Accelerating European Union (EU) membership for the Western Balkans would be a clear demonstration of the continent’s strength at a moment when transatlantic relations are being recalibrated.
Enlargement is not charity; it is strategy. By extending the EU’s zone of peace, democratic governance, and economic integration to Southeast Europe, the EU signals to Washington that it is capable of consolidating its own neighborhood and emerging as a more coherent geopolitical actor.
That signal is precisely what recent US legislation on the Western Balkans promotes, what Secretary Marco Rubio encouraged in his 2026 speech at the Munich Security Conference, and what would serve long-term American economic, security, and political interests, including those of US businesses.
EU enlargement has always functioned as strategic glue. Following the Cold War, accession anchored Central Europe in democratic and market institutions. Extending that process to Balkan countries would close a lingering geopolitical gap in Europe. It would reduce the likelihood of renewed conflict, lock in reforms, and demonstrate that Europe can act decisively in its own security environment.
For Washington, a united and stable Europe is not rhetoric; it is a real force multiplier. A more cohesive EU, expanding a market of 450 million consumers, becomes a stronger partner in addressing shared challenges from Russia’s aggression to China’s strategic investments.
The case for urgency is strengthened by new American policy. The Western Balkans Democracy and Prosperity Act, passed by Congress last year and signed into law by President Trump, commits the US to intensifying economic cooperation, combating corruption, strengthening democratic institutions, and resisting any redrawing of borders along ethnic lines in the Western Balkans. In short, Washington is aligning itself with European integration, not as a substitute for enlargement, but as a complement to it.
If the United States is serious about encouraging Europe to become a more stable and reliable partner, then it should fully employ the tools in this legislation. That includes mobilizing the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) to expand energy and infrastructure financing, supporting diversification away from Russian energy, and countering malign influence. It also means pressing partner governments to tackle entrenched corruption.
The new US legislation requires that the Secretary of State should, among other things, develop an initiative to “combat political corruption, especially in the judiciary, independent election oversight bodies, and public procurement processes.” It is a lack of transparency in public procurement that has damaged the competitiveness of economies in the region and discouraged US firms from contending for public contracts, resulting in an exclusion of American workers and investors from regional commercial opportunities. These reforms are not only EU accession requirements; they are preconditions for sustainable US investment.
European leaders themselves, including German Chancellor Friedrich Merz at the Munich Security Conference, have acknowledged that enlargement needs a new impetus. EU Enlargement Commissioner Mata Kos February 13 spoke positively of forward movement for Albania and Montenegro in accession negotiations, and others throughout the region continue to make progress in meeting accession conditions.
It was also notable that Kos issued a stern warning about lessons learned from the EU’s 2004 expansion, especially that some countries were guilty of backsliding on corruption and other key issues once membership was won. And also that some acted as “Trojan horses”, a coded reference to Hungary and Slovakia, which are accused of pursuing their own, or Russia’s interests, rather than Europe’s.
The EU’s Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, with its €6bn ($7bn) Reform and Growth Facility for 2024–2027, aims to deliver early economic benefits through gradual integration into the single market. EU and Balkans leaders will meet in Montenegro in June. Can they — and the US — mobilize the resources made available before then to expedite enlargement work and decisions?
These resources have catalyzed real progress before. Banking sectors once burdened by non-performing loans are now more stable. Education attainment levels approach EU benchmarks. Digital infrastructure has expanded, and several Balkan states are recognized as “emerging innovators.” Private equity funds report internal rates of return as high as 17%, according to the Balkan Barometer.
Yet gaps remain. The small- and medium-sized enterprise (SME) financing shortfall among Western Balkans candidates is estimated at €2.4bn. High interest rates, collateral requirements, and complex procedures constrain entrepreneurship. Targeted capital, particularly patient, risk-tolerant investment, could unlock high-impact ventures, accelerate green transitions, and bridge productivity divides.
For American businesses, this represents an opportunity. US firms in energy, digital services, logistics, and impact investing stand to benefit. NATO’s recent designation of Corridor VIII — from the Adriatic to the Black Sea — as a strategic infrastructure corridor underscores the commercial and security logic of deeper integration. By coordinating DFC financing with EU instruments and multilateral lenders such as the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Washington can amplify returns while reinforcing standards of transparency and sustainability.
Russia continues to exploit governance weaknesses, energy dependence, and disinformation networks. China has deployed trade, loans, Confucius Institutes, and elite-level partnerships to expand influence. Yet recent data suggest Beijing’s leverage is uneven. According to the 2024 China Index produced by Doublethink Lab and the China in the World network, Chinese influence decreased across the Balkans, though it remains pronounced in Serbia and has grown in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Serbia ranks 34th globally in exposure to Chinese influence; Bosnia and Herzegovina 54th; Montenegro 100th; North Macedonia and Albania at the bottom of the list. The lesson is clear: where democratic resilience strengthens, malign influence wanes.
Accelerated EU enlargement would consolidate that resilience. Membership, or at least phased economic integration paired with a credible timeline to full membership, would reward difficult reforms. Critics in Washington who question Europe’s competitiveness or cohesion would confront tangible evidence of strategic resolve. A Europe that can integrate the Balkans despite internal challenges demonstrates institutional vitality, not weakness.
For the United States, the benefits are equally concrete:
- Closing avenues for Russian destabilization and reducing the burden on US crisis management;
- Expanded trade and investment in a converging market favorably disposed toward cooperation with the United States; and
- A stronger EU partner capable of sharing responsibility in global governance. Secretary Rubio’s Munich message – that America seeks a more united, focused Europe – would find practical expression in EU enlargement.
Now is the moment to translate rhetoric into coordinated action. Expedited decisions on Balkan EU membership would signal that Europe is capable of strategic consolidation and that the transatlantic partnership remains forward-looking. By using the Democracy and Prosperity Act vigorously, Washington can help create the conditions for accession. In acting together, the EU and the US can take the first steps in a new transatlantic division of labor to advance European strength, and American prosperity and security alongside it.
David J. Kostelancik is a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). He was a career member of the US Senior Foreign Service, holding the rank of Minister Counselor. David served as deputy coordinator for terrorism prevention and detention in the State Department’s Bureau of Counterterrorism from 2024 to 2025. From 2021 to 2023, he was foreign policy adviser to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His overseas postings as deputy chief of mission and chargé d’affaires at the US Embassy in Hungary and two postings to Russia. He holds a bachelor’s degree in mathematics and political science from Northwestern University, a master’s degree in Russian and East European studies from the University of Michigan, and a Master of Science degree in national security strategy from the National War College.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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