Washington has built an elaborate web of export controls and licensing requirements to keep artificial intelligence chips from reaching China.

Yet Nvidia founder Jensen Huang’s apparent “honeytrap” affair with Alice Huang, a Chinese businesswoman accused of passing information to Beijing, is about more than the blind spots of those controls. It is about the difficulty of shutting down access to advanced tech in a globalized, interconnected world — and about a company, a regulator, and an executive branch that saw warning signs and were slow act on them. 

Had existing rules been enforced, Nvidia should never have been selling advanced chips to the Singapore-based cloud computing company Megaspeed International. Alice Huang was an executive at Megaspeed, which became a major Nvidia customer, and attracted scrutiny over possible violations of American export controls. Nvidia’s board has retained outside counsel to investigate whether Chinese intelligence targeted their former CEO, who resigned after his affairs were revealed. The company maintains that it has no reason to believe its secrets or national security were compromised.

At its core, the story is about the opacity of supply chains, and it begins with Megaspeed’s convoluted ownership. The company incorporated in Singapore in 2015 as 7Road International, emerging from the Chinese online gaming industry. It adopted its current name in 2023. Later that year, Megaspeed’s shares were transferred, through a company registered in the British Virgin Islands, to another Singapore-registered company, Swiftdata. Who ultimately controls Swiftdata remains unclear. 

Convoluted incorporation trails do not prove state control, and Chinese investment is not synonymous with Chinese government ownership. But state-linked and private Chinese capital often moves through subsidiaries, holding companies, and offshore vehicles. Megaspeed’s complex corporate history should have triggered rigorous scrutiny of who controlled the firm and who would ultimately benefit from its purchases of US chips. 

Despite the warning signs, Megaspeed became an official Nvidia cloud partner and purchased billions of dollars’ worth of advanced computing equipment. Its Indonesian subsidiary imported cutting-edge Nvidia hardware. 

US authorities have investigated whether Megaspeed also helped Chinese customers obtain Nvidia chips. Megaspeed has denied illicit transfers, and no public finding has established an export-control violation. But the question for Nvidia was never whether a violation had been proven; it was whether a customer with this profile warranted trust and access. 

In August 2025, Nvidia’s general counsel emailed Department agents investigating Megaspeed, saying that a senior Commerce official had approved the outreach. The investigation was paused and transferred to the Justice Department. 

Other agencies proposed adding Megaspeed to the entity list of foreign businesses and organizations that are deemed to pose a risk to US national security. Commerce never did. Officials pressed Commerce to act, and Secretary of State Marco Rubio sent Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick a memorandum on Megaspeed in May 2026. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent recently reportedly confronted Lutnik, asking: “How come Megaspeed isn’t on the entities list?” Commerce denies that the exchange took place.

The White House was warned. President Donald Trump was reportedly briefed late last year and a classified memorandum on Alice Huang circulated among senior officials before his May visit to China. Apparently, no action was taken. Instead, Nvidia CEO Huang joined the presidential delegation to Beijing and, in September, attended the White House state dinner for Chinese President Xi Jinping.

Jensen Huang’s own conduct compounded the failure. An executive with his access to the president and to sensitive policy discussions carries a responsibility that goes beyond his obligations to shareholders. A relationship with a foreign national linked to a customer under federal investigation was, at best, reckless.

Washington depends on companies such as Nvidia to sustain its technological lead over China, expand domestic computing capacity, and support an increasingly AI-dependent defense posture. Yet these companies remain commercial enterprises that are accountable to shareholders and driven by incentives that might not always align with national security objectives. 

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Although enforcing existing export controls would have gone a long way to prevent this crisis, the case reveals a genuine gap. US export controls focus on where advanced chips are shipped, yet access to computing power no longer requires owning the hardware. 

Renting “offshore” computing is often legal. A Chinese company banned from purchasing certain advanced US processors may be able to buy computing capacity from servers in another jurisdiction. Megaspeed reportedly providedcomputing services to Chinese technology customers, including the Chinese e-commerce leader Alibaba. This gap risks widening as AI infrastructure expands across Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and other regions.

The US needs to enforce existing rules and close the gaps.

First, that means applying export controls consistently. When the evidence warrants, enforcement must be separated from corporate lobbying — and acted on.

Second, add access to advanced computing power to export controls, not just the chips themselves. That means know-your-customer requirements for cloud providers and close monitoring of overseas cloud infrastructure.

Third, invest in systematic mapping of corporate ownership and financial networks. Screening named entities is insufficient when relationships extend across holding companies, investment vehicles, and multiple jurisdictions. Chipmakers should be expected to know who ultimately owns their customers.

Fourth, establish clear security expectations and channels for intelligence-sharing with executives at the commanding heights of American technology.

Congress is preparing to act. Top Republican and Democratic lawmakers hope to include three proposed measures toughening rules on exporting AI chips. Three House committee chairs have demanded a closed-door briefing from Huang. 

His resignation should not end the inquiry. Congress should examine not only whether sensitive information was compromised, but how Megaspeed won Nvidia’s trust, why Commerce never acted, and why intelligence warnings to the executive branch failed to translate into meaningful action.

The US has spent years building the tools to control what crosses its borders. But tools are only as strong as the institutions that wield them.

Elly Rostoum is a former US Intelligence Analyst and a Senior Fellow with the Tech Policy Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).

Bandwidth is CEPA’s online journal dedicated to advancing transatlantic cooperation on tech policy. All opinions expressed on Bandwidth are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.

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