There is a fierce focus on peace talks to end Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, with issues of land, finance, and security guarantees consuming much negotiating time. Likewise, the commercial opportunities that might follow. But behind the scenes, cooperation between Russia and China is getting ever deeper.
The latest evidence came from reports that the Chinese business magnate Wang Dinghua, who owns drone parts-makers in Shenzhen, had quietly acquired a 5% stake in Rustakt, one of Russia’s most important manufacturers of first-person view (FPV) attack drones.
The drone Rustakt helps produce, the VT 40, is no technological marvel. A former Ukrainian officer with Frontelligence Insight described it as the Model T Ford of Russia’s drone fleet, cheap and easily manufactured by the tens of thousands. But that’s also what makes it significant and dangerous.
Long gone are the days when China argued it was neutral in Russia’s war on Ukraine. In the first half of 2025, Russia imported $1.9bn of high-priority dual-use items from China, with Estonian intelligence now estimating that 80% of foreign components entering Russia’s military technology sector originate from the same source. Even pro-Kremlin media has acknowledged the role played by Chinese components.
Rustakt and similar firms are enabling Russia to launch cheap attack drones at a pace no Western military can match.
Kyiv is feeling the drone crunch as Moscow continues to bet on mass to prevail. “We’re holding the line, but we have far fewer infantry — and too few drones,” Yurii Dymkovich, a drone pilot with 23 Separate Mechanized Brigade, told this author. “The warehouse is almost out of FPVs, so they’re being rationed. Each crew is limited to a maximum of 25 per day.”
Ukrainian intelligence reports that China is also sending machine tools, chemicals, gunpowder, and other essential components to at least 20 Russian manufacturing plants. The benefits are self-evident: Russia provides battlefield testing, while China provides the parts and technical expertise, undermining sanctions in the process and refining technologies that Beijing will one day put to its own use (quite possibly against Taiwan).
China has also given Russia a critical edge by dramatically increasing exports of fiber optic cables and lithium ion batteries, enabling Moscow to mass produce the tethered drones that have overwhelmed Ukrainian defenses (these cables are now so thick on the ground in some parts of the front that they snare motorbikes). This is enabling Russia, particularly elite units like the Rubicon drone strike unit, to increase pressure on Ukrainian defense in places such as Pokrovsk in Donetsk Oblast.
China’s involvement runs deeper than components. Ukrainian intelligence reported that Beijing has also provided Russia with satellite imagery for missile strikes. During a large Russian barrage on October 5, at least three Chinese Yaogan 33 reconnaissance satellites passed over the main target area in western Ukraine, Militarnyi reported.
A Russian Geran 3 drone captured and dismantled by Ukraine was powered by a Chinese Telefly JT80 turbojet engine, and Chinese drone experts have repeatedly traveled to the sanctioned Russian arms maker IEMZ Kupol to assist with development.
China’s involvement goes beyond supplying components. Leaked Russian defense documents reviewed by the Kyiv Independent show that 40 Chinese military officers and defense industry executives secretly visited Russia in 2023 and 2024 to negotiate weapons purchases.
Beijing has since signed confidential contracts worth roughly $585m for Russian aircraft, armored vehicles, ammunition, and training, with deliveries scheduled through 2027. This has created a two-way pipeline in which China equips Russia’s drone and missile industries while Russia helps shape China’s future warfighting capability.
China has meanwhile helped Belarus produce some 500,000 artillery shells and Grad rockets for Moscow, providing entire assembly lines and stationing Chinese engineers in Belarusian plants to keep them running.
And China is putting into production technology derived from lessons learned in Ukraine. It has now rolled out the Feilong 300D, a long-range strike drone reportedly costing just $10,000.
Even President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, normally careful in his language about China, has abandoned his customary caution when talking about drones. “The Chinese Mavic is open for Russians but closed for Ukrainians,” he said, while highlighting the presence of Chinese staff on Russian production lines.
Zelenskyy noted that Beijing’s export curbs briefly created a crisis for Ukraine, forcing Kyiv to scour EU markets for FPV drones until Ukrainian factories could catch up. And the shortages were felt on the frontlines. Mykola Melnyk, a former officer of 47 Mechanized Brigade, said Western manufacturers should learn the lesson and urgently need to wean themselves off their dependence on cheap Chinese components.
One example of a successful shift away from Chinese parts is Frontline, the Ukrainian firm behind the Zoom drone, which was built as a military grade alternative to the Chinese Mavic. With a two-band control link, encrypted video, and AI navigation that works under heavy jamming, the Zoom lasts longer than commercial drones and sharply reduces cost per mission.
Oko Camera is another Ukrainian firm whose products reportedly use no Chinese components. Ukraine can now manufacture high-quality thermal cameras, video transmitters, flight controllers, communication systems, electric motors, structural elements, fiber optic reels, and a wide range of specialized modules. While Chinese systems cannot yet be fully replaced, Kyiv is working to fill the gaps created by Beijing’s export restrictions and to reduce supply chain risk.
The situation would become even more serious if Ukraine lost. As Alina Polyakova and Christopher Walker recently warned in a CEPA analysis: “If Ukraine’s fractured but highly innovative drone industry fell into Russian hands, the Chinese would expect to benefit.”
They added, “China, with its advanced manufacturing base and speed of adaptation, would be the ultimate winner. Which, of course, is a serious concern for the US military that may one day have to fight them.”
Leaked documents revealed that Russia is already helping China prepare for a potential invasion of Taiwan.
Moscow is learning from the war in Ukraine and sharing those lessons with Beijing. Unless this authoritarian axis is recognized as a single threat, it will only grow stronger as technological cooperation deepens.
David Kirichenko is a freelance journalist and an Associate Research Fellow at the Henry Jackson Society. He can be found on X/Twitter @DVKirichenko.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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