This article stems from the first of three 1.5 track dialogues convening policymakers and experts from the United States, Europe, and Japan. The initiative aims to deepen understanding of the evolving security challenges facing Europe and East Asia, the connections between them, and the importance of US leadership in both regions.
The global security architecture of the last 80 years is under acute strain. From Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine to China’s aggression around the Taiwan Strait, the geopolitical order established after World War II faces parallel tests across Europe and the Indo-Pacific. The linkage between these two theaters — in military, technological, and economic spheres — now shapes the future of global security.
The US, Europe, and Japan confront an authoritarian resurgence, spearheaded by China, as well as a new era of power politics that demands new strategies for domains central to the security agenda: Supply chains, dual-use technologies, and weaponized trade are top-order security considerations for allies. China’s rise and its abuse of the rules of the road are altering the global center of gravity in profound ways. An effective response to the China challenge from the US, Europe, and Japan trilateral requires a new mindset.
In a world of rapidly evolving security challenges, traditional measures of power like military strength and territorial defense are no longer sufficient. The US, Europe, and Japan must adapt their security strategies to take account of a world where technology, energy, trade, and competition play a larger role in shaping the geopolitical environment. The future of transatlantic and Indo-Pacific security will hinge on allies’ ability to protect and project strength along these nontraditional vectors.
A New Security Landscape
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 marked a crucial inflection point. Regional crises — in Ukraine, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific — have transformed into clashes of global entanglement. Each has become a test of allies’ resolve, and each presents new risks that autocracies will aim to exploit.
There should be no mistaking that the outcome of Russia’s war in Ukraine will shape Beijing’s calculus toward Taiwan and its broader Indo-Pacific ambitions. The cross-pollination of authoritarian tactics — Russia’s military dependence on North Korean weapons, Iranian drone technology, and Chinese economic lifelines — illustrates a new kind of authoritarian connectivity. The days of isolated conflicts are in the rear-view mirror.
For Europe, the war in Ukraine has forced a reckoning with long-standing assumptions about security, economic dependence, and the sustainability of US support. Europe’s response is taking shape along two principal axes.
- The first is defensive: Bolstering deterrence, rearming, and securing supply chains.
- The second is industrial: Reviving the continent’s capacity to sustain those defenses without relying exclusively on US or external systems.
Japan faces similar dilemmas. Beijing is fusing its economic and military power to expand its global influence and reshape the international order on its own terms, and Tokyo recognizes that today’s Ukraine may be tomorrow’s East Asia. Its partnership with NATO and Europe, once peripheral, now reflects an understanding that security in Europe and Asia is inseparable.
Japan’s approach to addressing China’s rise follows three key approaches:
- Economic Pragmatism: Acknowledging China’s indispensable role in trade while safeguarding Japan’s industrial base from overdependence.
- Economic Security: Tightening export controls and boosting domestic autonomy through new investment frameworks.
- Defense Readiness: Modernizing defenses across its southwestern islands, building long-range precision strike capabilities, and strengthening deterrence through action with allies.
Supply Chain Vulnerabilities
Developments of the last three years have given rise to a number of daunting challenges in supply chains. This is evident across many sectors, but perhaps the most notable is that of the aeronautics industry, whose civilian and military dual-use nature renders it central to national power. Aeronautics companies, particularly those in Europe, have experienced a wake-up call over the last couple of years as they face both an alarming rise in Chinese competition and critical supply chain threats.
On the one hand, these companies’ dependence on Russian titanium (once encouraged by allies after the Cold War to anchor post-Soviet Russia to the West) has exposed deep supply chain vulnerabilities as a result of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Meanwhile, competitive Chinese aeronautics companies are only a few years away from infiltrating and disrupting the wider commercial market. For an industry that was already suffering from the fallout of Covid-19, the situation is dire. Trade disputes have only aggravated the situation, as the aeronautics industry has been thrust to the center of the Chinese rare-earth crisis.
Resilience, therefore, is essential, and the clock is ticking. Europe’s technological and industrial security now hinges on a three-pillar strategy: stockpiling, dual sourcing, and innovation. Yet each carries opportunity costs — money spent on resilience is money diverted from decarbonization and long-term competitiveness.
The task, therefore, is not merely to protect European industry but also to promote innovation and partner across borders. European investment in this economic triad will be essential in securing key industries like aeronautics and automobiles in this new security environment.
The Accelerating AI Challenge
Artificial intelligence has emerged as the defining arena of strategic competition. China’s vast state-led investment in its AI industry, from inputs like rare earths and critical minerals to both hardware (e.g., chip manufacturing) and software (e.g., open-source AI models), is aimed at building a Chinese AI tech stack that can meet domestic demand and be a global competitor with US and allied AI firms.
For the US, Europe, and Japan, the challenge is not capability but coordination. The allies possess the scientific depth and industrial base to lead, yet diverging risk and regulatory philosophies hinder unity. The US favors rapid innovation and venture-capital dynamism; Europe emphasizes values-based regulation and ethical guardrails; Japan seeks balance between innovation and accountability. This fragmentation allows Beijing to exploit gaps in allied attempts to slow China’s AI innovation with export controls and investment screening, and scale its domestic high-tech industrial base while democracies debate process.
Allies also risk losing the adoption race — that means the ability to deploy reliable, mission-ready systems at scale. As one expert put it: “Governments don’t need Lamborghinis; they need Toyotas.” Success will hinge less on developing frontier models or being the first to reach artificial general intelligence than on adaptable, open-source applications that strengthen resilience and diffuse AI-enabled innovations across logistics, cyber defense, and public services.
Deterrence Through Full-Spectrum Strength
Lasting security in this new era of competition will be determined by allies’ commitment to strengthening deterrence together — not just through military strength, but also with sustained coordination across cutting-edge industries that are drivers of today’s great power competition. In tandem, the US, Europe, and Japan bring an unmatched capacity for innovation and crucial resources to meet the challenge. Beijing, along with Moscow, aims to recast the free world order.
But the authoritarians’ model rests on soft sand; it is built on fear, coercion, and dependence. It falls on free societies to expose this reality and work together to check China’s growing ambition for a world that serves narrow regime interests, rather than broader security and prosperity.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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