South of Novotoretske in Donetsk, dozens of bodies of Russian assault troops lie scattered across a field as drone operators track and strike survivors continuing the attack. Analysis of the footage, released by Ukraine’s Magyars Bird drone unit, suggests around 30 dead.
The defenders were helped by robust ground fortifications, according to John Spencer, chair of urban warfare studies at West Point’s Modern War Institute, who described the incident as “intense, World War I-era scenes but with lethal drones.”
Ukraine’s General Staff estimates total Russian casualties for November at around 31,000 personnel, an average of more than 1,000 a day. Estimates for December reached 35,000, a fourth straight month of rising losses, with Russian forces losing an estimated 1,730 soldiers on just one day.
British military intelligence estimates that total Russian casualties, including killed and wounded, long ago passed a million as Vladimir Putin’s disregard for the lives of his soldiers shows no sign of abating. So far, Putin’s regime has been willing to tolerate the carnage for what it considers a greater prize.
The Donbas is part of Kyiv’s “fortress belt” that Putin has failed to fully secure after four years of warfare and that he now seeks to win by negotiation with the US. It represents the core of the country’s defensive architecture built up since 2014. Dimko Zhluktenko, of 413 Separate Unmanned Systems Battalion, says that Russia could ultimately conquer the area, but reckons Ukraine “will destroy at least 500,000 Russian soldiers” in the process.
Throughout the war, Russia has relied on so-called meatgrinder tactics, throwing soldiers at fortified Ukrainian positions in the hope that attrition will force a collapse. Large armored pushes are increasingly rare, and instead, small infantry groups probe forward, attempting to slip through gaps, hide in folds of terrain, and establish footholds behind Ukrainian lines, although the tactics make big breakthroughs less likely.
Ukrainian defenses along the front combine layered field fortifications with persistent drone coverage, turning open ground into a killing zone. In effect, Kyiv has built a drone wall — once Russian troops leave cover, they are usually detected within minutes and attacked.
Where its troops are well dug in, “timely and high-quality fortifications and engineering obstacles” have enabled Ukrainian forces to disrupt and inflict maximum losses on Russian units, even when facing numerical superiority, according to Gen. Oleksandr Syrskyi, Ukraine’s commander-in-chief.
In contrast, poor fortifications meant Ukrainian units were unprepared for Russian attacks following rotations in places such as Toretsk, and similar problems emerged on the Kharkiv front in 2024, where defenders struggled to build adequate fortifications as Russian drones made using excavators and heavy engineering equipment too risky.
Since the full-scale invasion, Ukraine has moved toward dispersed, concealed, and flexible defensive networks adapted to drone-saturated warfare, according to an analysis by the Sahaidachnyi Security Center.
In Ukrainian military planning, these deliberately engineered corridors function as so-called “kill pockets” — small, bounded zones where attacking units can be fixed and destroyed by drones, artillery, and remote fire without exposing defending infantry.
Modern defensive lines should be designed as kill zones optimized for drones and ground robotic systems, Ukrainian Brigadier General Andriy Biletskyi said in December. Layered obstacle networks shape Russian movement rather than stop it outright, using anti-tank ditches, barbed wire, and dragon teeth.
The spacing of defensive lines, often roughly within mortar range of one another, allows Ukrainian units to trade space for time, counterattacking exposed assault groups before they can consolidate.
Instead of large, static strongpoints, Ukrainian units rely on small, positions hidden underground or in treelines, supported by remotely controlled fire and decoys that create overlapping kill zones and blunt infantry assaults.
Much of this defensive infrastructure is hidden. Analyst Andrew Perpetua notes that Ukraine’s most effective fortifications are rarely visible from satellite imagery. “If you know it is there, unless it is an obstacle like a vehicle ditch, it isn’t defending much,” he wrote.
The strongest positions are dug-in and concealed, which is why fundraising efforts have focused on small excavators capable of digging without disturbing cover.
“Building a proper bunker for an infantry platoon takes two weeks and eight people without an excavator,” wrote Constantine Kalinovskiy, a Ukrainian veteran who has raised funds on social media to supply frontline units with excavators. “With an excavator, it takes around three days and three people.”
And speed is essential in drone-saturated conditions, as is the need for wider, smoother, and better-protected trenches so unmanned ground vehicles can move safely and efficiently. Around 90% of frontline supplies in the Pokrovsk sector of the Donbas front are now delivered by ground robots.
“With drones, FPVs and guided bombs constantly in the air, trenches must now be deeper, stronger and properly camouflaged,” says Tonya Levchuk, co-founder and executive director of Liberty Ukraine, which raises funds for the excavators. “Building them by hand is simply too slow. Speed saves lives.”
Lyuba Shipovich, CEO of Dignitas Ukraine, added that future trench systems will require covered routes, protected charging bays, and communication lines able to function under jamming to create networks of autonomous firing points.
As the situation on the Zaporizhzhia front deteriorates, Ukraine has stepped up the construction of new defensive lines, according to Ukrainian Defense Minister Denys Shmyhal. He highlighted the scale of the effort, citing more than 2,100 platoon-strongpoints, about 3,000km of anti-tank ditches, and thousands of kilometers of extra barriers, razor wire, and other obstacles across the frontline.
“This is a continuous duel. Whoever adapts faster survives longer,” wrote Brad Crawford, an American veteran in Ukraine.
For all the engineering effort, manpower remains a limiting factor. Mykola Melnyk, a former officer of 47 Mechanized Brigade, said there’s a lack of infantry and ground drones. Effective defense still requires “either a person or a ground drone with a constant power system that can watch what’s going on,” he told the author .
When poorly equipped Russian troops infiltrate deep into Ukrainian positions or push into urban areas, humans are still needed to clear and hold terrain, as demonstrated during Ukraine’s recent clean-up near Dobropillia.
As Ukraine continues to adapt its defenses for a war dominated by drones and attrition, the question is not whether these systems work, but how long they can hold without sufficient manpower to support them. The better the fortifications, the better the odds for Ukraine.
David Kirichenko is a freelance journalist and an Associate Research Fellow at the Henry Jackson Society. He can be found on X/Twitter @DVKirichenko.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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