The thing about dictators is that they can hang around for an awfully long time. The septuagenarian leaders of Russia and China meet today (May 19) for close to the 50th time since 2012.
No other leader has had the face time with General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Xi Jinping that Vladimir Putin has enjoyed. In total, Xi has met Putin more than twice as many times as any other world leader.
This is not just about form; it’s a relationship of substance. The trip coincides with the 25th anniversary of the 2001 Sino-Russian Treaty of Friendship, a reflection of the length and depth of relations that have been forged over time between these ambitious autocracies.
The relationship has reached a new level since 2012. This is, in large measure, a function of the personal bond developed between Xi and Putin over this period. Since Xi became China’s paramount leader in late 2012, months after Putin returned to the Russian presidency, their two countries’ bilateral ties have deepened into a remarkably close and sustained leader-to-leader exchange.
With the benefit of hindsight, it is easier to see that as Putin was planning the 2014 occupation of Crimea and infiltration of eastern Ukraine, Xi was simultaneously adopting a more assertive and confrontational approach for China in the South China Sea. This belligerent posture was a sign of the more ominous ambitions these regimes harbored.
By the time of Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the two leaders had achieved what might be described as a “shared consciousness.” In response to signals from the top, their respective bureaucracies gradually expanded linkages across multiple domains, including media and information, military cooperation, economic relations, and governance practices. And as these authoritarian leaders grew more emboldened, they articulated ambitions in ways that should have drawn more serious attention from observers in the West.
In February 2022, following a summit in Beijing, Xi and Putin issued a joint statement describing relations between China and Russia as a friendship with “no limits”. Days later, Moscow launched its unprovoked attack, sending tens of thousands of troops across the Ukrainian border and upending European and global security in a manner not seen since the first half of the 20th century.
Beijing has supported Russia’s war in Ukraine through dual-use exports of machine tools, gunpowder, and chemicals, alongside coordinated information operations. Beijing claims to serve as a neutral actor, but with its indispensable support, and that of other like-minded regimes such as Iran, North Korea, and Belarus, the Russian regime has sustained its war effort for more than four years.
China and Russia alike are providing support to Iran in ways that complicate the US effort there, including through economic lifelines, military and intelligence cooperation, drone tactics gleaned from the frontline in Ukraine, and information operations and propaganda.
For some time, many observers of China and Russia were skeptical that these countries’ relationship could deepen and endure. Much of the analysis drew on the historical wariness between Moscow and Beijing (including serious clashes between their armies).
Some see Moscow as unwilling to function as a junior partner in a “marriage of convenience”. But this is outdated thinking. It has become clear that Xi and Putin have developed a close working relationship and have a shared vision for how the world should be ordered. Both leaders embrace a creed that privileges state power over individual liberty and is fundamentally hostile to free expression, open debate, and independent thought.
To put this into perspective, Putin is now in his second quarter-century in power. Xi is in year 14. Neither plans to fade into the sunset. On the contrary, they intend to pursue their objectives for as long as they can. A forthcoming CEPA report — The China-Russia Meta Threat: The Architecture of Authoritarian Power — puts the stakes into context. The analysis identifies the autocrats’ formidable power over crucial economic, military, and other domains.
Nevertheless, these have evident vulnerabilities.
For example, Russia’s economy and governance structure are decrepit. Putin has mortgaged Russia’s future and is attempting to shape Europe’s as well. Despite relentless propaganda about its inviolability and inevitable rise, the Chinese system has deep, persistent problems that include massive youth unemployment, festering demographic gaps, a real estate sector crisis, and a political system that increasingly has few policy levers to meaningfully address these serious structural challenges.
At a time of intensifying strategic competition, it is a good time to take stock. The US will need allies to contest the divide and conquer strategies used by Moscow and Beijing, whose leaderships understand that alliances are integral to US power.
When they meet, Xi and Putin no doubt will take up ways to further their strategy of cleaving apart democratic allies. The Trump administration should recognize that it is squarely in the US national security interest to strengthen relationships with natural allies in the face of intensifying competition with the now mature China-Russia partnership.
This includes setting aside the notion of accomplishing a “reverse Kissinger”. If anything, the inverse has occurred: a weakened Russia has cast its lot with China, along with Iran and other authoritarian regimes, against the United States and its natural allies. Absent a concerted approach from the democracies, the autocrats will forge ahead with their ambition to establish a different world order.
Christopher Walker is Vice President at the Center for European Policy Analysis. This article is drawn from the forthcoming CEPA report – “The China-Russia Meta Threat: The Architecture of Authoritarian Power.”
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
