The alliance cannot sustain collective defense if its citizens doubt why it exists, distrust what it says, or come to believe it is responsible for the threats it confronts. Public trust in NATO should be seen as a key part of Europe’s security infrastructure.
Societal trust is crucial to countering Russia in the information sphere, which is where the narrative battles take place. For NATO members, these battles matter because public acceptance of Moscow’s false claim that the West caused the war could weaken support for Ukraine and for the alliance’s broader deterrence mission.
Polling in all 32 NATO member states suggests this matters. In a survey conducted across the alliance, respondents who trusted NATO were far more likely to blame Russia for starting the war; people with greater faith in the alliance were nearly three times more likely to blame Russia and had about 65% lower odds of blaming the West and Ukraine, compared to those who did not.
The results revealed that distrust in supranational and alliance institutions is strongly associated with West blame.
After the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Western explanation of what happened was straightforward: Russia was the aggressor, Ukraine the target of an unprovoked attack. At the same time, Moscow focused on accusing the West and Ukraine of provoking the war and leaving Russia with no option but to invade.
Whichever of these narratives gains traction is likely to affect NATO’s ability to carry out its mission. Governments need public backing to sustain sanctions, weapons deliveries, higher defense spending, refugee assistance, and long-term deterrence.
If citizens conclude that NATO or Ukraine caused the war, sustaining those policies becomes harder, and it could lead to voters questioning whether defense measures against Russia should be continued.
Narrative failure by the West could boost the electoral fortunes of Russian-friendly right-wing populist parties and politicians across Europe, as outlined in a recent CEPA article. The Kremlin understands this vulnerability and has spent years exploiting it through propaganda and influence operations.
Why some NATO residents buy into the Russian narrative that the West is to blame for the war in Ukraine has puzzled researchers for a while. Our survey provided an important insight – across all NATO member states, respondents who trusted the alliance (and the European Union, too) were significantly more likely to blame Russia for the outbreak of the war. Those who did not trust NATO disproportionately blamed the West and Ukraine.
While those who already trust NATO may be less receptive to claims that the alliance caused the war, exposure to such claims may also erode a willingness to place faith in the alliance. Our survey could not fully disentangle those effects but did show a close connection between trust and vulnerability to competing explanations of the war.
NATO governments could increase public faith by explaining clearly what it does, why deterrence matters, and why support for Ukraine serves their citizens’ own security.
They also need to respond quickly when false claims about NATO gain traction.
Europe is spending billions on weapons, infrastructure, and increasing military readiness, and that investment is essential. But an alliance whose publics no longer believe in its purpose will struggle to use those capabilities when they matter. NATO’s home front begins with trust.
Juris Pupcenoks is Professor and Chair of Political Science at Marist University (USA), an Associate Fellow at the Academy of International Affairs NRW (Bonn, Germany), and a Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Geopolitical Studies in Riga (Latvia). He has held a range of leadership roles within the International Studies Association (ISA), including serving as Chair of the Programs Committee of the Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Migration Studies Section. He also serves on the Advisory Board of the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs’ Next-Generation Leadership Initiative (New York City).
Jessica Boscarino is Professor of Political Science at Marist University (USA). She holds a master’s degree in international relations and Ph.D. in political science from the Maxwell School at Syracuse University (USA). Her research examines the role of narrative contests in public policy debates, with a particular focus on energy and the environment. Her work has appeared in Review of Policy Research, Politics & Policy, Policy Sciences, Policy Studies Journal and Information, Communication & Society.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
