The Georgian parliament passed the third reading of the bill on foreign agents on May 14. This caused widespread indignation among the large parts of the population and the country’s Western partners. Brussels and especially Washington have grown more outspoken in their criticism of Tbilisi signaling a potentially major shift in their relations with Georgia if the law is finally adopted as it stands.
The question now is what price the government might pay for its legislative stampede.
The ruling party, Georgian Dream, signaled that it might modify some elements of the law, but its complete withdrawal (as happened with the previous attempt to pass it last year) seems unlikely. This is despite weeks of huge street protests by large sections of the population and involving many hitherto apathetic young people.
The party still enjoys support from parts of the population and clearly remains confident that the protests will not translate into a unified political opposition in October’s elections.
President Salome Zurabishvili announced she would veto the law, but Georgian Dream can overcome this given its parliamentary majority. Zurabishvili could suggest amendments, but she seems determined to demand its withdrawal as the only solution to the crisis.
The ruling parties see an array of benefits from the legislation. It aims to help solidify its rule before the elections by targeting NGOs often seen by Georgian Dream and its supporters as allied with the political opposition, primarily its foremost challenger, the United National Movement (UNM) of the now-imprisoned former President Mikheil Saakashvili.
NGOs represent a powerful check on the government’s work, causing discomfort within the party. Investigations into allegedly unfair tenders, corruption, and nepotism have been a continuous nuisance. NGOs are also accused of allegedly plotting internal unrest and Georgian Dream’s billionaire founder, Bidzina Ivanishvili.
Given that most NGO funding in Georgia comes from the West, Georgian Dream has targeted the US and the EU, accusing them of interfering in domestic affairs by financing projects that undermine the ruling party, the Georgian Church, and the Orthodox religion. Ivanishvili last month attributed this supposed attack on Georgia as organized by “the global party of war.”
Georgian society is deeply divided on the law’s potential impact. Opponents fear it is only the beginning and will serve as a roadmap to which other measures targeting individuals opposing the ruling party will be added. That is why comparisons between the Georgian law and the Russian law, which has effectively killed the NGO sector in Russia since 2012, came into being.
Ruling party supporters argue that the law will bring transparency to the NGO sector and limit Western pressure. They frame the bill as a way to protect Georgians’ religious sentiments and national identity against supposed LGBT+ propaganda and liberal values more generally.
Yet, the party’s decision and its absolute determination to pass the legislation also comes with costs. Its standing with the public seems to have significantly declined. Social media, opposition TV networks, and most of all the scope of public demonstrations over the previous month all demonstrate this.
There have been large anti-bill protests with crowds of up to 100,000 people, and even 120,000 demonstrators on one occasion. This is remarkable in a small country where roughly 45% of voters usually do not participate in regular elections and the political opposition enjoys minimal trust.
In contrast to the 2023 protests that compelled the government to rescind the earlier NGO bill, the current wave of protests is broader in scope. Simultaneous demonstrations have taken place throughout Georgia’s main cities, drawing participants from surrounding areas to the state capital for large-scale gatherings. The risk must be that this is developing into a national movement.
The enthusiastic involvement of young people is a new development that may hurt Georgian Dream’s prospects in the upcoming vote. Long-standing political apathy is rapidly waning, and participation is likely to be high in October. Given the size of the demonstrations, it’s hard to see how this can benefit Georgian Dream.
Furthermore, the population’s rising disillusionment and the West’s growing dissatisfaction with the party’s 12-year rule may hinder its ability to garner enough votes to form a legislative majority. A coalition government now seems a more realistic outcome.
Georgia will face significant geopolitical repercussions if the law comes into force. It’s hard to see much progress toward the EU when the statute remains on the books. After officially obtaining EU candidate status in December 2023, membership talks were scheduled to commence in late 2024. Georgia could now be excluded from the process — a decision some EU politicians have already openly threatened. The US Congress is meanwhile considering sanctions.
But the West does not have a sufficiently strong regional presence to prevent what is happening in Georgia. The clear focus on Ukraine since 2022 has left it with few options. October’s elections will be a litmus test for Georgian democracy.
Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of silk roads.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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