President Trump’s threat of enhanced tariffs and sanctions succeeded in bringing Vladimir Putin to the negotiating table and so demonstrated Moscow’s principal vulnerability: the economy.
Despite years of sanctions — and despite there being no imminent sign of additional US measures — even the current restrictions lack effectiveness because they have not adjusted to Russia’s countermeasures. Moscow relies on near-neighbors where it holds influence, along with sympathizers — high on the list of such enablers is the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
It is no coincidence that President Putin first offered to meet President Trump in the UAE, before he was persuaded to head for Alaska instead. The country has been a key ally in the battle to keep Russia’s economy functioning despite the greatest number of sanctions ever imposed on a single country.
The UAE seeks to avert Western anger by describing itself as a valuable mediator, especially in dealings with the US. UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed travelled to Moscow to meet Putin in August, his second visit to Russia in less than a year.
Such close relationships — what Putin terms a “strategic partnership” — help explain why trade between the two has exploded from around $4bn before Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine in 2021 to $11.5bn in 2024, almost triple. Russian money has poured into the UAE. Trade flows involve significant amounts of gold and diamonds whose origins can be masked, allowing it to enter global markets.
The two countries intend to go much further. In June, Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Khaled bin Mohammed bin Zayed travelled to Minsk for a meeting of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and agreed with the Russian and Belarusian leaders to an agreement to streamline trade with the economic bloc.
Belarus, too, has become an important economic hub for Russia over the past five years since the dictator Aliaksandr Lukashenka stole the 2020 elections and became deeply dependent on Kremlin cash and goodwill. During that period, bilateral annual trade has increased by almost 50% to nearly $51bn.
Some at least of this rise might be explained by the 47-fold explosion in UAE-Belarussian trade from $82.6m in 2021 to $3.9bn in 2024. This parallel and sharp increase in trade during a period of heightened sanctions confirms the UAE-Russia alliance.
Alongside this and arguably more significant, is the UAE’s centrality in Russia’s International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC); Moscow’s trade corridor to Africa and India. Abu Dhabi is the leading investor in Central Asia’s critical infrastructure. From a majority stake in Kazakhstan’s Khorgos special economic zone, oil exploration in Turkmenistan, and the hosting of Eurasian Development Bank bonds, the UAE has cemented itself as the leading regional patron. The area is key to Russian ambitions, both of political and economic influence, and as a key conduit for sanctions evasion.
Abu Dhabi’s patronage serves its own and Moscow’s interests. Russia and the UAE share a similar strategic interest in Africa, namely, eliciting profit and reinforcing positions across the continent. Russia employs Belarusian arms smugglers to ship weapons to Africa, including Sudan, which is currently suffering a bloody civil war. Most alarmingly, the UAE sends weapons to the RSF, a notorious party to the fighting, with US lawmakers attempting to block arms sales to Abu Dhabi until it stops “aiding and abetting genocide”.
The UAE has never deceived the West about its admiration for Russia; it has been able to play both sides because the West has ignored its behavior. While the UAE’s embrace of Russia is acknowledged by the West, its vast reserves of cash and potential investments in the US and elsewhere have made its Russian relationship a mere embarrassment. Abu Dhabi’s pledged investment of $1.4 trillion into the US suggests why this is so.
The UAE has meanwhile pursued a vigorous influence operation inside the US to shape opinion and outcomes on a range of issues, under multiple administrations, that saw it spend $154m on lobbying in the years 2016-2022 alone, and much more on other influence efforts. Most, but not all, were legal. Russian intelligence agents have meanwhile boasted of their cooperation with UAE agencies to work against US and British spy agencies.
The lack of public attribution towards the UAE-Russia alliance pales in comparison to concerns over the UAE-China relationship; US Republicans are currently calling for greater scrutiny of Emirati investments amid concerns that advanced Nvidia artificial intelligence chips wanted by the UAE might be routed to Beijing.
The Trump administration has made plain that secondary sanctions against Russia are on the cards. This would hurt the UAE, and it will be working behind the scenes to head off such an outcome. Yet to truly end the Kremlin’s ambitions, Moscow’s economic networks must be closed down.
Replicating the action taken against India by using a tariff hike, the UAE could be made to understand that playing two sides of the same game can be extremely profitable, but also extremely risky.
Matthew Hedges is an academic focusing on the activities of state security organizations. While conducting fieldwork research in the UAE in 2018, he was tortured and sentenced to life imprisonment for espionage on behalf of the British Government, but was freed shortly afterwards. His doctorate from the University of Durham has been published as ‘Reinventing the Sheikhdom; Clan, Power and Patronage in MBZ’s UAE.’
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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