It has been a long, long time since relations between the South Caucasian nations of Armenia and Azerbaijan have been so good. The signing of several deals in the White House on August 8 has delivered that, confounded Russia, which breezily describes this as its backyard, and brought prizes to the US, which wins has a direct stake in the region.
It’s all very unusual. As a result of the agreement, the United States now has a 99-year mandate to oversee the creation and operation of a potentially lucrative transit corridor. The project — branded the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity, or TRIPP — uses Armenian land that will be subleased by the US to a consortium tasked with its construction and management, which aims to link Turkey in the west to the Caspian Sea in the east, offering a shorter route than the traditional through Georgia.
The idea of a link through Armenia’s southern Syunik province is not new. For years, Azerbaijan has pushed for what it calls the Zangezur Corridor, a 40-km (25-mile) stretch that would connect Azerbaijan proper to its exclave, Nakhchivan, and then onto Turkey.
During the same Washington summit, the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan initialed a draft Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and Interstate Relations. The document does not feature a major breakthrough, except perhaps the first article, which states that “the Parties recognize and shall respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability of international borders and political independence of each other”.
That is quite a big deal given the wars and fearsome rhetoric that have marred relations between the two since before the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Armenia first took the region of Nagorno-Karabakh, with its large Armenian minority, in the 1990s and then lost it to Azerbaijan in 2023.
The Armenian and Azerbaijani sides also agreed to dissolve the OSCE Minsk Group of France, Russia, and the US — a major Azerbaijani demand that Armenia was previously unwilling to concede.
Other outcomes of the talks included bilateral arrangements with Washington. President Donald Trump signed an order lifting Section 907 of the 1992 Freedom Support Act, which had barred US military assistance to Azerbaijan since the first Nagorno-Karabakh war. The oil companies, SOCAR and the US firm ExxonMobil, concluded a memorandum of understanding, while Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan inked agreements with Trump on the “Crossroads of the World” initiative – Armenia’s energy and transportation plan to improve regional links, as well as cooperation in artificial intelligence and energy security. The US plans to finalize similar agreements with oil- and gas-rich Azerbaijan under a broader strategic partnership charter.
It all looks very encouraging for the region’s future, but there are important riders. While the text represents a step toward normalizing relations, both sides acknowledged that additional work is needed before the accord can be formally signed and ratified.
Some significant problems remain. The Washington meeting did not produce a final peace treaty — contrary to what was reported in some Western media. Azerbaijan insists that Armenia must amend its constitution, removing any references that could be interpreted as claims over Nagorno-Karabakh, before a treaty can be signed. President Ilham Aliyev reiterated in Washington that the newly signed documents do not remove this precondition: “Once the Armenian constitution is amended accordingly, a peace treaty can be signed at any time,” he stated.
Border demarcation is also contentious. Questions persist over whether Azerbaijani troops will withdraw from positions that Yerevan says they captured during the clashes following the second Nagorno-Karabakh war of 2020.
As for the TRIPP, differences might arise from customs procedures for cargo crossing Armenia. Also, how would the US control the corridor on the ground, and what will happen if danger to the route arises? And last but not least, will the US maintain its commitment for the 99-year term? These and other questions will undoubtedly arise and will require answers.
There are also geopolitical problems. Iran and Russia see danger in the US presence, even though American forces will not be deployed along the TRIPP; it puts a US presence bang in the middle of the key north-south land route between the allies.
Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs talked about “the negative consequences of any form of foreign intervention, especially near shared borders”. In a phone call, the Armenian leadership tried to assuage the concerns of its long-time Iranian ally, stating that the agreement will be beneficial to the region and that Iran will not be denied access to Armenia, that Yerevan will retain administrative control — since the road crosses its sovereign territory — and underlined the pledge not to involve US troops.
A similar call took place with the Russian leadership, which views the development with suspicion. Once the major mediator in Armenian-Azerbaijani affairs, the Kremlin now faces unexpected competition from Washington.
The Foreign Ministry publicly stated that it favors “a zone of stability and prosperity” in the South Caucasus, but more importantly warned that regional disputes should be resolved by regional states — meaning Turkey, Iran, and Russia — rather than outside powers. Russian policy analysts and especially media commentators (state media called the agreement a crisis) are even more open in their criticism of what is happening in the South Caucasus.
Perhaps the biggest winner is Turkey, for which the route would open a second land link to the Caspian and Central Asia, bypassing Iran. The US, too, may lean on Turkey for the management and security of the route. TRIPP’s existence will drive Russia and Iran closer on South Caucasus issues, and they can be expected to resist its success.
Emil Avdaliani is a research fellow at the Turan Research Center and a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia. His research focuses on the history of Silk Roads and the interests of great powers in the Middle East and the Caucasus.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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