development, and regional connectivity projects, the recent disagreements appear insufficient on their own to fundamentally disrupt the long-term alliance.
Islamism and Israel are irritants, but underneath the dispute lies something much closer to home for the Azerbaijanis. There are serious concerns about the development of the Turkey-Armenia normalization process amid a continued deadlock in the Azerbaijan-Armenia peace negotiations.
Following Azerbaijan’s restoration of full control over the Karabakh region in 2023, Ankara largely aligned itself with Baku’s position that the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations, including the reopening of the border, should proceed in parallel with the conclusion of a comprehensive peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia.
More recently, however, Turkey has appeared increasingly eager to advance its rapprochement with neighboring Armenia, which would open trade and energy routes that have long been closed.
Reports indicating growing Turkish-Armenian cooperation in areas such as education, business, and agriculture have generated unease in Baku.
From Azerbaijan’s perspective, the Ankara-Yerevan thaw risks a departure from the long-standing principle of strategic coordination that has traditionally underpinned the Turkish-Azerbaijani partnership.
Azerbaijan will likely continue to indicate its unhappiness with Turkey, without any direct confrontation, to signal that it can construct alternative strategic partnerships in Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia.
Fuad Shahbazov is a policy analyst covering regional security issues in the Eurasian region. He regularly provides his short geopolitical insights at @fuadshahbazov.
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