“All of them are pretty doggone essential with what we have to do as a nation,” said Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Stephen Twitty, a distinguished fellow at CEPA and former Deputy Commander of US European Command, when asked about the most critical US bases in Europe. “Our military bases in Europe provide a strategic depth,” he added — in terms of influence, deterrence, logistics, and because the US doesn’t fight wars on its homeland, but away from it.
“Pulling away from that now is saying, we’re going to walk away from peace and stability in Europe and our transatlantic partnership,” Twitty later argued. “We’re going to walk away from everything we stand for in terms of what we put in place in the Marshall Plan.”
In a Q&A with the Center for European Policy Analysis, Twitty outlines the strategic case for U.S. military bases in Europe.
CEPA: Which US bases in Europe are most critical for military operations on and beyond the continent, and which one do you consider the most essential?
Twitty: First of all, having looked at our bases and our posture in Europe, all of them are pretty doggone essential with what we have to do as a nation. What folks need to understand is our military bases in Europe provide the US strategic depth.
Number one, it means that we’re stationed away from the United States in order to provide the influence necessary to deter our adversaries. Whether you look at bases such as in Vicenza, Italy, which houses our 173rd Airborne Division, or in Vilseck, which houses our cavalry regiment, or Ramstein Air Base, which brings in strategic airlift and support. They’re critical.
Second, our bases deter our adversaries. So, if the US is in Europe, it is deterring our adversaries such as Russia, China, Iran, and others.
Third, these bases provide reassurance to our allies and partners over in Europe. There is no doubt that by being forward stationed in Europe, we provide the assurance and build trust. Our allies and partners participate in our joint and coalition exercises. By having that forward engagement where they see us every day, the best military in the world, it encourages them and builds partnership capacity.
The next thing is that by being stationed in Europe, it provides the gateway into other areas where we may need to operate. Case in point: When we invaded Iraq, we used many of our European bases as a stepping off point to conduct that invasion and to support logistics and maintenance into the Middle East theater. It was easier to use our Europe bases instead of our US bases to do that type of work. Another case in point: Landstuhl hospital. When our soldiers go into combat, the fastest way to get them to a level of care necessary is to fly them to Landstuhl, not the US.
The final thing is that our European bases provide us the geopolitical wasta [influence], if you will. We are a superpower, and folks see us as such when we’re forward deployed in bases around the world. It sends a message that the world’s superpower is here, prominently forward stationed to deal with world events.
Remember, we want to fight our wars not here on the homeland, but away. We want to play an away game. Our European bases allow us to do that.
CEPA: How would losing air and naval hubs like Ramstein, Sigonella, and Souda Bay impact US Force projection globally?
Twitty: Pretty significantly. The Sixth Fleet, for example, in Spain or down in Naples, or Ramstein Air Force Base, these are critical ports and airports where we have long-term basing relationships that are available for US contingencies because of agreements with the host community. You give up those things, and then when you want to deploy, you may not have access. These are critical facilities that allow us to deploy at a moment’s notice, we don’t have to wait for permission.
CEPA: What strategic advantages do US bases in Europe offer that differ from those in the Indo-Pacific or Middle East?
Twitty: The first thing is distance. Distance means everything when you’re conducting contingency operations. If you shut the European bases down and you say, okay, we’ll focus on the Pacific bases, then I think you’ll find that you’re going to have a distance problem being able to get to the critical locations in the Pacific due to non-basing rights. Europe gives you more depth and more flexibility.
CEPA: How would Russia and China interpret US Base closure and troop withdrawal from Europe?
Twitty: Number one, it definitely would signal a retraction from Europe. If you think about this, after World War II, the United States put in place the Marshall Plan and really committed to democracy, peace, and stability in Europe. Pulling away from that now is saying, “we’re going to walk away from peace and stability in Europe.” We’re going to walk away from everything that we stand for and turn it over to the Europeans and say, have at it. Over 600,000 Americans were killed as a result of World War II. They made a terrible sacrifice. We can never forget that. And we have got to stay strong in Europe, in my mind, as a result of it.
Now, that doesn’t mean that we need to lead everything in Europe. It just means that we need to be there for our European partners, and we need to recognize how critical the transatlantic alliance is. In many wars we embark upon, we’re not going to be able to go it alone. Our European partners will be the folks who we’ll be counting on to help us, just as they helped us after 9/11. They did not have to do that, but NATO voted on Article 5, and they jumped in behind us in both Afghanistan and Iraq. We can never forget that. We should continue to help them and continue to be a part of this great alliance.
CEPA: What do you think is often misunderstood about how European bases serve US Interests beyond NATO and the continent?
Twitty: We don’t talk about our European bases. Ever since the Berlin Wall came down until three years ago, we had pretty much a peaceful and stable Europe. We drew down from 200,000 soldiers to between 60,000 to 100,000 soldiers in Europe today. We did that because we viewed things through the lens of peace and stability in Europe. With the Russian invasion of Ukraine, it’s hard for folks to get their arms around something that’s been quiet, something that’s been stable. Now, there’s a significant disruption and there’s a threat to stability in Europe from Russia.
Many people did not believe Russia was a threat until three years ago. We still have some naysayers who think that this war is just a regional war, and it really does not impact Europe. So why do we need all that military capability there? Because in the big scheme of things, when folks look at it, Ukraine’s not part of NATO. Why do we care? Why should we get involved? On and on and on. And so, I think you have those things that are playing against our bases, against our military capability in Europe, and how important both are.
Interview conducted by Mila Tanghe of CEPA’s editorial staff.
Mila Tanghe attended Columbia University and is currently an Intern with the Editorial team at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
War Without End
Russia’s Shadow Warfare
CEPA Forum 2025
Explore CEPA’s flagship event.
